The problems and the controls of the new administrative state of the EU by Barroso, Luis
  
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Problems and the Controls of the New Administrative State of the EU 
 
 
Luis Barroso 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Law of the London School of Economics 
and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
December 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have 
clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried 
out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided 
that full acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior 
written consent of the author. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any 
third party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades the shape of the European public administration has changed 
considerably; the EU has become much more strongly involved in the regulation of very dynamic and 
fluid market activities. One of the consequences of that has been an increasing reliance on EU 
regulatory agencies to perform the novel administrative tasks. While agencies can be beneficial for 
the EU, they also generate new problems. In particular, these bodies have limited resources and have 
to rely on (national and sector) external capacities to a significant extent. There is a risk here that if 
the important issues are mainly capacity-related and „liquid‟, it will be very difficult to ensure „checks 
and balances‟ in these institutional systems. The thesis examines this through case-studies (EU 
regulatory agencies) in medicines, chemicals, financial services and aviation. It finds that the 
problems in each EU agency are different and unpredictable. In such a context, having more external 
and static controls on the agencies will hardly improve things. An alternative „framework‟ (that of fluid 
administrative law) should be considered to deal with the challenges of the new administrative state. It 
promotes constant administrative law principles (internal process, external justification, commitment to 
pluralism and policy effectiveness) to coordinate the operation of the agencies, and offers institutional 
tools for the dynamic application of such principles. As the „solutions‟ for each agency should have to 
vary, the review of these bodies (which usually occurs every three years) could be used to address 
the required heterogeneity of the controls. In order to make the best use of that exercise, the creation 
of a new European agency to review the regulatory agencies and make proposals for each of them 
(according to the fluid law principles) might be envisioned.    
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Chapter I 
 
The emergence of the new administrative state of the EU and its challenges 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last fifteen to twenty years the shape of the European public administration has changed 
considerably. At least since the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, forms of EU social 
and economic intervention have become more connected with the regulation of complex and 
sophisticated products and market activities. The European Union has also expanded its reach over 
fluid and dynamic sectors of the economy, from financial services, energy, transport or 
telecommunications. The intensity with which the EU now interacts with and regulates these markets 
emphasises that formal law-making is but one of the ways through which the Union exercises its 
authority and that new forms of public intervention (involving different actors and including other types 
of instruments and tools) are becoming more important. The European Union, today, is strongly 
involved with things such as the assessment and management of „risks‟, the approval of (new) 
products, the daily operation of highly networked sectors or the supervision of financial institutions. 
The added importance of these tasks stresses the role of the EU „regulatory expert‟ and the values of 
specialised knowledge and expertise which he offers. 
 
One of the effects of these new „Euro-markets‟ has been the growing dependence of the Union on 
regulatory agencies to perform the more dynamic administrative tasks. The proliferation of regulatory 
agencies in Europe has been rapid since the mid-1990s and new agencies continue to be introduced 
across a variety of sectors. These agencies have been created because the complexity of the 
involved market activities makes it too difficult for the problems to be handled by the Commission, or 
by national regulatory authorities on their own. European regulatory agencies are not really, however, 
an EU „equivalent‟ of their national partners. They include many more actors (the 27 national 
competent authorities, to start with), tend to focus on particular segments of the regulated markets 
and have been established to address a series of challenges that are relevant for the EU. While the 
powers of these agencies vary considerably across sectors, (overall) these bodies take on certain 
executive responsibilities in their own field of action, provide expert opinions to the Commission and 
others have decision-making powers in clearly defined cases or operational and inspection related 
types of work. 
 
The link between a new EU institutional structure (the regulatory agency) and the very dynamic and 
fluid nature of the new European markets may also create new problems. It puts pressure on the 
institutional capacity to perform the relevant tasks. EU agencies have, however, (as we shall see 
below) limited secretariats and internal capabilities. That raises the issue of „who‟ they rely on for 
resources and the risks which that creates. Moreover, the dynamism of these markets would imply 
that the administrative processes themselves have to become more fluid and adaptable to the own 
 11 
characteristics and „motion‟ of the sectors. It is not clear that we can deal with these issues through 
more static and external controls on the agencies. These may become more marginal, distant and 
irrelevant in the context of an administrative power where the problems are of a much more dynamic 
nature.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section explores the role of the Commission in the 
implementation of EU law. It looks at the constraints on this institution with regard to delegation of 
powers to agencies and examines the structure and evolution of EU comitology processes. Secondly, 
the chapter considers the emergence of regulatory agencies in the EU. The reasons for having 
agencies in Europe are then discussed. In the subsequent section, the dynamics of this new 
administrative state are explored. The final section looks at the mechanics of formal accountability 
and reflects on the limits of static checks on the agencies. 
 
1- The implementation of EU law and the Commission 
 
Before the European Union decided to create regulatory agencies in many different fields, the 
executive power of the Union was concentrated on the Commission. That is not to say that the 
Commission has traditionally had wide-ranging powers of „direct administration‟ as the Treaties 
maintain that the primary responsibility for implementing European Law remains at the national level.
1
 
Piris explains that this administrative system recognises “the national administrations (tax, customs, 
veterinary authorities, etc.)” to be the ones with “the necessary infrastructure and resources in terms 
of manpower and financial and technical means to apply and implement EU law”.
2
 In cases, however, 
where “centralisation has been judged necessary”, the Commission was handed direct responsibility 
to implement EU policies.
3
 Two important examples of this are the powers of the Commission in 
competition law (now regulated in Articles 105 and 106 TFEU) and its responsibility for the 
implementation of the EU budget (Article 317 TFEU).  
 
The Commission also has (as we shall see further below) a series of other powers: legislative and 
quasi-legislative, agenda-setting and supervisory powers.
4
 There is an issue about the “concentration 
of so many functions in the Commission” putting much pressure on its resources.
5
 We shall now see 
that the initial reaction of the Courts in such a context (which dates back to the time of the High 
Authority and the Coal and Steel Community) was to strongly constrain the conditions under which 
delegation of powers to other bodies (namely regulatory agencies, whose existence was not 
„predicted‟ by the Treaties) would be allowed to take place. 
                                                          
1
 J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, p. 25-27. See also: K. Lenaerts and A. 
Verhoeven, Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance, in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), 
Good Governance in Europe‟s Integrated Market, Oxford University Press, 2002 
2
 J. C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 98 
3
 Ibidem, p. 97-98 
4
 D. Chalmers et al, European Union Law, 2
nd
 Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 59-64   
5
 Ibidem, p. 66 
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Meroni and the EU regulatory agencies 
 
Since the early days of European integration there has been a question about whether the 
Commission (and, before that, the High Authority of the ECSC) could delegate powers to other 
(regulatory) bodies. Once the Court came to examine this issue, in the famous Meroni vs. High 
Authority case, it decided to impose strict conditions for such delegation to take place.
6
  
 
Meroni concerned an “equalisation system” set up to “prevent the prices of ferrous scrap within the 
Community from being aligned on the higher prices of imported ferrous scrap”.
7
 This system was 
entrusted to two private law organisations (known as the „Brussels agencies‟). Between October of 
1954 and August of 1956, an office representing the agencies periodically sent to the Meroni 
company a provisional account which showed that it owed the Fund a certain sum.
8
 The central issue 
in this case was the legality of the delegation of powers to the agencies. The Court assessed whether 
the decision establishing the financial arrangements for ensuring the regular supply of ferrous scrap in 
the European market constituted a “true delegation” or whether it only granted those agencies “the 
power to draw up resolutions the application of which belongs to the High Authority, the latter 
retaining full responsibility for the same”.
9
 As the High Authority explained that it adopted the “data 
furnished by the Brussels agencies without being able to add anything thereto”, the Court did not find 
it too hard to conclude that there had been an effective delegation of competences.
10
 Furthermore, 
the Court was concerned that the powers conferred on the agencies had not been subject to the 
conditions which would have been used if the High Authority had exercised these tasks directly.
11
 The 
Treaty imposed on the High Authority a number of duties (e.g. to state reasons, to publish an annual 
report and relevant data) that were not transposed to the agencies. According to the applicant, the 
Brussels accounts were “unassailable and almost sacrosanct and are certainly of greater weight and 
authority than are decisions proper, which can always be contested before the Court of Justice.”
12
 The 
reply of the Court supported this, but its more general conclusion was beyond procedural: 
 
“The consequences of delegation are very different depending on whether it involves clearly defined 
executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of objective 
criteria determined by the delegating authority, or whether it involves a discretionary power, implying wide 
margin of discretion which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of 
actual economic policy. 
                                                          
6
 Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR English special edition Page 00157 
7
 Ibidem, p. 159 
8
 Ibidem,  p. 160 
9
 Ibidem, p. 169 
10
 Ibidem, p. 170 
11
 Ibidem, p. 171 
12
 Ibidem, p. 168  
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A delegation of the first kind cannot appreciably alter the consequences involved in the exercise of the 
powers concerned, whereas a delegation of the second kind, since it replaces the choices of the delegator 
by the choices of the delegate, brings about an actual transfer of responsibility”.
13
  
 
This was considered to be the case in the institutional environment under which Meroni was operating 
because the agencies were handed a “wide margin of discretion” that involved reconciling a set of 
difficult and complex economic policy considerations.
14
 For the Court, this was inconsistent with 
Article 3 of the Treaty, where it was said that the objectives of the Community were binding on its 
institutions “within the limits of their respective powers, in the common interest.”
15
 This provision 
established a system of “balance of powers”, the distinctiveness of which constitutes a fundamental 
“guarantee granted by the Treaty in particular to the undertakings and associations of undertakings to 
which it applies”.
16
 
 
Meroni has been the subject of much criticism and controversy.
17
 There are also legitimate questions 
about whether some of the agencies which the EU has created in more recent times (see below) 
would be considered by the Court to be compatible with the Treaties if (or when) it looks into the 
matter.
18
 In any case, it is worth distinguishing between two parts of the Meroni ruling. The first, which 
is often overlooked, is that the Union (then Community...) cannot use a delegation of powers to place 
the regulated parties in a position which is worse than the one in which they would find themselves if 
this transfer of tasks had not occurred in the first place. That would suggest that as long as the Union 
is able to subject the exercise of delegated powers to conditions similar to those which apply to the 
Commission (e.g. duty to give reasons, other procedural guarantees) no legal problems would arise. 
The second point in Meroni is that the system of “balance of powers” enshrined in the Treaties 
represents an important guarantee to those affected by European public power. While the first point 
could suggest the existence of a problem linked to the particular circumstances of Meroni (lack of 
legal safeguards and controls in the agencies); the balance of powers argument indicates that there 
are wider issues of accountability (and about the reshaping of the institutional settlement) which have 
to be taken into account. What Meroni ends up doing (and here lies perhaps its major weakness) is to 
                                                          
13
 Ibidem, p. 173 
14
 Ibidem, p. 174 
15
 Ibidem, p. 173 
16
 Ibidem 
17
 See: G. Majone, The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No 2, 2000, 
pp. 273-302. For another article which pays attention to the Meroni ruling, see: M. Everson, Independent Agencies: Hierarchy 
Beaters?, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1995, pp. 180-204 
18
 The Court continues to cite Meroni in its case-law. Cases where the Court has referred to Meroni include: Case C-255/04 
Commission v France, ECR 2006 Page I-05251; Case C-240/03 P. Comunità montana della Valnerina v Commission, ECR 
2006 Page I-00731; Case C-301/02 P. Carmine Salvatore Tralli v European Central Bank, ECR 2005 Page I-4071. There have 
also been cases where the Court appears to hold on to the basic rationale of Meroni without nevertheless referring to it 
explicitly. This happened in Romano: Case 98/80 Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité, ECR 
1981 Page 01241. For an analysis of Romano, see: M. Chamon, EU Agencies between Meroni and Romano or the devil and 
the deep blue sea, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2011, pp. 1055-1075 
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emphasise the ex ante division of tasks between the Commission and the agencies, when attention 
might instead be focused on the controls on the latter. 
 
The structure and evolution of EU comitology  
 
The readiness of the Court to put a brake to delegations of power from the Commission to EU 
regulatory agencies contrasts with its readiness to accept (since the early days of the European 
project) substantial transfers of law-making responsibilities from the Council to the Commission. As 
Bergström explains, an “early expression of [that transfer] can be found in a ruling from 1970 [Köster] 
where the Court manifested its support for the idea that the Council should delegate „a general 
implementing power‟ to the Commission.”
19
 Köster concerned the legality of a „management 
committee‟ set up by the Council to control the exercise of certain implementing powers handed to the 
Commission in the field of agricultural policy.
20
 For the Court, the Treaty established a distinction 
between “the measures directly based on the Treaty itself and the derived law intended to ensure 
their implementation” and it could not be expected that “all the details of the regulations concerning 
common agricultural policy be drawn up by the Council” according to the traditional law-making 
processes of the Community.
21
 The Council only has to adopt the “basic elements” of the matter at 
hand and the remaining issues may then be dealt with by the Commission, following a Council 
“authorisation”.
22
 Moreover, the Council was allowed to determine the conditions under which the 
implementing powers of the Commission would be exercised: the so-called management committee 
procedure [which integrated representatives of the national administrations] forms part of the detailed 
rules to which the Council may legitimately subject a delegation of power to the Commission”.
23
 The 
management committee was created to “give opinions on draft measures proposed by the 
Commission”, and the constraint on the Commission was only that in case the opinion of the 
committee was negative, the measures taken would have to be communicated to the Council.
24
 The 
Court concluded that “without distorting community structure and the institutional balance” the 
management committee system allowed the Council “to delegate to the Commission an implementing 
power of appreciable scope, subject to its power to take the decision itself if necessary.”
25
 
 
                                                          
19
 C. F. Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 2 
20
 Case 25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster et Berodt & Co., ECR 1970 Page 01161. This 
case is often cited in the Court‟s judgements. See, for example: Case 230/78 SpA Eridania-Zuccherifici nazionali and others v 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, ECR1979 Page 02749; Joined cases T-64/01 and T-65/01 Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie 
GmbH and others v Council, ECR 2004 Page II-00521 
21
 Ibidem [Köster], Paragraph  6 
22
 Ibidem 
23
 Ibidem, Paragraph 9 
24
 Ibidem 
25
 Ibidem 
 15 
The easiness of the Court in Köster regarding the delegation of law-making responsibilities from the 
Council to the Commission sits rather uneasily with the problems which the Court had in Meroni about 
allowing some highly specialised tasks to be performed by new EU technical bodies working under 
the supervision of the Commission. To be sure, “highly significant matters have been delegated” to 
the Commission through the committee system and there are important questions about the 
“democratic accountability” of the whole process and the “modest controls” which it places on the 
Commission.
26
 Before the Lisbon Treaty changes on comitology (which are considered below), the 
way in which the national checks on the Commission‟s exercise of implementing powers worked 
according to a set of different procedures which were set out in Decision 1999/468/EC.
27
 Comitology 
has included four main procedures: the advisory procedure, the management procedure, the 
regulatory procedure and the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.
28
 In the advisory procedure, the 
committee “delivers a purely consultative opinion” of the draft Commission measures, and the 
Commission then has to „take the utmost account” of the opinion‟.
29
 In all the other procedures, the 
committee “has a fire-warning role”: it has “to decide whether or not the Commission draft should be 
referred to the Council.”
30
 Under the management procedure, if the committee does not agree with the 
draft Commission measures it can refer them to the Council by QMV.
31
 A major concern with this 
particular procedure has been that even if the majority of the national representatives disagreed with 
the Commission, it was still possible for the latter to adopt the measures.
32
 A similar situation was not 
possible under the regulatory procedure, where the committee has to “positively agree to the 
Commission draft by QMV” and if that failed to happen, the matter would then get referred to the 
Council (which has three months to adopt its decision).
33
 Chalmers explains that the “regulatory 
procedure contains its own perversity, which is the difference between the voting thresholds in the 
committee and those in the Council”: a QMV “must actively support” the draft Commission measures 
in order for them not be sent to the Council, whereas the latter needs a QMV majority to actively 
oppose the measure or support an alternative for the Commission draft not to become draft.”
34
 
Accordingly, there is “space for the Commission to adopt measures unchecked.”
35
  
 
Comitology has been the source of much institutional tension due to the role of the Parliament in the 
supervision of the Commission and of the workings of the committee system more generally. In the 
context of the regulatory procedure, the Parliament only had to be informed if the committee failed to 
support the draft Commission measures and could then submit an opinion to the Council where it 
                                                          
26
 Supra 4, [Chalmers et al, 2010], p. 60 
27
 Council Decision 1999/468/EC, OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23–26 
28
 Supra 4, [Chalmers 2010], p. 117-122 
29
 Supra 2, [Piris, Lisbon Treaty], p. 101 
30
 Supra 4, [Chalmers et al, 2010], p. 118 
31
 Ibidem 
32
 Ibidem, p. 118 and 119 
33
 Ibidem, p. 119 
34
 Ibidem 
35
 Ibidem 
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considered that those measures exceeded the implementing powers granted to the Commission by 
the basic legislative act.
36
 The Parliament became “increasingly uneasy during the 1990s about 
delegating powers to the Commission that it thought would be better exercised by the ordinary 
legislative procedure (then co-decision procedure).
37
 It was then agreed “that regulatory measures 
based on a parent instrument adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure would be notified to 
the Parliament and it could object though a Resolution if it considered they exceeded the 
implementing power granted by the parent instrument”; and (under Article 8 of Decision 1999/688/EC) 
the Commission vowed to take into account the opinion of the Parliament and reconsider the relevant 
measures.
38
 This system did not work well. The Commission did not have to give up the measures but 
only provide reasons to the Parliament on its decision; and it later admitted that it continued to often 
disregard parliamentary prerogatives in comitology.
39
 These difficulties led to the creation of the 
„regulatory procedure with scrutiny‟ (PRAC), which applies only to measures considered to „amend‟ 
the basic law-making instrument in cases where the latter was approved via the ordinary legislative 
procedure.
40
 Under this procedure, if the committee delivers a positive opinion, “the Commission has 
to submit the draft measures for scrutiny by the European Parliament and the Council” and either of 
the institutions may (within three months) decide to oppose the draft measures in case they “„exceed 
the implementing powers provided for in the basic instrument‟ or if the draft is incompatible „with the 
aim of or the content of the basic instrument or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or 
proportionality‟.”
41
 In that case, the Commission may “submit to the Committee an amended draft of 
the measures” or present a new legislative proposal.
42
 Otherwise, the measures may be adopted. If, 
on the other hand, the committee disagrees with the draft, “the same possibilities exist except that this 
time the Council can decide to oppose the measure for any reason and this pre-empts any 
consideration by the Parliament, which only looks at the draft if the Council is inclined to accept it.”
43
 
In case the “Council envisages adopting the measures, the European Parliament is to be seized with 
a maximum of two months for scrutiny of the draft measures” and may oppose them for similar 
reasons.
44
 We shall see later on in the chapter that it is the Council which has benefited from this 
procedure, not really the Parliament.
45
 These lessons may be useful when considering the increasing 
calls for (more) parliamentary controls on EU regulatory agencies (see below).   
 
The control of delegated powers of the Commission has been changed with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The new regime makes a distinction between delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) and 
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implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU). With respect to the delegated acts, the control of the 
Commission falls exclusively on the Council and the Parliament.
46
 On the other hand, with regard to 
implementing acts, the controls on the Commission are performed by the Member States. The new 
procedures for Member State control of the Commission‟s implementing powers are now established 
in an EU Regulation.
47
 The regime suggests that delegated acts constitute the standard way of 
handing power to the Commission in the definition of the technical rules, whereas the implementing 
acts essentially involve „filling in‟ the gaps.  
 
Article 290 (TFEU) 
1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of 
general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. 
[...] 
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is subject; 
these conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the 
European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
 
Article 291 (TFEU) 
(2) Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts 
shall confer implementing powers on the Commission... 
(3) ...the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise 
of implementing powers. 
 
The distinction between delegated and implementing acts is a fluid one. Institutionally, it may be read 
in the context of the power which, over the years, the Parliament has acquired in comitology and 
(particularly) taking into account the creation, in 2006, of the PRAC (regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny).
48
 As Piris explains, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the PRAC “is no longer 
needed as Article 290 TFEU provides for the procedure to be followed in such cases.”
49
 The Lisbon 
Treaty consolidates the controls of the Parliament and of the Council vis-à-vis the Commission with 
respect to a particular type of [delegated] act (i.e. acts of general application which seek to amend or 
supplement certain non-essential elements of the basic legislative instrument) but then eliminates 
those institutional checks in areas which are considered to be of an „implementing‟ nature.
50
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With respect to the „delegated powers‟ regime, the Parliament and the Council have at their disposal 
two main instruments to control the Commission at this level: the right of opposition and revocation.
51
 
To exercise any of the prerogatives, the Parliament should “act by a majority of its component 
members, and the Council by a qualified majority.”
52
 While the power to express objections is clearly 
directed at a particular delegated act, the revocation is a “general and absolute withdrawal of the 
delegated powers from the Commission.”
53
 The Commission considers that “opposition should thus 
be seen as the ordinary means of control exercised by the legislator over all delegated acts” and that 
“revocation appears to be a more exceptional measure, prompted for example by the occurrence of 
factors that undermine the very basis of the delegation of power.”
54
 Revocation may also be used 
where the exercise of the expression of objections “would be ineffective or impractical”, namely 
because the Commission has to adopt the delegated acts “subject to time constraints that are 
incompatible with the exercise of a right of opposition by the legislator.”
55 According to the 
Commission, the exercise of the right of revocation by the institutions should also be accompanied by 
a duty to give reasons (where provided for in the legislative act).
56
 This allows the other institution 
which was not exercising the right of revocation to better understand the motivations behind that 
initiative while clearly informing the Commission on what „went wrong‟.
57
 There is also an issue about 
„partial revocation‟. The Commission considers that the institution initiating the revocation should 
“explicitly state which delegated powers it is seeking to revoke” and it should be possible for the 
Parliament or the Council “to revoke only some of the powers delegated to the Commission.”
58
 Finally, 
it is also considered by the Commission that the revocation of the delegated powers does not 
necessarily affect the delegated acts which are already in force (the exact consequences should 
hence be set out in the basic legislative instrument).
59
 In conclusion, the ability of the EU legislator to 
revocate the delegated act is important and new. Before the Lisbon Treaty, a similar objective could 
only be achieved through a new legislative procedure, which of course required a proposal from the 
Commission.
60
 The Commission will therefore be exercising its (delegated) powers “under the shadow 
of the sword with the possibility that if does something institutionally unpopular it will suffer the 
consequences.”
61
   
 
Differently, the control of the implementing powers of the Commission falls on the Member States 
(Article 291 TFEU). The power to adopt the implementing acts is conferred on the Commission (or on 
the Council, in “duly justified” cases or in CFSP and ESDP matters) “where uniform conditions for 
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implementing binding acts are needed”.
62
 Regulation (EU) 182/2011 distinguishes between two 
different (committee) procedures for the control of the Commission by the Member States: the 
„advisory‟ and the „examination‟ procedure.
63
 The examination procedure applies (in particular) for the 
adoption of: a) implementing acts of general scope; b) other implementing acts relating to (i) 
programmes with substantial implications; (ii) the common agricultural and common fisheries policies, 
(iii) the environment, security and safety, or protection of the health or safety, of humans, animals or 
plants; (iv) the common commercial policy; and (v) taxation.
64
 The advisory procedure, on the other 
hand, applies (as a general rule) for the adoption of acts which are not directly associated to the 
examination procedure (although in „duly justified cases‟ it can also apply to those acts).
65
 Under the 
advisory procedure, the committee delivers its opinion by simple majority and the Commission then 
has to take the “utmost account” of it.
66
  
 
The power of the new (examination) committee lies essentially in that there is no possibility of 
reference to the Council. In case the committee gives a negative opinion (by QMV), the Commission 
cannot adopt the measures.
67
 This rule may be overturned in exceptional cases where the 
implementing act “needs to be adopted without delay in order to avoid creating a significant disruption 
of the markets in the area of agriculture or a risk for the financial interests of the Union [...]”.
68
 If, on 
the other hand, the examination committee does not deliver an opinion the Commission may adopt 
the implementing act (subject to a series of exceptions).
69
 Consequently, even if the committee has 
not rejected the draft implementing act the Commission is prevented from adopting it where: a) that 
act concerns taxation, financial services, the protection of the health or safety of humans, animals or 
plants, or definitive multilateral safeguard measures; b) the basic act provides that the draft 
implementing act may not be adopted where no opinion is delivered; or c) a simple majority of the 
component members of the committee opposes it.
70
 The fact that the Commission is a priori stropped 
from adopting the draft implementing act in certain policy areas, even if the majority of the members 
of the committee members are not against it, is odd and very restrictive.
71
 
                                                          
62
 Supra 2, [Piris, Lisbon Treaty], p. 103 
63
 Supra 47, [Comitology Regulation 2011]  
64
 Ibidem, Article  2 (2)  
65
 Ibidem, Article 2(3) 
66
 Ibidem, Article 4 (1) and (2) 
67
 Ibidem, Article 5(3) 
68
 Ibidem, Article 7. In such cases the Commission has (according to the same article) to “immediately submit the adopted 
implementing act to the appeal committee.” If the appeal committee then issues a negative opinion on the adopted 
implementing act, the Commission has to repeal that act right away (otherwise the act remains in place)   
69
 Ibidem, Article 5(4)  
70
 Ibidem, Article 4 (a) (b) and (c) 
71
 Article 5(5) of the new Comitology Regulation also indicates that a different procedure shall apply “for the adoption of draft 
definitive anti-dumping or countervailing measures, where no opinion is delivered by the committee and a simple majority of its 
component members opposes the draft implementing act.”    
 20 
On the other hand, the Commission can also increase the pressure on the committee to approve the 
draft implementing act. The role of the „appeal committee‟ is particularly important in this regard.
72
 The 
appeal committee represents a sort of „second round‟ deliberation, where the national administrations 
are asked to reconsider either their opposition to (or lack of support for) the Commission measures.
73
 
In either of those scenarios and where “an implementing act is deemed to be necessary”, the chair of 
the examination committee can either submit an amended version of the draft implementing act to the 
same committee within 2 months or submit the draft implementing act within 1 month to the appeal 
committee “for further deliberation”.
74
 The national controls on the Commission are laxer in the appeal 
committee. As long as the latter does not deliver a negative opinion, the Commission may adopt the 
implementing act (this does not apply for the adoption of definitive multilateral safeguard measures, 
where the Commission cannot adopt the draft act without the active support of the appeal 
committee).
75
 In case the draft implementing acts concern “particularly sensitive sectors, notably 
taxation, consumer health, food safety and protection of the environment”, the Commission 
nevertheless has to “avoid going against any predominant position” within the appeal committee 
against the appropriateness of an implementing act.
76
 
 
Finally, while the Council and the Parliament are excluded (under Article 291 TFEU) from the control 
of the implementing powers of the Commission, the Comitology Regulation provides them with a “right 
of scrutiny”.
77
 This essentially means that where the basic act has been approved under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, either the Council or the Parliament may indicate to the Commission that, in 
their view, the draft implementing act goes beyond the implementing powers provided for in the basic 
act.
78
 Where such concerns have been expressed, the Commission has to review the draft implement 
act and take into account those positions, but it remains free to maintain the draft implementing act if 
it so wishes.
79
  
 
2- The emergence of a new administrative model: the „four waves‟ of European agencies 
 
The comitology system has evolved, as noted above, hand in hand with the emergence of new 
administrative structures in Europe. In 1975 the first European agencies were introduced with the 
establishment of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop)
80
 and 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working conditions (EUROFUND).
81
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These two bodies were mainly created for information collection purposes. This is visible in the 
mission of Cedefop, which compiles documentation and analyses of data, develops research and 
offers a debating forum on vocational training issues. The first EU agencies were therefore handed 
very confined powers and the idea behind them was mainly that the Commission could outsource 
particularly time-consuming and specialised tasks, allowing it to focus on its core functions of policy 
initiation and implementation.
82
  
 
The reliance on „regulatory‟ agencies acquired new momentum during the 1990s, in the context of the 
completion of the internal market. Some of these agencies also highlighted the Union‟s increasing 
reach over matters of social relevance such as gender equality, racism or drug addiction issues. In 
total, during that decade eleven agencies were introduced: the European Environmental Agency 
(EEA)
83
; the European Training Foundation (ETF)
84
, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
85
; the European Medicines Agency (EMA)
86
; the Office for Harmonisation 
of the Internal Market (OHIM)
87
; the European Agency for Health and Safety at work (EU-OSHA)
88
; 
the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)
89
; the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)
90
; 
the Translation Centre for Bodies of the European Union (CdT)
91
; the European Monitoring Centre for 
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)
92
; and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)
93
. With two 
exceptions (the EMA, for medicines; and the OHIM, for trademarks), all of these bodies‟ were created 
for the collection and analysis of information. One of the authorities which stands out is the Office for 
the Harmonisation of the Internal Market, which can adopt decisions binding on third parties regarding 
trademarks and designs registrations. The OHIM introduces a new layer of (EU) industrial property 
rights so that companies might rely on them when operating across borders. The European Medicines 
Agency, on the other hand, has been entrusted with risk assessment and advice functions. Its 
scientific opinions on medicinal products are relied on by the Commission, which authorises them. 
The EMA is not responsible for the scientific evaluation of all medicines in Europe. Its central 
responsibility is the assessment of particularly innovative medicines (namely those derived from 
biotechnological processes) through the so called „centralised procedure‟. The EMA hence opened up 
a new layer of product approvals, which was mandatory for the biotech products. The reason for this 
was tied to the problems with the decentralised systems of medicines authorisation in Europe (i.e. 
mutual recognition), which were not working well due to lack of trust between the national authorities.  
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The BSE crisis and the new law of socio-economic regulation  
 
The status of regulatory systems in Europe changed significantly after the Commission, and the Union 
more generally, got mixed up in two major crises during the late 1990s. The outbreak of the bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scandal highlighted a set of serious problems in the handling of the 
„knowledge‟ on this issue by the Commission.
94
 Post-crisis evaluations portrayed this institution as 
being too influenced by “British thinking” as a consequence of the “number of British officials sitting in 
two relevant committees: the Scientific Veterinary Committee and the Standing Veterinary 
Committee”.
95
 The independence and competence of the Commission, (as a regulator) was seriously 
brought into question; while the reliability and transparency of comitology also began to be contested. 
On top of this, the mismanagement cases which ultimately led to the fall of the Santer Commission 
handed another huge blow to the credibility and prestige of the Commission.
96
 This period has 
therefore become badly associated with an un-transparent and problematic entanglement between 
politics and science, by a dominance of ad hoc approaches to the handling of risk and allegations of 
undue influences in areas where citizens‟ trust in the public powers is important.  
 
Following these difficulties, one of the central indications of the Task Force on Administrative Reform 
(1999) was that the Commission should do less administration and delegate more tasks to 
agencies.
97
 This idea was then appropriated by the Commission in its White Paper on Governance 
(2001), which proposed to accelerate the introduction of further European regulatory agencies in 
areas where a single public interest dominates:  
 
The creation of further autonomous EU regulatory agencies in clearly defined areas will improve the 
way rules are applied and enforced across the Union. Such agencies should be granted the power to 
take individual decisions in application of regulatory measures. They should operate with a degree of 
independence and within a clear framework established by the legislature. The regulation creating 
each agency should set out the limits of their activities and powers, their responsibilities and 
requirements for openness.
98
 [Emphasis original] 
 
The Commission then sets out the expected benefits:  
 
The advantage of agencies is often their ability to draw on highly technical, sectoral know-how, the 
increased visibility they give for the sectors concerned (and sometimes the public) and the cost-savings 
that they offer to business. For the Commission, the creation of agencies is also a useful way of 
ensuring it focuses resources on core tasks.
99
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Since 2004 a number of additional agencies have been created: the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA)
100
; the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
101
; the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA)
102
; the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
103
; the European Centre 
for Disease and Prevention and Control (ECDC)
104
; the European Railways Agency (ERA)
105
; the 
Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA)
106
; the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)
107
; the 
European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)
108
; the European Agency for the Management of 
Operation Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX)
109
 or the European 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems Supervisors Authority (GSA).
110
 While their functions may vary 
considerably, the “most wide-ranging power granted to a number of agencies is to provide expert 
opinion, which will either guide other EU institutions in deciding whether to authorise a product or 
activity or inform legislation they wish to develop in this field.”
111
 Whereas EU institutions are not 
obliged to follow with these „opinions‟ for the adoption of legislation or granting of product 
authorisations, “there is invariably a duty to consult the agency” before departing from the latter‟s 
advice.
112
 Moreover, the EU institutions “can then depart from the agency‟s Opinion only on grounds 
of safety where it can provide an alternative, equally authoritative, contradictory opinion.”
113 
The effect 
of this has been that, for example, the EFSA “has become the central institution for determining which 
food may be marketed in the European Union.”
114
 This then “allows both the acquisition of new EU 
capacities and the taking of important decisions behind the cloak of „expertise‟”.
115
 For Azoulay, the 
“core of the new stage is the „mad cow crisis‟, with the need to invent a new „law of economic and 
social regulation‟ and the project of creating the conditions for a „good governance‟ in Europe”.
116
 
 
Be it as it may, this has not been the end of the line for comitology. On the contrary, the committee 
system keeps growing in the EU: a total of 270 committees were in operation by the end of 2008.
117
 
Defending this governance model, Joerges has observed that the “much maligned comitology has the 
                                                          
100
 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1–24 
101
 Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 1–9 
102
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council,  OJ L 240, 7.9.2002, p. 1–21 
103
 Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 77, 13.3.2004, p. 1–11 
104
 Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 1–11   
105
 Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 1–43. Amended by: 
Regulation (EC) No 1335/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 51–59 
106
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 768/2005, OJ L 128, 21.5.2005, p. 1–14 
107
 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1–849 
108
 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007, OJ L 53, 22.2.2007, p. 1–14 
109
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, OJ L 349/25, 25.11.2004 
110
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004, OJ L 246, 20.7.2004, p. 1–9 
111
 Supra 4, [Chalmers et al, 2010], p. 66 
112
 Ibidem 
113
 Ibidem; see: Case T-13/99 Pfizer animal Health vs. Council [2002] ECR II – 3305, p. 380-2  
114
 Ibidem  
115
 Ibidem  
116
 L. Azoulay, The Court of Justice and the Administrative Governance, European Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2001, p. 428 
117
 Supra 4, [Chalmers et al, 2010], p. 117 
 24 
advantage over agencies of the American pattern in that it structures risk policy pluralistically, that 
national bureaucracies have to face up to the positions of their neighbour states, and that interests 
and concerns in Member States cannot be filtered out.”
118
 But we also know from experience that the 
mix between EU politics and technocracy has its risks and, in any case, it is ill-suited to deal with 
more complex and dynamic market activities where a more intimate involvement with the sector is 
needed and specialised expertise becomes more important. Moreover, the Commission has also 
become more dependent on regulatory networks for the implementation of EU law. Even in the field of 
EU competition, where the Treaties charge the Commission with the direct execution of the policy, 
this institution has had to decentralise the enforcement of those rules through the creation of a 
European Competition Network, integrating the National Competent Authorities.
119
  
 
(i) Executive agencies. In recent years the Union has also created six „executive agencies‟: the 
Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA); the European Research Council 
Executive Agency (ERC); the European Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI), the 
Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (EAHC); the Research Executive Agency (REA), and 
the Trans-European Transport Executive Agency (TEN-T EA). The institutional position of the 
executive agencies is less problematic as they are not independent and operate under full 
responsibility of the Commission. These executive bodies have all been created in accordance with a 
Council Regulation (2002), assigning the former to the management of specific EU programmes.
120
 
Their lifetime is therefore limited while headquarters remain closely located to the Commission. With 
the introduction of executive agencies the Commission outsources certain management related tasks 
of the Community programmes and, more specifically, the financial and accounting work which needs 
to be performed in relation to them.   
 
(ii) CSDP and PJCC agencies. EU agencies have also been introduced in the areas of security and 
defence, as well as in police and judicial cooperation issues. Concerning common security and 
defence, three bodies have been established: the European Defence Agency (EDA)
121
; the European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
122
; and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUCS).
123
 
Their powers are limited; mostly confined to the preparation of analyses and issuing of policy 
recommendations. Regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, three agencies are 
currently in operation: the European Police College (CEPOL)
124
; the European Police Office 
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(EUROPOL)
125
; and the European Union‟s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST).
126
 The most 
significant of these bodies is EUROPOL, the law enforcement agency of the EU. It was set up in 1992 
to coordinate national police authorities by collecting, analysing and disseminating information and 
coordinating operations. The Europol experts and analysts can also integrate joint investigation teams 
dealing with criminal cases on the spot, but the power of arrest remains with the national police of the 
concerned Member State(s).  
 
The emergence of a new breed of EU regulatory systems 
 
Before the European Union established agencies (or authorities) in the field of financial services, this 
area had been „governed‟ by decentralised regulatory structures known as the „Lamfalussy‟ 
committees.
127
 Three Lamfalussy committees were created in 2001: the European Securities 
Regulators (CESR)
128
, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
129
 and the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (CEIOPS).
130
 They were 
established to issue non-mandatory guidelines for the implementation of EU financial services 
legislation. Following the 2008 financial troubles, it was decided to transform these structures into 
formal EU agencies and to grant them powers to issue binding technical guidelines. The new bodies 
are: the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
131
, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA)
132
, and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
133
 The new 
architecture of EU financial services supervision also includes a European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), to deal with macro-prudential supervision matters.
134
 The ESRB is not a regulatory agency 
and its links are clearly directed towards the European Central Bank. With the introduction of this 
Board the EU hopes to be able to monitor and assess systemic financial risk so as to avoid future 
crises. Together with the three micro-supervisory bodies (ESMA, EBA and EIOPA) the ESRB 
integrates a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) “bringing together the actors of 
financial supervision at national level and at the level of the Union, to act as a network.”
135
 
 
In energy and electronic communications, new bodies have also been established: respectively, the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
136
 and the Body of European Regulators for 
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Electronic Communications (BEREC).
137
 The ACER is namely empowered to take decisions in 
relation to infrastructure affecting two or more Member States where the latter fail to agree on the 
relevant regulatory regimes or in case their common approach harms the internal electricity or gas 
markets. BEREC, on the other hand, is seeking to develop coordinated regulatory practices in Europe 
by fostering (through opinions) the consistency of national market remedies and the respect of NRAs 
for its common positions.
138
 The institutional reforms in these sectors emphasise that EU regulatory 
systems are acquiring new types of tasks. Whereas the importance of the third generation agencies 
cannot be separated from the BSE crisis and risk regulation, the newer structures have 
responsibilities which are much more connected with operational matters, the performance of 
inspections and the issuing of fines. The impacts of the 2008 financial crisis are relevant to 
understand the context and mission of the new agencies, which operate in industries which are highly 
networked and where the „spill-over‟ effects of uncoordinated national activities become very 
concerning. To be sure, the nature of the transnational links is different from one sector to the next. 
Whereas in energy the network dimension is related to the infrastructure, in financial services the 
crisis showed has shown how significant the incorporeal inter-dependencies can be. EU regulatory 
agencies are also acquiring tasks which very sensitive, politically. An example of this can be seen in 
the responsibilities of ESMA (securities) in the supervision of credit rating agencies.
139
 ESMA‟s will be 
able to examine applications for registration of these agencies in Europe;
140
 ensure non-interference 
with (and transparency of) ratings and methodologies;
141
 issue requests for information;
142
 pursue 
general investigations (examination of records, data and procedures);
143
 conduct on-site 
investigations;
144
 and impose fines.
145
 Taking into account the extraordinary importance of concerns 
with the supply of capital in Europe, the ESMA power to supervise the credit rating agencies in 
Europe is by all means significant and emphasises that the EU has come a long way since it started 
to set up a few data collection agencies to support the Commission in the 1970s.    
 
3- Considering the growth of regulatory agencies in Europe 
 
The creation of regulatory agencies in the EU has sparked an intense debate on the substantive and 
institutional reasons behind this important development. The perplexity comes in part from the rather 
unique role of the European Commission. Whereas in national democracies the creation of regulatory 
agencies is normally justified by the need to „isolate‟ certain regulatory activities from the daily political 
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dynamics and party politics, in the EU the context is somewhat different and the Commission has 
traditionally combined its political mission with the reputation of an independent and competent 
technocratic body.
146
 The question of why Europe began entrusting a series of technical but still 
important tasks to regulatory agencies would therefore require some other explanation.  
 
According to Majone, the answer to this question essentially lies in the „regulatory turn‟ (and vocation) 
of the European project. This author stresses that one of the most distinctive features of the European 
Union‟s development since the 1970s and 1980s has been the impressive growth of its regulatory 
competences.
147
 Due to the rise of European health, safety, environmental, consumer protection or 
labour protection rules, „regulation‟ became “by far the most important type of policy making in the 
EU.”
148
 The Commission appreciated the growing regulatory responsibilities and involvement, seeing 
it as a way to increase its own authority legislatively and at the implementing stages. Also, the limits of 
the EU budget favoured such a „costless‟ move as the Community lacked resources to pursue “ large-
scale initiatives in the core areas of welfare-state activities – redistributive social policy and 
macroeconomic stabilisation”.
149
 As the workload and complexity of the Union‟s regulatory 
responsibilities increased, however, its traditional institutional machinery was not ready for the impact. 
Majone consequently emphasises that if the EU has become a more sophisticated and complex 
„regulatory state‟, its affairs need to be managed through new institutions which are capable of 
organising the required levels of expertise, while ensuring „credibility‟ and „independence‟.
150
 Majone 
is therefore critical of the Commission. He emphasises the processes of politicization and 
„parlamentarisation‟ of this institution and how the dynamics have changed and affected its regulatory 
capacity and reputation.
151
 
 
Majone‟s defence of EU regulatory agencies can overlook the fact that the process of creating new 
non-majoritarian bodies can become self-reproductive. The Union may see the agencies as a way to 
acquire new powers and capabilities (which would also not be the most transparent of processes). 
This point has been made by Shapiro, who considers that the neo-functionalist inclination of the Union 
generated the perception that as “direct routes to further political integration are blocked [...] further 
growth can be achieved indirectly through the proliferation of small, limited jurisdictions, allegedly 
„technical agencies‟ that will appear politically innocuous.”
152
 While Member States succeeded in 
forcing the inclusion of national representatives in the EU agencies‟ management boards, the author 
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notes that “by stressing the technical and informational functions of these agencies, by making each 
highly specialised to a particular technology and by incorporating large components of scientific 
personnel, there is undoubtedly the hope that technocrats will take over these agencies from the 
politicians.”
153
 The unifying principle of this strategy is therefore the growing status of the EU 
„regulatory expert‟ and the values of specialised knowledge and capacity which he embodies. The 
added importance of regulatory expertise is important for the EU as it weakens the distinction 
between the „European‟ and the „national‟. It provides the EU with a „single‟ and clearer sense of 
purpose.   
 
Regardless of more or less „hidden intentions‟ which one may see in the proliferation of EU regulatory 
agencies, it is difficult to ignore some of the benefits which these bodies offer. Agencies are known to 
facilitate the provision of expertise in areas of high complexity and that allows the Union to acquire the 
capacity to address transnational challenges in contexts that are much more with complex and 
fluid.
154
 Secondly, agencies also counteract the dangers of politicising the expertise. Whereas 
comitology represents fosters the link between technical values and „normative‟ sensibilities as 
mediated by national (political) representatives; that is also not without problems and the regulatory 
agencies „may be right‟ in trying to advance the best possible expert advice or decision. Considering 
the high levels of risk and increased level of complexity of EU regulatory activities (be it in 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, transport or financial services) one might wonder why it should be 
otherwise. The creation of EU agencies may also improve the quality of the implementation of EU 
Law.
155
 Regulatory agencies may also help to build up common views (“communauté de vues”) 
between national experts and that may then reflect on how these actors behave in their own 
jurisdictions.
156
 This point is important as it suggests that the introduction of EU regulatory agencies is 
not something that suddenly „fell from the skies‟; it accompanies and emphasises a shift of power 
from national political officials to national regulatory experts. Moreover, the agencies foster a 
“communauté d‟action” as national supervisors should work out existing problems and differences 
within the new European structures.
157
 While comitology also engages national actors, agencies can 
provide “greater stability” and “more systematic action”.
158
 Whereas EU committees are more open to 
„wider interests‟, regulatory agencies are keen on “role purification”.
159
 The emphasis is on “expertise, 
autonomy and specialization of tasks in a narrow range of policy issues.”
160
  
                                                          
153
 Ibidem. For an alternative view, focused on the importance of the managerial structures of the EU agencies (and external 
political controls at that level), see: D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practices, and the Living 
Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 155-157. See also: M. Busuioc, Accountability, control and independence: the 
case of European Agencies, European Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 5, 2009, pp. 599-615  
154
 For an analysis on the advantages of regulating through agencies in the EU see: Dehousse, Joerges, Majone, Snyder and 
Everson, Europe after 1992: New Regulatory Strategies, Florence: EUI Working Paper LAW 92/31, 1992, p. 51  
155
 Ibidem  
156
 Ibidem 
157
 Ibidem 
158
 Ibidem, p. 52 
159
 T. Christensen and P. Laegreid, (2006) Agencification and Regulatory Reform in T. Christensen and P. Laegreid, Autonomy 
and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State, Edward Elgar, p. 12 
 29 
The recognition of some of the advantages of EU regulatory agencies should not, however, ignore the 
existing risks. With regard to possible problems, two issues are often ignored. The first point concerns 
perhaps an excessive „Euro-optimism‟. When it is said that the national regulatory authorities should 
be able to work out existing differences or that the European public interest will ultimately emerge 
from those interactions, this may be overlooking that these regulatory agencies might display similar 
types of social conflicts. The notion that national or economic interests or imbalances suddenly 
disappear because the agencies are committed to the vales of expertise may be very illusory. These 
new „EU unities‟ can hardly push away conflicts that are not resoluble but will introduce different ways 
of managing them. One of the paradoxes of modern societies “is that most interests, values, and 
systems are irreducibly opposed to each other: economy versus society, capital versus labour, France 
versus Germany”.
161
 Even if communities of national experts are able to find common ground where 
politicians cannot (the „problem‟ which has concerned Shapiro), one would have to be very optimistic 
to expect national supervisors to ignore the own dynamics and interests of their markets or to be 
indifferent to issues which are politically sensitive at the national level. Secondly, there is an issue 
about the internal capacity of EU agencies and who is proving the resources for the system to work. If 
we let go of the idea that there is „perfect deliberation‟ within these structures, it becomes more 
important to understand the internal dependencies and capacity problems, and to then start looking at 
how existing institutional biases and problems can be controlled.       
 
4- The dynamics of the new administrative state 
 
The creation of regulatory agencies has important implications for the relationship between EU politics 
and expertise, and it also affects the way in which the national experts interact with each other and 
with the markets which are being regulated. Regarding the first point, we have seen above how the 
Courts have constrained the Commission when it receives „expert advice‟ from European regulatory 
expertise. The fact that namely for product authorisations, the Commission cannot decide to disregard 
the opinion of agencies without providing equally significant scientific evidence in support of its 
preferred route of action, has the effect of associating „science‟ with the European dimension strongly 
(which is not without risks). In such a context, regulatory expertise is not seen as being external to the 
EU political process (which may not decide to „ignore‟ its suggestions for reasons which the former is 
not prepared to take into account or evaluate), but rather as something which is in-built and integral to 
the „good‟ political decision. It was noted before that the EU seems to „like‟ this because expertise 
does not have a national colour; it offers a common language which de-territorialises the integration 
process. The problem, however, is that wider social, ethical or cultural interests will still plays its role 
and can destabilise a form of European authority which is framed in such narrow terms. The paradox, 
therefore, is that because many of social tensions do not go away through institutional constraints or 
due to sweeping judicial rulings, what might end up having national forms of contestation of this 
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regulatory science (the controversial authorisations of GMOs by the EFSA are a case in point).
162
 As 
the EU public discourse fails to accommodate the different interests and wider concerns (which 
cannot be expressed in scientific terms) the reaction is likely to be a „return‟ to the Member States and 
a challenge to the authority of the EU. 
 
With respect to the inner structure of EU regulatory expertise there is an issue about how expert 
interaction works within the agencies. The basic formal shape of the „technological‟ controls is the 
international one, which ensures the presence of every national competent authority in the decision-
making processes. That structure (which is the typical one in these agencies) would guarantee that 
each Member State‟ authority has a fair chance of contributing to the work, to participate in the 
relevant discussions, and review or criticise what the others are doing. Such a system begs questions 
regarding the asymmetric levels of regulatory capacity (human, financial and institutional resources) 
of different NRAs and to what extent that can generate imbalances in the decision-making processes. 
Moreover, whereas most of the regulatory agencies are based on formal equal footing of the national 
experts, other models favour the selection of a narrower task-force of regulatory experts which 
disregards the national representation principle openly (this is the case of the European Aviation 
Safety Agency, as well shall see in the relevant case-study chapter). That may occurs as the nature of 
the sector and tasks are too complicated and technical for a big deliberative committee to be able to 
keep pace with relevant developments and efficiently organise the required expertise. Questions 
about this formal structure also relate to an idea of „partial Europeanization‟, but in a somewhat 
different way. 
 
The previous comments underline that one of the most significant aspects about the new European 
regulatory power relates to the notion that we may be dealing with a process of pulverisation and 
fragmentation of actors. The EU regulatory agencies have limited internal resources and secretariats. 
They structure more or less decentralised forms of interaction between the national competent 
authorities. The agencies also operate in market contexts which are particularly fluid and dynamic and 
where, therefore, the involvement with the sector can be quite important. One of the effects which can 
have is that it becomes unpredictable where the power will be, who will have the important resources 
to make the regulatory system work effectively and how the internal division of labour is to be 
organised. To be sure, the challenge here does not simply concern the „national identity‟ of the 
expertise but the way in which the European agencies communicate with market activities that are 
highly fluid and dynamic. It would appear that, in such contexts, it becomes more important to ensure 
intimate relationships with the sectors and to develop institutional structures and tools which are well 
adapted to the specific characteristics of the markets. The link between the European regulatory 
agencies and new product authorisations („one-off‟ technical assessments) is relevant in this regard. 
Where they deal with product licensing, the EU agencies are usually concerned with the evaluation of 
particularly innovative substances (e.g. pharmaceuticals or food sectors) which are associated with 
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higher levels of uncertainty and complexity. The institutional effects of these product assessments can 
be important for they increase the constraints on those which are meant to check the „initial‟ scientific 
assessments, through EU „peer reviews‟ for example.   
 
The emergence of regulatory agencies in the EU is also associated with a set of de-legalisation 
dynamics. In EU aviation safety, for example, while the EASA „certification specifications‟ (which set 
down this agency‟s own understanding on how the safety rules should be complied with by the 
industry) only represent this agency‟s opinion, respect for such standards leads to a presumption of 
compliance with the law. While their status remains unclear, „soft‟ regulatory instruments still set 
market expectations and may involve consequences of high importance for those affected by these 
decisions. Reliance on soft law instruments of regulation reflects a conscience of the limits of 
command-and-control regulation and signals a closer involvement with complex and fast-moving 
markets where it is important to ensure flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness to change. The de-
formalisation of European regulation can (according to Joerges) be seen as threatening the very idea 
of integration through law and the guarantees that this is supposed to offer to those affected by that 
power.
163
 Alternatively, he says, one might consider a more modest place for EU law: the European 
legal system should acknowledge its integrative limits. Where it cannot regulate on the basis of 
political mediation or without weakening legal guarantees for third parties, the „relative autonomy of 
the state‟ in handling the relevant conflicts should be recognised.
164
 One of the difficulties with this 
approach, however, is that in many cases the use of soft laws by EU regulatory authorities is used to 
precisely to challenge more serious problems of coordination in contexts where the level of 
decentralisation is higher. With regard to the aviation safety example provided above, the („soft‟) 
certification specifications already existed before they became part of the EU legal system; they were 
organised and worked out through international frameworks (in this case via the Joint Aviation 
Authorities, as we shall see in the EASA case-study chapter). In a context such as this, the concerns 
about the use of soft laws in Europe do not go away, but the „autonomy‟ of the Member States is also 
an illusion.  
 
5- The mechanics of formal accountability  
 
The growing status and authority of the EU regulatory agencies raises the fear that we may be lacking 
equally significant controls on their powers. As we shall see below, the literature‟s response has been 
that strengthened ex post checks on these bodies may be needed. Meanwhile, the focus on formal 
accountability has diminished attention vis-à-vis the dynamic aspects of the regulatory systems‟ 
institutional life. One may wish to distinguish between three types of threats to the effectiveness of the 
controls „of the state‟ (i.e. judicial review and parliamentary reviews) in the context of the new EU 
regulatory state. They may face a problem of „exclusion‟ (e.g. soft laws escaping the judicial process, 
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regulatory tasks too quick or fluid for Parliaments or Courts to intervene and to do so effectively). 
Such ex post controls may also encounter a „dependence‟ or „incapacity‟ problem due to the strong 
reliance on regulatory systems for the implementation of EU law. Moreover, the Courts and the EP 
are heavily reliant on the information and expert analyses provided by the agencies in their 
questioning exercises.
165
 Thirdly, those checks confront a risk of „marginalisation‟ or „irrelevance‟ 
because the dynamics of the EU regulatory agencies can create internal risks (notably in terms of the 
functioning of a regulatory state that is fundamentally de-centralised) that are impermeable through ex 
post reviews on the „expertise‟. Whereas the first two dimensions („exclusion‟ and „dependence‟) have 
deserved attention from the literature, the final („irrelevance‟) point has been underplayed or simply 
ignored as it has been assumed that the internal (techno-)controls are working well. This is a critical 
issue, however, suggesting that the regulatory agencies raise new types of concerns and that we may 
be lacking the administrative law tools to deal with those issues. 
 
Judicial controls on EU regulatory agencies  
 
One of the concerns with the creation of EU agencies is that judicial controls on their power may be 
weak. Former Article 230 EC did not include agencies in the list of EU bodies the acts of which could 
be subject to judicial review. As we shall below, this gap has been addressed by the Lisbon Treaty, 
and it is now explicitly accepted that acts of EU agencies (intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties) fall within the jurisdiction of the Court (Article 263 TFEU).  
 
Before „Lisbon‟, the Courts therefore had to decide what to do in cases where agencies‟ decisions 
affected third parties, whether or not to afford them protection. This issue was considered by the 
General Court (then CFI), in Sogelma, where it was asserted that “any act of a Community body 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties must be open to judicial review”.
166
 Sogelma 
concerned a case directed against the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) relating to tender 
procedures. The EAR was managing a number of programmes for the reconstruction of Serbia and 
Montenegro, which included preparing and assessing invitations to tender and awarding contracts. 
Sogelma had submitted a tender (following a procurement noticed issued by EAR) but the Agency 
ended up cancelling this tender procedure since “none of the offers received was technically 
compliant.”
167
 The General Court considered that the cancellation of the tender by EAR fell under its 
jurisdiction, by analogy with Les Verts (i.e. the principle of judicial review „of any act of a Community 
body intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties‟).
168
 The Court noted that while Les Verts 
concerned “Community institutions” and not agencies, the situation of bodies “endowed with the 
power to take measures intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties is identical” to that 
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case; and it was hence not acceptable that in a Community of law “such acts escape judicial 
review”.
169
 The applicant had effectively lost, as a consequence of EAR‟s decision, the possibility of 
being awarded the relevant contract. Moreover, if judicial protection was not ensured in this case the 
applicant would be denied a right that would otherwise exist if it had been the Commission (instead of 
an agency) the one taking these measures.
170
 
 
Sogelma was (it should be remembered) decided at the time of the European Community. Even if the 
reasoning in this case was to be accepted, there were still questions about the opportunities for 
judicial review with respect to the (former) third-pillar agencies, in an area where the Court had limited 
jurisdiction.
171
 That problem was considered in Spain v. Eurojust (which was in fact delivered before 
Sogelma).
172
 The case concerned an application for annulment under former Article 230 EC brought 
by Spain against Eurojust for language requirements with respect to individuals‟ applications for the 
post of librarian/archivist in that agency. For the Advocate General (Poiares Maduro), while Spain 
could not rely on Article 230 EC to seek the annulment of the contested acts as these were adopted 
under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union; “in a Union governed by the rule of law, it is essential 
for measures of Union institutions and bodies to be amenable to review by a Union Court, so long as 
they are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”
173
 [Emphasis original] However, the 
admissibility of an action brought by a Member State, under these conditions, could be contested. The 
affected parties (candidates for the posts in Eurojust) had access to the Court of First Instance under 
EU Staff Regulations. The Court therefore ruled that it was sufficient that the concerned acts could be 
brought within its jurisdiction through the intervention of the aggrieved parties for the requirement of 
effective judicial protection to be met in this case.
174
  
 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has confirmed the importance of judicial review of EU agency 
acts (but it also creates new problems, as we shall see below). The new Article 263 TFEU is 
reproduced here: 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of the 
Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, 
and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-
à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  
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Moreover, the Court of Justice will be able to review the regulatory agencies‟ “failure to act” (Article 
265 TFEU): 
 
Should the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the European 
Central Bank, in infringement of the Treaties, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the 
Union may bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement 
established. This Article shall apply, under the same conditions, to bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union which fail to act.
 
 
 
The new Article 263 TFEU means that Courts will now have to consider what the provision allows 
them to do, what type of acts can be considered to generate legal effects on third parties. There are 
both legal and institutional constraints which have to be taken into account in this context. It is not 
clear, for example, that the Courts may (or will) review acts of EU agencies which directly imply 
consequences for third parties but which only „prepare‟ subsequent regulatory measures (in the 
context of an authorisation procedure, for example). Judicial intrusions in the inner world of EU 
agencies may also have to be limited to avoid litigation from being systematically used by powerful 
social and economic interests wishing to challenge all sorts of regulatory deliberations that somehow 
affect them in a way which they do not like.  
 
There is, in addition, a question related to judicial review of agency opinions to the European 
Commission. Before the Lisbon Treaty was introduced, the status of those opinions and the role of 
Courts in their review were considered. This happened in Artegodan; a case which emerged after the 
Commission decided to withdraw the marketing authorisations of a number of medicines used to treat 
obesity (anorectics).
175
 The General Court observed that the Commission decision only confirmed the 
scientific opinion issued by the European Medicines Agency‟s main scientific body: the Committee for 
Human Medicinal Products (CHMP). The Commission itself did not have the resources which would 
have allowed it to conduct the required scientific assessments and so the reliance on the CHMP‟s 
opinions was needed for the Commission to decide on such matters.
176
 The Court also considered 
that whereas the scientific recommendation did not formally bind the Commission, it was “extremely 
important so that any unlawfulness of that opinion must be regarded as a breach of essential 
procedural requirements rendering the Commission‟s decision unlawful.”
177
 The judiciary was 
therefore entitled to review both the formal legality of the CHMP‟s scientific opinion and the 
Commission‟s exercise of discretion.
178
 Regarding the first point, the Court considered that it should 
review the proper functioning of the Committee, the internal consistency of the opinion and the 
statement of reasons.
179
 This enables the Court to namely “examine whether the opinion contains a 
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statement of reasons from which it is possible to ascertain the considerations on which the opinion is 
based, and whether it establishes a comprehensible link between the medical and/or scientific 
findings and its conclusions.”
180
 The scientific committee was hence “obliged to refer to the main 
reports and scientific expert opinions on which it relies and to explain, in the event of discrepancy, the 
reasons why it departed from the conclusions of the reports or expert opinions supplied by the 
undertaking concerned.”
181
 What the Court could not do, however, was substitute its own views for 
those of the Committee.
182
 This judicial approach was later confirmed in Oliveri.
183
 
 
Despite of where the new Article 263 TFEU might take us, it may be difficult for the Courts to do more 
than stick to this notion of a scientific due process when looking at EU agency „opinions‟. The 
complexity and dynamism of the new administrative state warns Courts about the dangers of trying to 
second-guess the agencies‟ expert advice. The features of this new power also suggest that the 
Court‟s concerns with the integrity of the „technological‟ process essentially highlight a (legal) concern 
with formal interactions within the Agency. This is different from actually considering how the 
procedures work (in their own terms) and to look at what the substantive institutional risks are.  
 
The Parliamentary controls on EU regulatory agencies 
 
The rising profile of EURS has led many to believe that it would be advisable to refine and strengthen 
the existing political accountability processes in relation to these bodies. For Griller and Orator, for 
example, the accountability of EU agencies could be fashioned in accordance with the model of the 
European Central Bank (which is based on regular parliamentary reporting and hearings) and further 
“surveillance mechanisms” of the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission vis-à-vis 
agencies be enhanced.
184
 The Parliament‟s control of the regulatory agencies touches on both the 
performance of the technical work and on budgetary/financial related matters.
185
 Regarding the 
regulatory activities as such, the Parliament scrutinises annual reports and conducts hearings in 
specialised committees. A study concludes that the “intensiveness with which [the EP] makes use of 
the various arrangements at its disposal varies significantly from one committee to the next”.
186
 The 
political accountability of EU regulatory agencies is also said to be “sketchy and sporadic”, focused on 
a “limited number of issues” and “driven by political priorities.”
187
 On the other hand, it is said that “it is 
                                                          
180
 Ibidem  
181
 Ibidem 
182
 Ibidem   
183
 Case T-326/99 Nancy Fern Oliveri v Commission and European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, ECR 2003 
Page II-06053. For an analysis of this case see: M. Busuioc, The Accountability of European Agencies, Legal Provisions and 
Ongoing Practices, Eburon (2010), p. 175-176 
184
 Griller and Orator, Everything under control? The “way forward” for European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni 
Doctrine, European Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2010, p. 13 
185
 M. Busuioc, The Accountability of European Agencies, Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices, Eburon, 2010, p. 98 
186
 Ibidem, p. 130 
187
 Ibidem. p. 131 
 36 
in situations of „fire alarms‟ that the merit and value of these forums can be found.”
188
 The MEPs 
failure to monitor the daily work of the agencies may (according to the author) be compensated for “in 
situations of crisis or where serious problems involving a particular agency come to the public eye.”
189
 
The fact that the Parliament „wakes up‟ after a public crisis has emerged is not a compliment, 
however, to its accountability credentials. The question would also have to be why the Parliament was 
incapable of identifying the problem beforehand and whether its intervention makes much of a 
difference in those circumstances, considering that under „alarming‟ scenarios the relevant agency 
might have a strong incentive to look into and remedy what has possibly gone wrong.  
 
The European Parliament also has responsibilities in the supervision of the regulatory systems‟ 
budgetary and financial life. Through the discharge procedure, the Parliament is asked to politically 
approve the implementation of the agencies‟ budgets.
190
 If the Parliament believes there is a problem, 
it may postpone or refuse the discharge.
191
 This happened for the first time in May of 2011, when the 
Parliament decided to postpone the 2009 budget discharge for the EMA and the European Police 
College (CEPOL).
192
 Whereas the CEPOL‟s case concerns a “persistent lack of compliance with the 
Financial Regulation”, the EMA‟s condemnation questions the independence of its experts, its hiring 
practices and warns about conflicts of interest with the pharmaceutical industry.
193
 The MEPs 
consider that “there was no proper guarantee of the independence of experts hired to carry out 
scientific evaluations of human medicines and that some experts had conflicting interests in the case 
of the evaluation of the anorectic Benfluorex.”
194
 They are particularly worried about the “very late 
withdrawal from the market” of this substance (commonly known as „Mediator‟), a sleeping pill which 
was taken from circulation in 2009 due to risky side-effects.
195
 The Parliament‟s comments arguably 
damage the public image and reputation of EMA. It is unclear, however, whether this demonstration of 
force by the Parliament was based on solid evidence against the EMA (and will be consequential) or 
whether it reflects other types of institutional concerns. The Parliament‟s decision to postpone the 
approval of EMA‟s budget only happened after the withdrawal of mediator from the market and 
followed much public criticism directed at the EMA for its handling of this case.
196
 It is therefore 
tempting to see this alarm with regard to EMA as a sign of a weakness on an institution which for 
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more than fifteen years of this agency‟s existence never once questioned its internal procedures or 
the quality of its practices. 
 
Overall, the push for bolder parliamentary controls with regard to European regulatory agencies may 
overlook the lack of resources and expertise of this institution to carry out that mission well. The 
Parliament‟s difficult experience in the context of the control of the Commission‟s implementing 
measures (comitology) deserves to be remembered, in this context. As explained above, the 
Parliament spent many years and invested much political energy in its attempt to be granted equal 
footing vis-à-vis the Council in the supervision of the workings of the committee system. Once it got 
those powers, however, it failed to use them. As noted elsewhere, in 2008 “the committees gave 
2,185 opinions but only seven references were made to the Council.”
197
 Moreover, data on the 
operation of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny shows that only in very few cases has the Council 
or the Parliament vetoed the draft Commission measures. In 2008, for example, “seven measures 
were vetoed by one or other of the institutions on the grounds that the Commission was exceeding its 
powers, just under 10% of the measures proposed for regulatory procedure with scrutiny in that 
year.”
198
 These numbers also indicate that “it is the Council that has benefited most from the 
procedure, not the Parliament, vetoing all but one of them.”
199
 Overall, the important constraints in 
comitology can hence be found „within the process‟, in the relationship between the Commission and 
the committees, as the work of Joerges and Neyer has managed to show.
200
 Studying the interaction 
between the Commission and the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs (StCF) and the Scientific 
Committee on Foodstuffs (SCF), they saw that comitology did not involve national checks on the 
Commission but worked alongside more fluid and problem-solving lines, generating an “Europeanized 
inter-administrative discourse characterised by mutual learning and an understanding of each other‟s 
difficulties in the implementation of specific solutions.”
201
 Considering the higher levels of complexity 
and sophistication of the market activities with which the EU regulatory agencies have to engage with 
(in comparison with comitology), the suspicion that the EU institutions do not have the resources to 
police the operation of the agencies can only be stronger.   
 
European Ombudsman 
 
There have also been calls to strengthen the accountability of EU regulatory networks through the 
European Ombudsman.
202
 While the Ombudsman is a “modest entity, with much to be modest about” 
(8 million Euros of budget and approximately 60 staff); some see the soft, flexible and more informal 
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nature of its mandate as an advantage in control of these supranational systems of networking.
203
 The 
mission of the EO is informed by the following (main) characteristics: 1) “the free and easy access for 
the citizen”; 2) the “primary focus on the handling of complaints” (which is accompanied by “the power 
to recommend not only redress for individuals but also broad changes to laws and administrative 
practices”); 3) “use of proactive means” (i.e. own-initiative inquiries and guidance to public officials on 
how to manage the relationship with the public); 4) “effectiveness based on moral authority, cogency 
of reasoning and ability to persuade public opinion, rather than power to issue binding decisions”; and 
5) “broad review function that can encompass legal rules and principles, the principles of good 
administration, and human rights.”
204
 Differently from the Courts, the Ombudsman “rightly stresses the 
value of a complaints service that is not only free of charge at the point of delivery but also free from 
strict standing rules and relatively swift.”
205
 Unlike the judicial process the Ombudsman has a much 
more conciliatory, mediatory and balancing logic.
206
 This reduction in formalism means that the 
intervention of the Ombudsman ensures, at least, that the target EU body provides reasons for its 
approach or decision.
207
  
 
The scrutiny of the Ombudsman in relation to EU regulatory systems tends to be dominated with 
personnel issues and access to documents disputes. In some cases, however, the Ombudsman‟s 
intervention has had important substantive implications.
208
 In a case lodged in 2007, two researchers 
of the Nordic Cochrane Centre applied for access to clinical study reports and protocols for trials of 
rimonabant (brand name: „Acomplia‟) and orlistat (brand name: Xenical, Alli), both of which are anti-
obesity medicines.
209
 While the manufacturers of these products had submitted this data to the EMA 
for the purposes of obtaining a marketing authorisation, the Agency has traditionally refused the 
publication of clinical trials information with the argument that this would threaten the commercial 
interests of the companies. The complainants argued that such information “was important for 
patients because anti-obesity pills are controversial” and that “the effect on weight loss in the 
published trials is small, and the harms are substantial.”
210
 The EMA insisted that the information was 
commercially sensitive and that there was no „overriding public interest‟ in the disclosure.
211
 The 
Ombudsman then proposed a „friendly solution‟ which asked the EMA to grant access to the required 
data or else provide good reasons why that should be denied. After the EMA failed to comply, the 
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Ombudsman put forward a second friendly solution proposal (asking the EMA to clarify its position).
212
 
Finding no positive response, the Ombudsman went to the EMA to inspect the relevant documents.
213
 
Finally, in a very critical draft recommendation the Ombudsman concludes that “there appears to be 
nothing to suggest that disclosure would specifically and actually undermine commercial interests.”
214
 
[Emphasis original] Moreover, the Ombudsman “finds that the EMA‟s refusal to grant access to the 
requested documents constituted an instance of maladministration”.
215
 The EMA then informed the 
Ombudsman that it would grant access to the requested documents.
216
 In a British Medical Journal 
article, the two doctors describe their story and accuse the EMA of “protecting the profits of the drug 
companies ahead of protecting the lives and welfare of patients.”
217
 They also note that their case 
“sets an important precedent” as on November of 2010 the EMA announced that it “would widen 
public access to documents, including trial reports and protocols.”
218
 While this case started off as an 
access to internal documents dispute, its wider implications became clear as the EMA resisted with all 
its strength to cooperate with the Ombudsman (until it finally „gave up‟).  
 
In other situations the effectiveness of the Ombudsman is inevitably more limited. In a case which 
also concerned the medicines agency (EMA), a German company that was in the business of selling 
homeopathic veterinary medicines applied for the establishment of maximum residue limits for two 
substances and their consequent inclusion in the annexes of a Council Regulation.
219
 The EMA‟s 
veterinary committee (CVMP) rejected this with the argument that the safety profile of these 
substances was known to be problematic. When deciding on the case, the Ombudsman considered 
that it was “not in a position to decide whether the [EMA] could have adopted a less strict approach 
towards the substances concerned” and that “this question could ultimately only be decided by the 
Community courts.”
220
 The Ombudsman therefore concludes by noting that “in the light of the need to 
protect the health of consumers the attitude of the EMA cannot be regarded as constituting 
maladministration.
221
 This case serves to show that the mission of the Ombudsman is mainly focused 
on instances of maladministration. It also has a strong human rights focus. The resources of the 
Ombudsman are quite limited (as explained above), and there is also an issue about the lack of 
expertise of the Ombudsman in contexts where level of complexity of the matters is very high and 
requires some degree of specialised knowledge. On the other hand, the Ombudsman may still offer 
some interesting opportunities as a means to ensure that the „internal process‟ of the regulatory 
                                                          
212
 Supra 209, [P. Gøtzsche and A. Jørgensen] 
213
 Ibidem 
214
 European Ombudsman – „Draft Recommendation in his inquiry into complaint 2560/2007/BEH against the European 
Medicines Agency‟, p. 12 
215
 Ibidem, p. 12-13 
216
 Supra 209, [P. Gøtzsche and A. Jørgensen], p. 2  
217
 Ibidem, p. 3 
218
 Ibidem, p. 4 
219
 European Ombudsman – „Decision on complaint 1193/99/GG against the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products‟, 3 March 2000 
220
 Ibidem, point 1 of Decision 
221
 Ibidem 
 40 
agencies can be checked on and protected if and where there is a risk of an institutional imbalance 
within the system.  
 
EU regulatory agencies and the new institutional concerns 
 
The increased complexity and sophistication of modern EU governance begs questions about the 
institutional capacity of the regulatory agencies to deal with the existing challenges. European 
regulatory agencies have limited resources, they tend to have relatively small secretariats, and 
essentially organise more or less decentralised forms of cooperation between twenty-seven different 
national competent authorities. The sectors that are being targeted by these agencies are also very 
dynamic and fluid ones. The regulation of new market activities in financial services, the approval of 
novel aircraft type-models, the licensing of new medicinal products or the supervision over thousands 
of chemicals substances marketed across Europe are all tasks which require unparalleled levels of 
EU engagement with the sectors and in many ways transform how the administration of „Europe‟ 
operates. In this context, there are important questions about the resources of the EU regulatory 
structures, the extent and nature of the reliance on national expertise to carry out the work and on the 
way in which the connection with the own dynamics of the sector develops. If EU agencies in fact lack 
internal resources, there will be an issue regarding who is providing the human, financial or 
institutional means for the system to work and whether (and how) such a dependence can be 
worrying from the perspective of the „European public interest‟. In such a context, one may wonder 
whether calls for more political and judicial constraints on EU regulatory agencies can actually deal 
with the problems of the new administrative state. By emphasising (static) formal controls on the 
agencies, there is a risk of diverting attention from the peculiar structure of these bodies as well as 
from the dynamic challenges associated with this power.  
 
In the subsequent chapters, the thesis explores these issues in the context of four EU regulatory 
agencies: the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA). We will see that the dynamics of each of those bodies creates a series of dysfunctions and 
that the available ways of controlling them are unsatisfactory. It will also be shown that the institutional 
concerns emerging from each of those case-studies are different and peculiar; each sector raises its 
own set of risks. The case-study chapters shall, in addition, consider possible solutions to the 
difficulties which they indentify. Those individual proposals will then be examined (further) and 
„brought together‟ in the Conclusion of the thesis, where an attempt is made to develop a common 
framework to deal with the problems of the new administrative state of the EU.       
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Chapter II 
 
New risks and institutional imbalances: the European Medicines Agency‟s centralised 
procedure for medicines authorisation 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1995 the European Union decided to introduce a “centralised procedure” for the evaluation and 
authorisation of medicinal products.
222
 It also established an agency (the European Medicines 
Agency) to coordinate the operation of this procedure and submit opinions to the Commission.
223
 The 
centralised procedure offers pharmaceutical companies the possibility of submitting a single 
application for a marketing authorisation, which (if accepted) is valid throughout the territory of the 
Union. The application is sent to the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the latter conducts the 
scientific assessment of the product. The EMA cannot itself grant marketing authorisations but makes 
proposals to the Commission, which formally decides on this (although, in practice, the Commission 
has always supported the EMA marketing authorisation recommendations).
224
 The centralised 
procedure was established (we shall see) mainly due to problems of trust between the national 
competent authorities and as a consequence of institutional failures in the workings of the mutual 
recognition procedures. Importantly, though, while the remit of the centralised procedure has been 
formally broadened in more recent reforms, the scope of this procedure is limited and essentially 
covers medicinal products which are new or that involve some relevant aspect for society. The 
centralised procedure is therefore linked to a particular type of product (where innovation is 
important). On the other hand, most medicines in Europe continue to be authorised either via national 
procedures, or through mutual recognition or decentralised processes.   
 
Institutionally, the mechanics of the centralised procedure are more decentralised than they might 
otherwise appear. When the EMA receives an application for a marketing authorisation (human 
medicines), the scientific assessment of that product is not performed „in London‟ (where the EMA is 
based), but is given to a Member State „Rapporteur‟, which then reports the results back to the 
Agency‟s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) – where each national 
competent authority is represented (and the Rapporteur is chosen from the members of this 
committee).
225
 The process might also include a Co-Rapporteur, which performs a „second‟ scientific 
assessment of the product, independently from the Rapporteur. The Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur 
then have to share their own „initial‟ assessments with the CHMP, for deliberation. The chapter 
considers the workings of these „scientific‟ interactions by examining how the EMA decided on two 
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medicines (Acomplia and Champix) – both of which were evaluated and authorised through the 
centralised procedure. It will be shown that the initial assessment of the Rapporteur has a very strong 
impact on the outcome of the product‟s assessment and that „checks and balances‟ within this system 
(via the CHMP) have become diluted. The link between the centralised procedure and the scientific 
evaluation of new substances (such as Acomplia and Champix) is important to understand why that 
happens. These „one-off‟ product assessments are associated with higher levels of scientific 
uncertainty (as there is no past experience with these medicines) and promote an institutional model 
which is more fluid and less stable. There is also a risk that, ultimately, the scientific work produced by 
the EMA will (as a consequence of these pressures) end up being of a lower quality.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: first, the emergence of EU regulation in the pharmaceuticals 
sector is considered. Secondly, the reforms to the centralised procedure introduced in 2004 shall be 
assessed. The third section examines the reasons behind the mitigated impact of those reforms and 
relates that to the nature of the centralised procedure „product‟. Fourthly, the importance of the 
Rapporteur and the issue of regulatory capacities will be developed. The subsequent section 
investigates the dynamics of deliberation in the CHMP. Finally, the relationship between the EMA and 
the Commission will be explored. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how the new type of 
problems emerging from the operation of the centralised procedure could be managed.  
 
1- The emergence of EU regulation of pharmaceuticals 
 
It is difficult to address the EU regulation of pharmaceuticals without recognising the impact of the 
Thalidomide disaster, in the early 1960‟s. Thalidomide is a sedative that was designed to help 
pregnant women when suffering from morning sickness. Tragically, the use of this drug led to the birth 
of thousands of deformed babies. This crisis exposed the inadequacies of safety control mechanisms 
and shaped the regulation of the medicines sector in the decades to come. In a time where 
pharmaceutical scientific research progressed and international trade flows increased, the existing 
regulatory regimes were inadequate to face the nature of the risk involved.
226
 The lack of regulatory 
cooperation at the European and International level also surfaced as a major issue.  
 
Within the European context, the Commission took initiative and decided to tackle the existing 
diversity in regulatory assessments and evaluation systems between the Member States. With the 
approval, in 1965, of the first European piece of legislation in the pharmaceuticals sector, the EU was 
pursuing three main lines of action: 1) it clarified what a „medicinal product‟ was considered to be; 2) 
established that a drug would only be approved for marketing if accompanied by documentation in 
support of its safety, effectiveness and therapeutic value; and 3) laid down a number of common rules 
guiding testing requirements and labelling.
227
 As Permanand observes, the emphasis of these reforms 
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“[...] was decidedly on product safety and efficacy”.
228
 The degree of EU involvement in the 
pharmaceutical sector was still, in any case, at a very embryonic stage.  
 
A new wave of legislative intervention came ten years later, in 1975.
229
 The Directives approved at the 
time introduced three important changes. First, they developed a set of detailed common rules to 
standardise the tests and trials that medicinal products were subject to in the European Union. 
Secondly, a multi-state mutual recognition procedure was established, whereby a company which had 
received authorisation to market a certain medicine in a Member State could seek the recognition of 
that authorisation in at least five other Member States.
230
 Thirdly, a Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products (CPMP), including representatives of the Commission and national authorities, 
was created with the objective of supervising the multi-state application process and submit an 
opinion on whether medicines subject to that procedure complied with the requirements laid down by 
Council Directive 65/65/EEC.
231
 The procedure worked as follows: once a marketing authorisation had 
been sent to at least five Member States, the competent authorities of those Member States were 
given a period of 120 days to approve the drug or raise objections.
232
 Where the Member States 
objected, the CPMP had to be notified. Within 60 days the CPMP would then have to submit an 
opinion on the matter.
233
 The national authority which had raised concerns, however, was not bound 
to the position expressed by the CPMP.  
 
This new system of drug authorisation did not meet the Commission‟s expectations. In fact, according 
to the Commission, “[t]his procedure was hardly used by the pharmaceutical industry.”
234
 Between 
1978 and 1985 only 41 applications were made under the multi-State application procedure.
235
 The 
Commission was also concerned with the slowness of the decision-making process. While half of the 
national authorisation decisions were taken in the year following the opinion of the CPMP, the 
Commission considered that it was “worrying to note that the other half of definitive decisions have 
taken more than 1 year and as much as 4 years in extreme cases, after the opinion of the 
Committee.”
236
  
 
It was in the context of this frustration that the Union (then Community) introduced, in 1987, a 
„concertation procedure‟ for high technology medicinal products (in particular those derived from 
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biotechnological processes).
237
 As the Commission observed at the time, this new framework 
“[differed] fundamentally from the multi-state procedure in that, it is applicable prior to any national 
decisions concerning high technology medicines...”
238
 Indeed, once a Member State had received an 
application for a marketing authorization of a medicine developed by means of a new biotechnological 
process, the national authorities would be required to bring the matter before the CPMP for an 
opinion.
239
 The final responsibility for the decision, however, still rested with the Member State 
concerned.  
 
Despite these efforts the fact was that attempts to standardise the national authorisation processes 
for medicines had not been successful. Whether it was through a push for harmonisation measures, 
or an emphasis on institutional mechanisms of cooperation between the national competent 
authorities, the Member State evaluations of medicinal products still differed considerably.
240
 Majone 
has observed that “[t]he system lacked credibility, and was held responsible for the loss of 
international competitiveness by the European pharmaceutical industry.”
241
 After a long period of 
discussions, the Council finally approved, in 1993, three pieces of legislation that would substantially 
transform the EU regulatory regime for pharmaceuticals.
242
 The core of the reforms consisted in the 
establishment of two new procedures for medicines authorisation: the Centralised Procedure (C.P.) – 
which would be supported by a new European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMA) 
– and the Decentralised and Mutual Recognition procedures.  
 
The Centralised Procedure 
 
Initially, the centralised procedure was mandatory for biotechnological products (Part A medicines) 
and optional for medicines which involved significant innovation, as well as for new drugs derived 
from human blood or human plasma (Part B medicines).
243
 For medicines falling under Part B of the 
Annex to the Regulation companies could therefore choose whether they wished to pursue a 
centralised application for a marketing authorisation or instead preferred the mutual recognition route. 
Under the centralised procedure pharmaceutical companies send an application for a European-wide 
marketing authorisation directly to the EMA. The Agency carries out a scientific assessment of the 
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medicine – in which it examines its safety, quality and effectiveness of the medicinal product in 
question – and makes a recommendation to the European Commission (which has the final say in the 
authorisation process).
244
 
 
The Decentralised and Mutual Recognition Procedures 
 
Regardless of its significance, the centralised procedure is only one of the procedures through which 
medicines may be authorised in the European Union. Companies which hold a marketing 
authorisation in one Member State may wish to seek recognition of that original licence in one or more 
Member States (Mutual Recognition Procedure).
245
 The decentralised procedure, which is usually 
considered together with mutual recognition, differs from the latter in that it is applicable to medicinal 
products which have not received a marketing authorisation at the time of the application.
246
 In both of 
these procedures the evaluation of the medicine is carried out by the Reference Member State (where 
the drug was first authorised or the marketing application initially submitted), but the Concerned 
Member State (where another authorisation is sought) can object on public health grounds.
247
 If the 
Member States involved are not able to reach an agreement the matter is subjected to arbitration, 
where similarly to what happens in the centralised procedure, the CHMP, the Commission the 
Standing Committee become involved. The conclusions of the arbitration process are binding for the 
Member States. 
 
National authorisation procedures 
 
Pharmaceutical companies may simply wish to market a medicinal product within the territory of a 
Member State. In that case, the national authorisation procedures will apply. This option is only 
foreclosed if the product falls under the mandatory scope of the centralised procedure, in which case 
an application has to be sent to the EMA. The 1995 reforms have therefore resulted in what Feick 
calls a “remarkable range of three alternative regulatory routes” for medicines authorisation in 
Europe.
248
 As the author himself explains, this variety of options reflects different underlying market 
interests. The centralised procedure appears to be particularly of use for global and research-based 
pharmaceutical companies, which are ready to face strict measures of regulatory control and are best 
served by an authorisation process which reduces transaction costs and provides access to a wider 
market.
249
 On the other hand, the decentralised or national procedures may be more appropriate for 
companies which focus on more traditional products and target smaller, possibly only national, 
markets.    
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2- The 2004 pharmaceuticals review and the reform of the Centralised Procedure 
 
In 2001 the Commission launched a review of the European legislation on pharmaceuticals.
250
 To that 
end, Enterprise Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and Health Commissioner David Byrne set up, in March 
of that same year, the “High Level Group on Innovation and Provision of Medicines" (or the G10 
Medicines Group) to consider changes to the existing EU regulatory regime.
251
 By May of 2002 the 
G10 Group had finished its final report, where a number of “recommendations for action” were 
presented.
252
 The G10 Group emerged in a context where the loss of competitiveness of the 
European industry surfaced as a major theme. In a wide-ranging report submitted to the Directorate 
General for Enterprise of the European Commission in November of 2000, it is said that the 
“European industry has been losing competitiveness as compared to the USA [...]” and that “Europe is 
lagging behind in its ability to generate, organise, and sustain innovation processes that are 
increasingly expensive and organizationally complex.”
253
  
 
Moved by the nature of this problem the European institutions began to reconsider the existing 
regulatory regime, namely in what concerns the balance between the centralised and decentralised 
procedures. Pharmacovigilance
254
 (post-authorisation supervision of medicines), an important pillar of 
the EU regulatory system, was affected by the reforms, namely to ensure further centralisation and 
clarification of reporting duties and institutional responsibilities.
255
 In another report carried out for the 
Commission, it was concluded that while “[t]he centralised and decentralised procedures are both 
perceived to have contributed in a qualitative and quantitative sense to the creation of a harmonised 
Community market in medicinal products”, there exists “criticism of particular aspects of both systems 
and in the case of the decentralised system, a level of real concern about the willingness of regulatory 
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authorities to operate the central principle of mutual recognition.”
256
 
 
In what the centralised process 
was concerned, this study concluded that that it was “capable of working very well” and emphasised a 
“high level of satisfaction with it”.
257
 It also stressed that many companies wished the procedure to 
become available to a wider class of products.
258
 
 
Widening the scope of the centralised procedure 
 
While the European system for medicines licensing has been based on a balance between the 
centralised and decentralised procedures, the amount of applications to centralised marketing 
authorisations falls clearly below the numbers of mutual recognition. From 1995 to 2000 inclusive, the 
EMA received 279 applications for a centralised authorisation. During the same period, a total of 988 
procedures were finalised under the decentralised process.
259
 In 2004 the ambition of the 
Commission was, first, to extend the mandatory list of pharmaceutical products subject to the 
centralised procedure to all medicines containing a „new active substance‟.
260
 This would mean that 
any product containing a substance which had not been previously authorised in the Community 
would necessarily be channelled through the centralised procedure. The argument was that the 
“decentralised procedure is not adequate for authorisation of medicinal products containing new 
active substances, taking into consideration the high costs for their development as well as the effects 
on society when those products are only placed on the market of a limited number of Member 
States.”
261
 
 
The increased reach which the Commission sought for the centralised procedure would find 
opposition in the Council, however. Some Member States argued that if the centralised procedure 
was already optional for such classes of products it would be unnecessary to make it obligatory.
262
 
This argument seems to be well grounded on the evidence available at the time. A report from the 
Commission notices that for “medicinal products containing new active substances and taking into 
account only those for which the centralised procedure is optional, since 1995 until 2000, 113 
applications were made through the centralised procedure and 73 through the mutual recognition 
procedure.”
263
 In the end a compromise was reached whereby the mandatory list of the centralised 
procedure was extended to orphan medicinal products (medicines for rare diseases) and to those 
                                                          
256
 Report on the "Evaluation of the operation of Community procedures for the authorisation of medicinal products", carried out 
on behalf of the European Commission by Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting, November 2000, p. 12 
257
 Ibidem, p. 13 
258
 Ibidem 
259
 Report from the Commission on the experience acquired as a result of the operation of the procedures for granting 
marketing authorisations for medicinal products laid down in Regulation (EEC) N° 2309/93, in chapter III of Directive 
75/319/EEC and chapter IV of Directive 81/851/EEC. - COM/2001/0606 final, Brussels, 2001, p. 8-9 
260
 A „new active substance‟ is one which on the date of entry into force of EC Regulation 726/2004 was not authorised in the 
Union 
261
 Supra 256, [Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting], p. 13 
262
 [Interview]: Respondent 1b (European Commission) 
263
 Supra 256, [Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting], p. 9 
 48 
containing new active substances for which the therapeutic indication is the treatment of acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome, cancer, neurodegenerative disorder or diabetes.
264
 This list of diseases 
was not random. In 2004, for example, the therapeutic areas which met a higher number of positive 
opinions from the agency were: neurology and central nervous system (at 21.9%); and, secondly,   
immunotherapy and oncology, alimentary tract, and blood (all at 15.6).
265
 
 
In addition to the widening of this mandatory list, the Commission also pushed for the extension of the 
centralised procedure as an optional authorisation route. Insisting that the decentralised process was 
not appropriate for certain classes of products, the Commission considered that the existing list B of 
the Annex was “inadequate and rather narrow, especially in the case of other innovative products and 
of generic medicinal products.”
266
 In the end, the 2004 Regulation would indeed open up the 
centralised procedure, as an optional authorisation procedure, for medicines which can be considered 
to be “therapeutically innovative”.
267
 In addition, even for products which are not particularly 
innovative, where a “benefit to society or to patients” can be found, access to this centralised route 
should be given.
268
 This would be the case, for example, with certain products which can be supplied 
without a medical prescription. Finally, the centralised process would also be available to generics of 
medicines authorised by the EU.
269
 These changes were significant because they had the potential to 
transform the relationship between the centralised procedure and innovation. If the centralised 
process was, before 2004, confined to biotechnology and particularly innovative products, applicants 
could now seek authorisation of medicines in which R&D was not so important, such as OTC (over-
the-counter) products and generics. As this chapter explains below, however, the extent to which the 
centralised procedure has been used for the authorisation of such categories of products is not 
impressive. 
 
Decentralised procedure: strengthened coordination and ‘European’ arbitration 
 
The decentralised procedure, while considered to be of significant importance for medicines which do 
not bring impressive therapeutic advances and for products which target relatively small markets, 
continued to cause concerns in terms of its operation. Member State assessments often diverged and 
applicant companies usually decided to withdraw their applications once complications began to 
emerge.
270
 Because of this, the EU legislator decided, first, to foster the mechanisms of cooperation 
by formalising the work of the Coordination Group for Mutual Recognition and Decentralised 
Procedures (CMD (h)), which integrates members of the national competent authorities.
271
 If conflicts 
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cannot be solved in the CMD(h), the matter should be referred to arbitration in the CHMP. After the 
final opinion of the CHMP on the application, the Commission issues a decision instructing Member 
States either to grant, maintain, suspend, or withdraw/ revoke the marketing authorisation.
272
 The 
results of this new regime have been mixed. The percentage of mutual recognition procedure 
applications which were referred to the CMD(h) has stabilised at 10%.
273
 With 81 referral procedures 
concluded by the CMD(h) in 2008, the group managed to reach agreement for 77% of procedures.
274
 
Out of the 15 applications which were referred to the CHMP for arbitration, only four received a 
positive opinion from the Committee.
275
 More problematic though, withdrawals from the decentralised 
procedures continue to represent a major risk to their operation, as applicants often fear the 
discussion of objections at the CHMP level.
276
        
 
3 - The mitigated impact of the 2004 reforms 
 
The analysis of how the extended centralised procedure has worked in practice provides valuable 
insights into the nature of this authorisation process. Following the 2004 review there was an increase 
in the use of the centralised procedure. After a decline in applications in the year of 2005, which was 
attributed to global industrial factors, the 41 centralised applications of 2004 had gone up to 78 by 
2006
277
 and to 90 by 2007.
278
 The EMA now talks about reaching the symbolic 100 mark of total 
approval requests in a period of one year. This growing use of the centralised process did not begin 
after 2004, however. Between 2002 and 2004 the number of applications for a centralised 
authorisation went from 31 to 51. The level of increase in applications following the 2004 extension of 
the centralised procedure does not seem to be too different from the evolution which took place in the 
years before the reforms came to effect. Two sets of factors help explain why the reform of the 
centralised procedure has had a limited effect on the number of applications. The first relates to the 
mandatory scope of the centralised procedure and the second touches on its optional segment.  
 
To begin with, the extension of the mandatory list of the centralised procedure to cover new active 
substances aimed at the treatment of certain diseases has had no substantial effect in the relative 
weight that those products have in the overall numbers of this authorisation procedure. In 2004, the 
products containing a new active substance represented 88.2% of all new applications for a marketing 
authorisation
279
 and, two years later, that percentage remained at the same level (88.4%).
280
 In 2007 
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it actually came down to 62%.
281
 While recommending a careful observation (since they show 
percentages and not absolute numbers), these figures suggest that the wider scope of the mandatory 
centralised procedure has not been responsible for any substantial increase in the use of this 
authorisation route. This is not altogether surprising, since the pre-2004 centralised regime already 
allowed for sufficient flexibility, in its optional segment, to include significantly innovative products (as 
will normally be the case with medicines containing a „new active substance‟).
282
 
 
In order to understand the mitigated impact of the 2004 extension of the centralised procedure one 
should also consider developments in what concerns the classes of medicines falling under the new 
optional centralised process. If before 2004 the centralised procedure was restricted to biotechnology 
or products involving significant innovation, following this reform the centralised procedure became 
open to other classes of products, such as OTC medicines and generics. Since 2006, it is indeed 
possible to observe an increase in the use of the centralised procedure by biosilimilar medicinal 
products, as well as generics. The number of applications for these medicines, however, is still very 
low compared to those represented by new active substances. In 2006 there were 69 applications for 
products containing a new substance, a total of 9 applications for generics or hybrid products, and 
only 4 for biosimilar medicinal products.
283
 In the subsequent year, a higher number of initial EMA 
evaluations were taking place for biosimilars (10 applications); at the same time that the numbers for 
generics remained at the same level (also with 10 applications in 2007).
284
 Still, these numbers are 
not particularly impressive when compared to a total of 56 evaluations by the EMA for medicines with 
a new active substance, in that same year.
285
 
 
The situation is quite different in the mutual recognition/decentralised procedures, where the 
significance of generics and OTC medicines has been acknowledged by the respective European 
associations. The European Generic Medicines Association (EGA) took good note of the fact that, in 
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2006, generic medicines represented almost 75% of all new applications finalised following the mutual 
recognition procedure.
286
 In what concerns OTC products, the Association of the European Self-
Medication Industry is essentially concerned about the workings of the mutual 
recognition/decentralised procedures, which are considered to be “an important option” for 
manufacturers of non-prescription medicines.
287
    
 
The link between the centralised procedure and R&D and innovation should also be understood in a 
context where influential stakeholders emphasise the existence of “considerable unmet medical 
needs” and the role that institutions play in the development of a new research agenda.
288
 While 
emphasising its determination to exploit and expand the science base of the EU, the European 
pharmaceutical industry likes to underline the importance of networks such as the Innovative 
Medicines Initiative (IMI), which is a public-private relationship established to reinvigorate the 
European biopharmaceutical sector.
289
 In a response to a 2007 Commission consultation paper, the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) considers that the ability of the EU 
regulatory framework to accommodate emerging technology is “the most challenging question which 
the Commission wishes to address.”
290
 Despite the scientific progress being slower than initially 
anticipated, the ABPI expects a “revolution” which will lead to regenerative therapies, personalised 
medicinal products, nanomedicines and other “therapeutic breakthroughs”.
291
  
 
While the development of such challenges is beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice is to say that 
scientific progress is likely to have fundamental implications for existing regulatory structures. 
Furthermore, even for the time being, these reminders of the industry have an eye in the current 
framework for medicines regulation in Europe. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries 
and Associations (EFPIA) notes that emerging technologies call for a renewed emphasis on issues 
such as the “provision of development advice” and demand an increased “centralisation of regulatory 
activities.”
292
 The role of the centralised procedure in responding to scientific progress, as well as that 
of the EMA in supporting a novel and more engaged dialogue with the industry, surface as major 
themes in the emerging context of pharmaceuticals regulation.         
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4- Formal architecture of the centralised procedure and „new active substances‟ 
 
The centralised procedure can be broadly divided into two stages: the scientific evaluation and the 
administrative decision-making process. The EMA has been entrusted with the first task. Within the 
Agency, it is the CHMP (Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use) which performs the 
scientific assessment of medicines for human use. This Committee consists of one member 
appointed by each of the EU Member States and also includes members appointed by each of the 
EEA-EFTA States.
293
 In addition, the Committee may “in order to complement its expertise” appoint 
up to five co-opted members on the basis of their specific scientific competence.
294
 The scientific 
assessment of an application for a marketing authorisation is performed by a Rapporteur, which is 
selected from amongst the members of the CHMP. Where appropriate, the Rapporteur may be 
supported by a Co-Rapporteur.
295
 Following a scientific discussion in the CHMP (developed below), 
the Committee adopts an opinion on whether the medicinal product should be authorised. Where 
possible this should be done by consensus, but absolute majority voting may be used.
296
 In case the 
opinion of the CHMP is in support of giving a marketing authorisation, that recommendation shall be 
sent to the European Commission. Once the Commission has in its power the opinion of the CHMP it 
has 15 days to prepare a draft decision. The draft Commission measures should then be sent to the 
Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use, where the Member States are 
represented. 
 
By considering the approval of two medicines evaluated under the centralised procedure (Acomplia 
and Champix), this chapter will examine how these procedures have worked in practice. Acomplia, 
which contains the active substance rimonabant, is used together with diet and exercise to treat 
obese and overweight patients who also have other risk factors, namely type 2 diabetes or 
dyslipidaemia (excessive levels of fat in the blood).
297
 This medicine was authorised in the European 
Union in June 2006 and was marketed in 18 EU countries. At the time this product was assessed by 
the EMA, the CHMP was aware that Acomplia could involve psychiatric side effects, in particular 
depression, but still concluded that it was effective “in weight reduction in obese or overweight 
patients with associated risk factors” and that its benefits outweighed existing concerns. New data on 
psychiatric side effects which became available after its authorisation led the CHMP to restrict the 
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medicine‟s use in July 2007.
298
 In May of 2008 the Committee again updated the product information 
of Acomplia, advising doctors to monitor patients for signs of psychiatric disorders. Since new data 
was confirming these concerns, the CHMP decided to ask a group of experts to review this medicinal 
product. The group met in June 2008, concluding that the benefit/risk balance had “narrowed” since 
the approval of Acomplia, but still noted that more data was needed for a more conclusive position to 
be taken.
299
 Because the latest data provided by the company had increased existing fears, the 
European Commission issued a formal request under Article 20 of Regulation (EC) 726/2004, which 
allowed the CHMP to prepare an opinion on what regulatory action to be taken - maintain product on 
market, change product information, suspension or withdrawal from market? The CHMP considered 
that Acomplia was “moderately effective in helping patients to lose weight”, but also noted that the 
“risk of psychiatric side effects, including depression, sleep disorders, anxiety and aggression is 
approximately doubled in patients taking Acomplia, compared to obese or overweight patients taking 
placebo (a dummy treatment)”.
300
 It was also noted by the Committee that there had been reports of 
serious psychiatric disorders, including suicide. All this led the CHMP, in October 2008, to conclude 
that the benefits of the medicine no longer outweighed its risks and to recommend the suspension of 
the marketing authorisation of Acomplia. 
 
The second case-study, Champix, is a medicine which contains the active substance varenicline and 
which is used by patients to help them stop smoking.
301
 The applicant Pfizer Limited submitted its 
application in November 2005 and in July of the following year the CHMP concluded that in the light of 
the data submitted and the scientific discussion that had taken place, a positive opinion should be 
granted for the marketing of Champix. It was considered that the medicine had shown effectiveness in 
helping patients stop smoking and that its risks did not outweigh the benefits. The marketing of 
Champix has raised concerns about the product‟s safety. In December 2007 the EMA concluded that 
it was necessary to provide updated warnings to doctors and patients, in order to “increase 
awareness of cases of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts reported in patients using Champix 
(varenicline)”.
302
 Despite these concerns, Champix is still marketed across the European Union.       
Champix and Acomplia are significant medicines both for their alleged therapeutic value and because 
of the intense institutional history which they have been associated with. These products integrate 
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emerging therapeutic areas (anti-smoking and anti-obesity, respectively) and therefore provide good 
examples of the new risks facing the centralised procedure evaluations. In addition, institutional 
patterns in the assessment of these products after post-authorisation complications started to occur is 
something which this chapter is also interested in exploring. The next section considers what the 
scientific assessment of these two products can tell us about the role of the Rapporteurs in the 
centralised procedure.        
 
5- The reliance on the Rapporteur and regulatory capacities 
 
Once a successful centralised procedure application enters the primary evaluation stage, the product 
has already been allocated a Rapporteur and a Co-Rapporteur to perform its scientific assessment. 
This primary assessment stage can be divided into two distinct moments. First, the Rapporteur and 
Co-Rapporteur have 80 days to send their (separate) initial Assessment Reports to the CHMP.
303
 
These reports assess the quality, efficacy and safety of the medicinal product. On the basis of those 
criteria, the reports include a recommendation to the CHMP as to whether a marketing authorisation 
should be granted. Secondly, the CHMP is given a period of 20 days to submit its comments and 
another 20 days to adopt a formal position, a provisional recommendation and a list of questions to be 
addressed by the applicant company. After day 120, the clock stops for this primary evaluation 
stage.
304
 The applicant then has 3 months to answer the CHMP questions, although this time limit can 
be extended up to 6 months if necessary.
305
 Once those answers are received, a secondary 
evaluation stage begins. The Rapporteur and the Co-Rapporteur have 30 days to present a Joint 
Assessment Report which addresses the replies submitted by the company to the CHMP‟s list of 
questions. Following this, the CHMP has 20 days to comment on the Joint Assessment Report. If no 
outstanding issues remain, the Committee shall adopt an opinion within 10 days. On the other hand, 
the CHMP may decide, also within 10 days, that outstanding issues need to be addressed, which 
would require a hearing.
306
 If that is the case, the clock stops at day 180. Once the hearing has taken 
place, the CHMP is given 30 days to adopt a final opinion on the matter, meaning that day 210 is the 
legal deadline for centralised authorisations. Notwithstanding this limit, since 2005 it is possible to see 
a decrease in the active time of the centralised procedure evaluations. After an average active time of 
194 days in 2004, the assessment procedures have been quicker in recent years (189 days in 2005; 
176 in 2006; and 183 in 2007).
307
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The Rapporteur and the lack of a European regulatory capacity 
 
One of the main features of this scientific assessment process is the reliance on a Rapporteur and a 
Co-Rapporteur to pursue the initial evaluation of the medicinal product seeking a marketing 
authorisation. The appointment of the Rapporteurs should be initiated at the CHMP meeting following 
the receipt of the company‟s letter of intention to submit a centralised procedure application.
308
 Both 
the Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur are appointed from amongst the members of the CHMP. The 
appointment is said to be based on “objective criteria”, namely to “allow the use of the best and 
available expertise” on the relevant scientific area.
309
 In order to pursue the scientific evaluation of the 
product, the Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur may choose, on the basis of a database of European 
experts, the members who will integrate their assessment teams.
310
 This list includes experts who 
have been put at the disposal of the EMA by the Member States or which the Agency has directly 
appointed.
311
  
 
The mission of the Rapporteur in the scientific evaluations draws attention to the lack of a European 
regulatory capacity. Indeed, the position of Rapporteur both reflects and operationalizes the Agency‟s 
networking model. The necessary scientific work for the assessment of a product does not take place 
in London, where the EMA is located, but in the offices of the National Competent Authority of the 
Member State from which the Rapporteur comes from. This is explained by an EMA scientific 
administrator, who observes that the scientific evaluations “take place at the national level” and that 
the EMA staff is not there to “re-do” this work.
312
 Such reliance on the NCAs is not a surprise 
considering the very limited scientific resources of the Agency‟s Secretariat. Presently, the EMA has a 
total of 226 members which are designated as „scientific administrators‟, a category which essentially 
includes physicians, pharmacists and biologists.
313
 While the Secretariat (which has been given a 
scientific mandate since 2004) is now performing the initial scientific assessments in the field of 
orphan and paediatric drugs,
314
 outside these areas it has a marginal role in the preparation of CHMP 
opinions. Its mission is mainly devoted to the administrative handling of centralised procedure 
evaluations.  
The relationship between the Rapporteur and applicant companies 
 
It has been mentioned above that the importance of new and innovative medicines in the centralised 
procedure places the EMA in a challenging institutional context. As these products do not have a 
regulatory history; there is no „real-life‟ experience with the marketing of the substance to which the 
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regulator can turn to understand its benefit/risk balance more fully. This puts the pharmaceutical firm, 
which developed the product and produced its application dossier, in a strong position.  
    
Moreover, the contacts between the Agency and the pharmaceutical companies begin several months 
before an application for a centralised authorisation is formalised. According to a Commission “Notice 
to Applicants”, firms should notify the Agency of their intention to submit an application for a 
centralised procedure authorisation with an anticipation of at least seven months.
315
 During this pre-
submission stage, the meetings between the Rapporteurs and the applicant companies may be of 
considerable importance and are said to take place on an “extremely common” basis.
316
 Information 
on these exchanges is very difficult (or even impossible) to find because there are no formal records 
and they do not take place in London, but in the offices of the National Regulatory Authority from 
which the Rapporteur comes from.
317
 It is also worth mentioning that not all the Rapporteurs feel the 
same way about these pre-submission meetings. Some of them are said to be “very reluctant” to see 
the applicant at this stage “because they understand that this may interfere with the [assessment] 
procedures.”
318
 These meetings represent the underworld of the EMA and the centralised procedure; 
the less than visible dimension of its scientific assessment processes, where national regulatory 
authorities (Rapporteurs) are allowed to disregard the Agency‟s commitments to openness and 
accountability.    
 
After an application is formally submitted and if clarification regarding the data submitted is 
considered necessary, the applicant company and the Rapporteur (and Co-Rapporteur) may also 
liaise, in which case they shall inform the product team leader (official from the EMA secretariat) of 
the outcome of their discussions.
319
 These meetings take place in the London headquarters of the 
Agency, they are recorded, and the product team leader is also present. This dialogue is particularly 
important after the CHMP has adopted a list of questions to be addressed by the applicant. 
Clarification meetings may be convened between the latter and the Rapporteurs, so as to provide an 
“opportunity for clarification and transparent guidance on the list of questions and proposed strategy 
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for the responses (…)”
320
 These meetings are considered to be particularly important when the CHMP 
list of questions have identified “major concerns” in the assessment of the product.
321
 During the 
Acomplia and Champix approval processes two clarification meetings between the Rapporteurs and 
the applicant companies took place for each of the products.
322
 In the case of Acomplia, there was 
also a de-briefing meeting regarding a draft list of CHMP questions.
323
 These moments of 
coordination stress the importance of the conversations between the Rapporteurs and the applicant 
companies, highlight the peculiar mission of the Rapporteur, and finally draw attention to the 
„privileged‟ information and knowledge of the product which this CHMP member benefits from and 
brings to the centralised procedure deliberative process.  
 
The proximity between the Rapporteurs and the companies is further strengthened during the post-
authorisation period. During the life-time of the product (a centralised marketing authorisation is valid 
for 5 years) the marketing authorisation holder may wish to alter or improve the product or the EMA 
may consider that changes need to be introduced to the marketing authorisation to reflect new 
information.
324
 For certain minor variations (Type I) and for all major variations (Type II), the (same) 
Rapporteur is involved. The troubled case of Acomplia provides a good example of how demanding 
this post-authorisation phase can be. Before being taken from the market, Acomplia suffered four 
Type II variations, of which two are especially relevant: an update to the summary of the product‟s 
characteristics (SPC) in July 2007 “to reflect new contraindication in patients with ongoing major 
depression and/or ongoing antidepressive treatment”; and another update to the SPC to include a 
further warning related to depressive reactions, in May 2008.
325
  
 
It can be concluded that while the existence of a Rapporteur seems to provide an efficient way of 
conducting the required scientific dialogue with the applicant, the nature of this proximate and 
enduring relationship may promote a sense of affinity within the process, which may have to be 
looked after.
326
 The question which follows is whether, and how, the discussions in the CHMP force 
the Rapporteurs to justify their positions (Assessment Reports) to the remaining members of the 
Committee and if these processes of internal accountability mitigate the risks identified here.   
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6- The CHMP and the nature of the deliberative process  
 
After an initial scientific assessment stage based on a strong element of „personalisation‟ 
(Rapporteur), the CHMP serves the important function of promoting a wider level of participation in 
the adoption of the Agency‟s recommendation. At this stage, therefore, the scientific debate becomes 
a „European‟ one, not just an issue to be dealt with by the National Competent Authority of the CHMP 
member who was entrusted with the role of Rapporteur. Although all the Member States are 
represented in the CHMP, the operation of this committee has been quite asymmetric. A senior EMA 
official explains that discussions are essentially restricted to five Member States (United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Sweden and The Netherlands).
327
 The position of Rapporteur (and Co-Rapporteur) 
is usually decided between these members of the Committee.
328
 Then there is, according to EMA 
officials, a “silenced majority” of members which merely observe the debates taking place.
329
 Outside 
the group of five leading Member States there are also differences, however. Denmark, for example, 
has a certain degree of intervention in areas where it possesses additional expertise.
330
 The level and 
type of participation also varies according to the accessibility of the issue under discussion. When an 
over-the-counter medicinal product is being assessed, for example, the debates often get livelier.
331
 
Again, this stresses the peculiarities of new active substances and the impact they have on the 
development of the processes of scientific evaluation. As these products demand more advanced 
science and regulatory expertise, CHMP discussions end up being restricted to a few Member States 
which can be „trusted‟. This means that number of national authorities which check the assessment 
reports of the Rapporteurs is much thinner than the wide composition of the Committee suggests.  
 
The peer review system and its weaknesses 
 
As part of its “Quality Assurance System”, the EMA has established a process of peer review to check 
the quality and coherence of the assessment reports submitted to the CHMP by the Rapporteurs.
332
 
The peer reviewers are chosen from amongst the members of the CHMP. It is up to this committee to 
define the scope of the peer review as well as the number of reviewers to pursue this task (normally 
two members). Peer review only lasts for a period of 40 days. It begins when the Rapporteurs release 
their initial Assessment Reports (Day 80) and stops once the CHMP has adopted its first consolidated 
list of questions (Day 120).
333
 The review is therefore limited to the primary evaluation stage, which 
leaves, for example, the Rapporteurs‟ Joint Assessment Report outside the scope of this quality 
assurance mechanism.  
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A third dimension of peer review in the centralised procedure questions the level of controls it places 
on the assessment reports, the duties of justification which it requires from the Rapporteurs. In this 
regard, a senior EMA official notes that peer review normally involves “consensus views”.
334
 The 
cases of Acomplia and Champix are good examples of this, since for both products the two peer 
reviewers concurred with the Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur‟s recommendations. This is not to say, 
however, that the reviewers agreed with everything. In the evaluation of Champix (anti-smoking 
medicine), for example, one of the reviewers considered that there had been an important lack of data 
in terms of clinical safety since the company had not provided an interaction study with 
antidepressants.
335
 According to the review, this was problematic because “many persons who intend 
to stop smoking are currently treated by antidepressants.”
336
 Therefore, this reviewer concurred with 
the Rapporteurs on the conclusions and on the benefit/risk assessment, but disagreed on the product 
information section, arguing that the applicant “should be asked to develop an informational 
programme for both professionals and patients.”
337
  
 
These reviews of the assessment reports essentially discuss the questions (or objections) to be 
addressed by the applicant. In this sense, they set the ground for the CHMP‟s list of questions which 
the company should answer within three months. With Acomplia, both the Rapporteur and the Co-
Rapporteur had considered that the psychiatric safety profile of rimonabant was a “major concern”.
338
 
Still, as one of the reviewers noted, the two assessment reports “allow to conclude that provided the 
safety issues are adequately addressed, the benefit/risk in weight management could be 
acceptable.”
339
 When examining the Rapporteur‟s major objection #6, one reviewer asks that this be 
formulated in a “more precise” way, as the “risk of psychiatric reactions and in particular depressive 
reactions represent a major problem associated with rimonabant (…)”.
340
 This restraint is illustrative of 
the type of worries which the peer reviewers had; rarely asking for more than a refinement to the 
questions or concerns expressed by the Rapporteurs.        
 
This should not be understood as a scientific or technical criticism. Under conditions of uncertainty it 
is very difficult to always “get it right”. The point that can be made, though, is a procedural one. The 
peer reviews did not to show a capacity to destabilise the authority of the Rapporteurs in the 
centralised procedure; they generally failed to open up a new page in the assessment of the products 
on which the CHMP could perhaps build on. These peer review documents, in its worst, appear to be 
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a comparison between the two assessment reports (Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur), failing to 
incorporate an autonomous scientific judgement on the products. The next section suggests that 
these limitations be understood in a wider context; one which links deliberation to the nature of the 
issues (products) subject to debate in the centralised procedure.    
 
The CHMP and the checks on the Rapporteur 
 
Consensus is increasingly dominant in CHMP deliberations. A 2006 EMA survey shows that out of 26 
medicines that started to be reviewed in 2005 and which received a positive CHMP opinion, only one 
(Tandemact) was not approved “following consensus views in the Committee.”
341
 The same study 
observes that in “previous years majority views have been more prevalent.”
342
 Therefore, a total of 33 
(10.5%) out of the 313 medicines approved between 1995 and 2006 were approved with divergences 
in the CHMP.
343
 The number of cases where CHMP recommendations are not approved by 
consensus has therefore been low.    
 
It is suggested that these figures be understood in the context of the empowerment of the 
Rapporteurs. Beginning with Acomplia, the applicant company had proposed that this drug be 
approved for the management of multiple cardiovascular risk factors, weight management, type 2 
diabetes, dyslipidemia, and smoking cessation and maintenance of abstinence.
344
 The two 
Rapporteurs - Dr. Salmonson (Swedish authority) and Dr. Zwieten-Boot (Dutch authority)– agreed 
that while “disturbing” concerns on the psychiatric safety of the product persisted, as long as the 
applicant provided adequate responses this medicine could be approved “for the indication as an 
adjunct treatment to diet and exercise to reduce weight in overweight patients (...), and in obese 
patients.”
345
 Their view was that “the occurrence of symptoms indicative of depressions is definitely 
not trivial” but could be addressed in the SPC.
346
 The efficacy of the product was considered to be 
“clinically relevant”, but it also did not provoke great enthusiasm.
347
 In terms of deliberation, the 
important point is that the other CHMP members did not oppose the Rapporteurs‟ evaluation. Even 
with a medicine which was considered to have a very fragile risk benefit advantage, the agreement of 
the two Rapporteurs strongly influenced the Committee debates.        
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The CHMP discussions on Acomplia were more divisive in areas where the Rapporteurs diverged. Dr. 
Salmonson (Rapporteur) believed that, in addition to weight reduction, the product was also 
approvable for the specific indication of type 2 diabetes.
348
 On the other hand, several members of the 
committee supported a different line, following the Co-Rapporteur‟s position, which essentially argued 
that a bodyweight independent reduction of glucose (the level of sugar in the blood) “had not been 
convincingly demonstrated” [Emphasis original].
349
 An oral explanation by the applicant company was 
held in March 2006, where the type 2 diabetes indication was debated, as was the wording of the 
weight management indication.
350
 Following the company‟s presentation, the open of exchange views 
between the Committee members was as intense as it got in the evaluation of Acomplia. In the end, 
the position of the Co-Rapporteur won more support and the CHMP therefore concluded that an 
indication in type 2 diabetes “was not approvable”.
351
  
 
The debates on anti-smoking medicine Champix show a similar institutional pattern. Both the 
Rapporteur and the Co-Rapporteur – Dr. Thirstrup (Danish authority) and Dr. Zwieten-Boot 
respectively (Dutch authority) – agreed that while certain issues had to be clarified by the applicant 
company, the product could be approvable for smoking cessation. The Committee supported this line 
in the first time it was called to evaluate Champix (20-23 March 2006); concluding that as long as the 
company responded satisfactorily to the list of questions the product could be approved for the above 
mentioned indication.
352
 The agreement between the Rapporteur and the Co-Rapporteur made this 
possible. The following meetings, in June and July 2006, were devoted to a few methodological 
issues, namely the question of whether or not an additional 12 weeks treatment for quitters was 
necessary to improve long-term abstinence.
353
 On this issue, the Rapporteur was satisfied with the 
responses which the applicant firm had submitted. The Co-Rapporteur, however, stated that the 
population in need of a second 12 weeks course “was difficult to identify” and that it was not 
understandable why the applicant was being “inflexible” in terms of exploring who should be treated 
for an additional 12 weeks and who should not.
354
                                       
 
This outstanding issue was addressed by the company during an oral explanation before the CHMP, 
on July 26
th
 2006. After the applicant had provided its responses, the Committee debated this issue, 
with Dr. Ljungberg (Swedish authority) arguing that the company “should have provided a better 
representation of the study results.”
355
 These discussions led the Committee to introduce a wording 
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amendment to the SPC (summary of the product‟s characteristics) so as to reflect that longer 
treatment could be considered under certain circumstances.
356
 As it had happened in the approval of 
Acomplia, the Co-Rapporteur was able to win the support of most CHMP members for her position. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The dynamics of deliberation in the case of Champix and Acomplia: the agreement between the 
Rapporteur and the Co-Rapporteur meant that the role of the CHMP in the technical discussions was a very 
limited one.  
 
A conclusion which can be taken from this evidence is that while the existence of a Co-Rapporteur (to 
perform a scientific evaluation of the product independently from the Rapporteur) seems to be a very 
powerful mechanism to check the Assessment Report of the Rapporteur; nothing seems to stifle 
debate and reduce contestation in the CHMP discussions as much as the concurrence between the 
two Rapporteurs. Where a disagreement exists, the Committee members are asked to consider which 
position is „better‟, which creates the conditions for quite an intense exercise of deliberation. The 
authority of the assessment reports is (only) disrupted when the Rapporteur and the Co-Rapporteur 
diverge in their evaluations. The nature of new active substances helps explain why the initial 
scientific assessment is so crucial, since their evaluation takes place under conditions of uncertainty. 
It is important to distinguish these new substances from mere reproductions of other medicines 
(generics), as well as from products which introduce some changes to an active substance which has 
been previously authorised („me-toos‟). As scientific innovation can quite important in the 
development of new active substances and these have not been tested on the market, their 
evaluation is not only more difficult; it is also favours asymmetries of information because a full 
understanding of the issues requires resources, expertise and time. The CHMP procedures both 
confirm and accentuate this risk as only the Rapporteurs have complete access to the file (“dossier”) 
of the medicinal product.
357
 The other members of the Committee have to limit themselves to the data 
contained in the assessment reports; a restriction which was criticised in the peer reviews of the 
Rapporteurs in the cases of Champix and Acomplia.   
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The CHMP under conditions of ‘crisis’ 
 
Finally, the contentious regulatory experience with the approval and later suspension of the marketing 
authorisation of Acomplia suggests that the occurrence of a „crisis‟ with a product influences the 
CHMP discussions in important ways. Post-authorisation debates on the safety of Acomplia began to 
gain force in June 2007, after the (American) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decided to 
recommend a negative opinion on a new marketing application for rimonabant (the active substance 
of Acomplia). The FDA concluded that there was a serious risk of psychiatric adverse reactions (e.g. 
depression, suicidal ideation and anxiety).
358
 Another important safety concern was related to the 
combined use of rimonabant with antidepressants. In its 16-19 July 2007 meeting, the CHMP 
decided, following the opinion of the Agency‟s Pharmacovigilance Working Party (PhVWP), to 
introduce SPC changes to reflect these safety issues.
359
 
 
As the reporting of depressive disorders, aggressiveness and suicidality had increased since that 
period, the CHMP agreed, in April 2008, that it was necessary to reconsider the benefit/risk balance of 
Acomplia and for that purpose decided to request the opinion of the Agency‟s Scientific Advisory 
Group (SAG) for Diabetes/Endocrinology, which met in June 2008.
360
 It was the view of the experts 
that “whilst the product was considered effective, the Benefit risk margin had narrowed and the 
product might be inappropriate for non expert use.”
361
 In the CHMP July meeting the marketing 
authorisation holder (MAH) was requested to submit further analyses on the safety concerns. It was 
the Committee‟s view that the “overall assessment of these data confirmed the previous safety 
concerns of Acomplia without identifying any subgroups with a potentially more favourable benefit/risk 
balance.”
362
 Following this evaluation, the European Commission initiated a procedure under Article 
20 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, requesting the CHMP to consider whether the product should be 
maintained, varied, suspended or withdrawn from the market. The marketing authorisation holder was 
called for an oral explanation before the Committee on October 20
th
 2008 and, following that 
presentation, a discussion was held on what line of action to take.
363
 A minority of the Committee 
members (5 out of 31) wished the product to be maintained on the market subject to more SPC 
changes. After some discussion it was agreed, by consensus, that the marketing authorisation of the 
product should be suspended (not revoked).
364
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The sequence of events just described shows how under conditions of „crisis‟ the relationship 
between the Rapporteur and the CHMP can be affected. As concerns over Acomplia increased, the 
Committee decided to consult external scientific experts (SAG), the assessment of which signalled a 
new, more complicated future for this drug. One of the important aspects about the SAG meeting is 
that it weakened the position of the Rapporteur. From that moment on, what mattered was what the 
experts concluded. The Rapporteur became a „normal‟ member of the Committee and the SAG 
effectively played the role of the CHMP. The Committee‟s demand for additional expertise under 
conditions of crisis can be understood as translating a certain lack of faith in the traditional, 
Rapporteur-based evaluation process. Finally, the passive role of the Commission in this process 
deserves to be noted. While the decision to suspend the marketing authorisation of Acomplia had to 
be taken by the Commission, this institution‟s intervention was, its own officials recognise it, not more 
than a formalistic one.
365
 The request to reconsider the risk benefit balance of Acomplia under Article 
20 of the Regulation came not from the Commission‟s reassessment of the product‟s risks; it 
originated from the will of the CHMP to open a new page in the Acomplia dossier. The very high risks 
involved in the marketing of this product did not strengthen the Commission‟s authority in the 
centralised procedure, but actually weakened it further. The next section explores why this happens, 
and reflects on the difficult relationship between complex products and structures of political 
accountability.  
 
7- The EMA and the role of the Commission in the centralised procedure  
  
The EMA, it should be repeated, has no legal authority to grant marketing authorisations to medicinal 
products. That responsibility falls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Standing Committee on 
Medicines Products for Human Use. The fact, however, is also that since this (centralised) procedure 
was introduced (15 years ago) the Commission has never rejected an EMA recommendation for a 
centralised authorisation of a medicinal product.
366
 In practice what happens is that the Commission 
adopts a draft marketing authorisation decision on the basis of a CHMP opinion, and the Standing 
Committee approves these measures without contestation. During the 15 days which the Commission 
has to turn the EMA‟s recommendation into a draft decision, its role has been confined to 
administrative details, such as the assignment of a Community registration number to the medicinal 
product waiting to be granted a marketing authorisation.
367
 The EMA and the Commission accept that 
this is how the system works.
368
 In the words of a Commission official, this institution‟s job “is not to 
re-do the scientific assessments which the EMA was created to perform”.
369
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There is also an issue about the role of the Commission in the centralised procedure before the 
CHMP opinions are provided. The Commission has a number of powers which enable it to play a role 
in the management structures of this agency, which may raise a fear that this institution might use that 
leverage to interfere with technical aspects of EMA‟s own work.
370
 According to senior EMA officials, 
however, this concern has not materialised.
371
 The Commission accepts that its role in the centralised 
procedure authorisations has essentially been a “legal and procedural one”.
372
 The „worries‟ of the 
Commission in what the centralised procedure is concerned are therefore formal in nature; they do 
not touch on the substantive assessment of the products. There may be good reasons for the 
Commission to show this type of institutional restraint (as we shall see below). Still, the automatic 
acceptance of EMA expert opinions on marketing authorisations by the Commission emphasises the 
importance of the „technological‟ interactions within the Agency (and its problems). It underlines that 
the institutional system lacks dynamic controls on the power of the Rapporteur. Those (deliberative) 
dysfunctions are not exposed to any clear institutional challenge. 
 
While this is recognised to be an “exceptional” case, there has been at least one case (however) 
where the Commission in fact discussed the approval of a product with the EMA before the opinion of 
the CHMP had been issued.
373
 This happened with Yondelis, a medicine “used to treat patients with 
advanced soft tissue sarcoma, a type of cancer that develops from the soft, supporting tissues of the 
body.”
374
 While the CHMP considered the approval of Yondelis in 2003 - a product which had been 
designated an “orphan medicine” (used for rare diseases) - the Commission was being asked by 
some patient groups to authorise this medicine because it would respond to an unmet medical 
need.
375
 Under these circumstances, the Commission had conversations with the EMA to consider 
whether the product could be approved. In July of 2003, however, the CHMP (at that time it was 
called CPMP) gave a negative opinion on the granting of a marketing authorisation to Yondelis, 
arguing that there existed “critical concerns on the methodology used” and that the efficacy of its 
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active substance (trabectedin) in the proposed indication “could not be established”.
376
 A few years 
later, the company which developed this medicine re-applied for a centralised marketing authorisation 
and this time it was more successful. In a July 2007 meeting, the CHMP issued a positive opinion to 
Yondelis under “exceptional circumstances”.
377
 „Yondelis‟ suggests that the dialogue with the 
Commission does not really change much in what the regulatory approach of the EMA with respect to 
particular dossiers turns out to be. Despite the Commission “pressures” in this case, the CHMP still 
rejected the granting of a marketing authorisation to the product and only a few years later (once 
these CHMP worries had been addressed) did the Committee change its opinion. Moreover, the 
Commission‟s intervention in Yondelis seems arbitrary and rather odd. It raises questions about this 
institution‟s interest in this particular dossier. It is also problematic in that appears to reflect sensitivity 
towards particular interest groups. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The institutional structures of the centralised procedure and of the European Medicines Agency draw 
attention to an EU „problem‟ of (regulatory) capacity in this system. The EMA lacks the resources to 
perform the scientific evaluation of the medicines itself and therefore has to outsource this work to the 
national authorities, via the Rapporteurs. Meanwhile, the organisation of those processes also seeks 
to ensure the involvement of a wider range of actors (i.e. national competent authorities) in the 
deliberative process and sustain controls on the scientific work that is „shipped out‟ to the national 
authorities. We have seen, however, that the dynamic and fluid nature of these activities have 
generated a more imbalanced and asymmetric model. The power of the Rapporteur is very difficult to 
control and „checks and balances‟ within the process are in fact very weak. One of the difficulties with 
the way in which the institutional arrangement has been readjusted is that this „move‟ was (to a 
certain extent at least) unexpected. As such, the formal checks on the EMA do not account for this 
new type of institutional concern. The Commission‟s „legalistic‟ and external role in the EMA 
(centralised procedure) system does not respond to this difficulty, it crystallises it. 
 
The reflection on what type of checks and balances would help in this context is therefore important. 
One way to start thinking about the „solution‟ to these problems could be through the lens of the 
European Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman receives a complaint regarding the EMA‟s handling of a 
certain dossier, his „office‟ should investigate the matter and ask appropriate questions to the Agency. 
That may induce the Agency to go back and reflect on how the relevant issues were considered 
internally and what sort of problems might have existed. One effect which that may have is a certain 
recalibration in the deliberative process. The action of the Ombudsman might allow the CHMP to 
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acquire a stronger hold of the decision-making process; it may allow for internal institutional reflection 
and would (potentially) reduce the constraints on the scientific committee‟s dialogues with the 
Rapporteur. The Ombudsman would therefore work as an outside institutional pressure which could 
hopefully give added energy to the internal (EMA) procedures that have become destabilised. If the 
Ombudsman is to be considered as a form of dealing with the dynamic challenges (of the EMA and of 
the centralised procedure) that would also recognise that „more‟ controls within the EMA would not 
necessarily be a good idea. The fact that the centralised procedure already includes a Co-Rapporteur 
(the „real‟ control in this system) is important in this respect. Instead of increasing the layers of internal 
checks (which in this case, run a serious risk of being neglected) it may consequently be preferable to 
consider (namely via the Ombudsman) other dynamic ways of injecting vitality to the (deliberative) 
procedures which already exist.       
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Chapter III 
 
Data gaps and EU capacity constraints: the ECHA and the expansion of the 
authorisation procedure 
 
Introduction 
 
The European approach to the regulation of the chemicals sector has undergone major changes 
since 2006, when the REACH program (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) was 
introduced.
378
 REACH is a regulatory initiative that requires the „registration‟ of all the substances on 
the market, subjects some of them to „evaluation‟, and imposes the „authorisation‟ of the most 
dangerous substances. The REACH Regulation has also created the European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA) to administer the new regime and provide technical advice to the Commission.
379
 The role of 
ECHA is to receive and accept the registrations submitted by the industry, to check the quality of the 
registration dossiers and to submit technical opinions to the Commission on applications for EU 
authorisation. Moreover, ECHA has to manage the authorisation procedure, a complex and staged 
process that requires the „identification‟ of the dangerous substances and their subsequent 
„prioritisation‟ for authorisation. Importantly, the EU authorisation procedure is formally independent 
from the registration and evaluation of the substances. Authorisation may be initiated even before the 
registration of a substance (where enough information is available). At the same time, the previous 
registration of the substances and their subsequent evaluation through the ECHA system is meant to 
ensure that the required data is received and analysed, and that authorisation may then really target 
the most problematic and riskier chemicals on the market.    
 
We shall see below that the ECHA procedures are not working as expected. The problem starts with 
the industry registrations, which are often of poor quality and companies are failing to provide all the 
important substance data. What is usually missing in the registration dossiers (we shall see) are 
descriptions of how exactly the substances are being used on the market, across Europe. The ECHA 
was meant to control these dynamics (through the evaluation procedures) but it has limited resources 
to do so and the dimension and complexity of the EU registration process (and problems) is 
something that can overwhelm an agency. The chapter shows that due to fundamental problems in 
the way access to chemical data works, the stability of the ECHA internal procedures (and in 
particular the role of the EU authorisation procedure) has been deeply affected. Based on a study of 
ECHA‟s handling of „Diarsenic Trioxide‟ (a substance which has been targeted for EU authorisation) it 
will be noted that „authorisation‟ can be used primarily as a way to acquire more data on the 
substances, as a form of dealing with doubts about what the risks of certain substances „really are‟. 
To be sure, the use of the EU authorisation procedure for fact finding purposes is not without 
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problems. Authorisation was created to consider and structure bans on the most dangerous 
substances, not to offer a standard way to learn about a wide-range of chemicals and their risks. 
Moreover, the dependence of ECHA on the „authorisation system‟ presents two sets of issues. First, 
this move does not sustain a credible strategy for the effectiveness of the (regulatory) policy. It is 
hardly conceivable that the authorisation procedure can grow enough to actually deal with all the data 
gaps. Secondly, the sort of legal and policy entrepreneurship that the Agency is engaging in creates a 
„checks and balances‟ difficulty. The use of the authorisation procedure for data collection purposes 
imposes tough regulatory requirements on the industry (small and medium companies, in particular, 
may suffer) and there are no real controls on this „readjustment‟ of the system.  
 
There is, as a consequence, a strong case to be made in favour of the reform of these procedures. 
The changes should be focused on two main pillars, or problems: the analysis of the chemical data 
(i.e. the identification of data gaps in the industry registrations) and a new enforcement strategy to 
deal with serious cases of non-compliance. With regard to the first point, the chapter suggests that the 
ECHA integrates environmental NGOs in the system as patrols, so that they may contribute to the 
review of the dossiers submitted by industry. The inclusion of environmental groups in the regulatory 
process is highly advantageous in that it provides the system with much needed (external) regulatory 
capacities, giving new energy to the data reviews and controls on industry. Secondly, the reform of 
the ECHA procedures needs to tackle an enforcement issue. Currently, chemical companies have 
weak incentives to comply with the EU registrations fully and to provide the Agency with all the hazard 
information. That creates a major challenge for this regulatory system for even if the industry faces 
own challenges in complying with the new registration requirements, the success of the policy 
depends to a large extent on the ability to make registration work and lead companies towards an 
ever more collaborative attitude. It is consequently recommended that a reformed system includes a 
system of fines to address serious cases of (registration) non-compliance. The responsibility to 
impose fines would fall on the Commission (and ECHA could make recommendations on this, 
including the opinions of the environmental groups involved in the relevant dossier reviews). Such a 
move would put significant pressure on the industry to provide the data, and would then (hopefully) 
also reduce the current dependence on the authorisation procedure for purposes which are outside its 
intended remit. This „solution‟ therefore addresses questions on the overall effectiveness of the policy 
as well as risks to the stability and predictability of the internal processes of the Agency. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: it begins by considering the pre-REACH European approach to 
the regulation of chemicals and its problems. Secondly, the registration process and the ECHA‟s 
administrative management of that system will be considered. Thirdly, the quality of the registration 
dossiers and the constraints on the EU public „evaluation‟ structures shall be explored. Fourthly, the 
role of the EU authorisation procedure is considered (and the case-study is also developed). The final 
section explains why the reform of the current regulatory procedures would be important.   
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1- REACH and the „burden of the past‟ 
 
Chemicals are an important part of our daily lives. In addition to their intended purposes, a great 
number of these substances also generate serious risks to public health and the environment.
380
 The 
contribution of this sector to the European economy is also significant.
381
 Some of the world‟s leading 
multinational chemical firms are based in the EU and more than 36,000 SMEs are active in this 
territory.
382
  
 
The development of a common regulatory regime for chemicals in the EU has been a concern at least 
since the 1980s. Before the entry into force of REACH (2007) the EU regulatory regime relied on a 
series of Directives and Regulations.
383
 That model was essentially shaped by a distinction between 
„existing‟ and „new‟ substances.
384
 The „new‟ substances were those entering the EU market after 
September 1981, while the „existing‟ ones were chemicals which had been reported as being on the 
EU market between January 1971 and September 1981.
385
 New substances (i.e. those introduced on 
the EU market after 1981) had to undergo a notification requirement. This was designed to help EU 
authorities acquire more information on chemicals and prepare some sort of common risk 
management model.
386
 Market access therefore became dependent on the notification of a dossier to 
the competent authority of the Member State where the manufacturer (or importer) wished to initiate 
the marketing of the substance. This „national notification‟ then generated one-stop shop rights as it 
was valid in the whole EU territory. The notification duties for new chemicals were tough (for the 
industry) as they started from a very low threshold (production or import in quantities exceeding 10kg 
per year). National authorities were also asked to perform risk assessments (since the early 1990s) 
based on the dossiers submitted by the industry, according to new EU risk standards approved during 
that period.
387
 In case EU level risk management measures were required this would be done through 
(legislative) restrictions on marketing and use. 
 
However, for chemicals that were in circulation on the EU market prior to 1981, this notification 
system did not apply. It was considered that a general requirement to supply data and to carry out 
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tests (for those substances) was “too onerous and potentially disruptive to the economy.”
388
 The 
consequence was that the regulatory regime was split, favoring old over new substances.
389
 
According to Heyvaert, this did not favor innovation and meanwhile failed to ensure a strong grip on 
old chemicals, which “tend to pose greater risks” than newer ones.
390
 Moreover, while there were 
3.800 „new‟ chemicals when REACH was introduced, the number of existing substances was much 
higher (about 100.000 chemicals).
391
 In the 1990s „data gathering‟ system established to deal with 
„existing‟ substances (through Regulation EEC 793/93), manufacturers and importers had to report 
available data on their chemicals to the Commission (and then these submissions were gathered by 
the European Chemicals Bureau).
392
 It was based on this information that the prioritizing of the 
dangerous chemicals began: the Commission prepared priority lists for the higher risk chemicals and 
these substances were subsequently assigned to the Member States for (risk) assessment.
393
 
National authorities (acting as „Rapporteurs‟) carried out risk evaluations and reported the results 
back to the Commission. Where risk management measures were required, this had to be done 
legislatively (namely, under the under the marketing and use restrictions Directive).
394
 Until 2006, the 
Commission developed four priority lists (including 141 „existing‟ high-volume substances).
395
 Only 70 
risk assessment reports had been concluded by that time (and the latter usually ended with a note 
saying that more information was needed for risk control measures to be put in place).
396
 Moreover, 
the „data-bank‟ European Chemicals Bureau observed, in 1999, that basic data on „high production 
volume‟ chemicals was only available for 14% of the substances (while for 21% there was no data 
whatsoever).
397
 All in all, while the notification procedure for new substances had positive results,
398
 
the regulation of existing substances failed to work. The industry had no real incentive to comply with 
the data submission regime and the decentralized risks assessment process was too slow and 
ineffective.
399
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The formal structures of REACH 
    
 
 
Figure 1: the tripartite and sequential structure of REACH 
 
In June 1999, the Council adopted a series of conclusions on a new European chemicals strategy, 
which then informed the Commission White Paper (2001) outlining a „Strategy for a future Chemicals 
Policy‟.
400
 Here, the Commission proposes to establish „REACH‟ (for the Registration, Evaluation and 
Authorisation of Chemicals). Following years of negotiations, REACH entered into force in 1 June 
2007.
401
 
 
REACH replaced a series of legislative acts by one Regulation.
402
 It puts an end to the distinction 
between „new‟ and „existing‟ substances that characterised the previous regulatory regime, 
establishing instead a single system for all chemicals.
403
 It seeks to have them all registered, 
evaluated and to subject the most dangerous ones to a new authorisation requirement.
404
 Only 
chemical substances produced or imported in quantities equal or above 1 tonne per year fall under 
REACH.
405
 This threshold is actually higher than the previous notification requirement for „new‟ 
substances (which started at 10kg per year) and in practice it means that it requires the registration of 
about 30.000 chemicals (most of which are „old‟ ones).
406
 Substances are now described as non-
phase-in (i.e. those not produced or marketed prior to the entry into force of REACH) and phase-in 
(which are effectively the older ones).
407
 The previous category of „new substances‟ (post-1981), 
which had undergone notification duties, are immediately considered to be part of REACH and their 
former registration number (in the EILINCS list) is converted into a new identification reference.
408
 
Whereas REACH targets all chemicals (old and new), the big challenge (as explained above) is to 
overcome the data gaps on the former “existing substances”.
409
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The starting point of REACH is therefore the registration of all substances above the 1 tonne 
threshold (see details below).
410
 While registration duties vary according to the properties of the 
chemicals and their level of production or import (see below), these provisions generally “require 
manufacturers and importers to generate data on the substances they manufacture or import, to use 
these data to assess the risks related to these substances and to develop and recommend 
appropriate risk management measures.”
411
 It is therefore not just about compiling data; it also 
involves an assessment (by the industry) of the risks presented by “their” substances and how these 
can be tackled. Registration is also a very demanding process for the industry: it involves thousands 
of companies and it establishes new and tough regulatory requirements which can be difficult to cope 
with.
412
  
Secondly, the „evaluation‟ procedures may be activated as soon as a substance has been registered. 
Evaluation exists to check the quality of the registration dossiers, to ask the industry to correct and 
improve the data which they have submitted and to develop a better understanding on the 
substances‟ risks.
413
 There are two types of evaluations: dossier evaluations and substance 
evaluations.
414
 The investigation of the dossiers can involve compliance checks (i.e. assessing 
whether the registrations comply with the REACH legal requirements) and examinations of the 
industry‟s testing proposals by the ECHA secretariat.
415
 The REACH Regulation only demands that 
the ECHA performs compliance checks on at least 5% of the total number of registration dossiers 
received.
416
 The substance evaluations, on the other hand, focus on substances that raise an initial 
concern, and which therefore require “further evaluation”.
417
 This responsibility falls on the national 
authorities, which are assigned specific substances for the purpose of that examination.
418
 The 
substance evaluation process has not yet started, but will begin soon (January 2012).
419
  
Thirdly, REACH introduces an authorisation procedure targeting the most dangerous substances on 
the EU market.
420
 The institutional selection of substances for authorisation is formally independent 
from the registration and the evaluation processes; it is carried out through “identification” of 
substances of very high concern (which are included in a candidate list) and their subsequent 
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“prioritisation” for authorisation.
421
 These SVHC substances are eventually included in the Annex XIV 
of the Regulation and can only be approved if their risks are considered to be “adequately controlled” 
or if the socio-economic benefits associated with them outweigh the risks and no safer substitutes are 
available.
422
 The expert opinions of the ECHA on applications for authorisation are prepared by two 
technical bodies: the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) and the Socio-Economic Committee 
(SEAC).
423
 The importance of the socio-economic assessments and of the substitution investigations 
suggests that authorisation is not just about banning or approving substances in the EU market. It 
constitutes a series of administrative processes designed to generate more data on the substances‟ 
risks and about the overall technical and social context in which they are used.  
2- The complexities of registration and the constraints on the ECHA 
 
Registration fundamentally changes the relationship between private and public actors in EU 
regulation of chemicals. The initial reliance on the industry for the provision of data on the substances 
via the registration system may have important advantages, but it is not without problems. The big 
challenge has been (as we shall see below when looking at the evaluation of the dossiers) the quality 
of the data provided by industry during registration. Moreover, the registration process requires much 
collaboration within the industry, particularly for data sharing and joint submission of dossiers, and 
that has not always gone down well. The level of administrative support which is needed at this stage 
largely exceeds what had been expected and creates difficulties. We shall see that conflicts within the 
industry during registration may affect the quality of the dossiers, consume ECHA technical resources 
and attract disputes to the Agency itself.  
 
Chemicals produced or imported into the EU in quantities exceeding 1 tonne per year have to be 
registered with the ECHA.
424
 This system operates on the basis of a series of deadlines, prioritising 
substances produced or imported in higher quantities as well as those with dangerous intrinsic 
properties (see figure 1, below).
425
 After the lapse of the applicable (final) registration date, 
substances cannot be marketed unless they have been registered in the ECHA system („no data, no 
market‟).
426
 For the companies, registration can involve either the preparation of a technical dossier or 
a (more demanding) chemical safety report.
427
 These are distinguished by a tonnage trigger. The 
technical dossier (which applies for substances produced or imported in quantities between 1 and 10 
tonnes) essentially involves the communication of adequate information on the substances.
428
 In that 
dossier, data on the properties, uses and classification of the substance (as well as guidance on safe 
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use) should be found. On the other hand, a chemical safety report (which applies to substances 
manufactured or imported in quantities exceeding 10 tonnes per year) includes not just data about the 
properties of the substance and the exposure profiles, but also the set of risk reduction measures that 
need to be put in place to ensure safe production and use.
429
 In practice, however, the majority of the 
substances do not require the stricter chemical safety report registration duties as most of them are 
produced or imported into Europe below the 10 tonnes per year level (1 - 10 t/y = 17,500 substances; 
10-100 t/y = 4977 substances; 100-1000 t/y = 2641 substances; and > 1000 t/y = 7204 
substances).
430
 
 
The very large dimension of the registration process suggests that the challenges for the ECHA, in 
terms of organizing the system and then checking the quality of the dossiers, are significant. Overall, 
about 30.000 chemicals will be registered over a period of 11 years (until 2018).
431
 Until 2010 (the first 
registration deadline was on November of that year) ECHA had received 25.000 registration dossiers 
for 4.300 chemical substances (there can be several registrants of the same chemical substance, as 
we shall see below).
432
 Out of these almost 4.300 chemicals, 3.400 were phase-in (i.e. older) 
substances.
433
 Regarding this latter (phase-in) category, the first registration deadline targeted: a) 
substances produced or imported in quantities of 1000 tonnes or more per year; b) „low production or 
import‟ CMR chemicals reaching the 1 tonne threshold (i.e. carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic for 
reproduction, category 1 or 2); and c) substances above the 100 tonne threshold classified as „very 
toxic to aquatic organisms which may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment‟.
434
 
The first (November 2010) registration deadline therefore mostly affected substances produced or 
imported above 1000 tonnes per year (very high production) in addition to the lower production CMRs 
(“very high concern” chemicals). In 2010 there were 17.459 registrations for the >1000 t/yr (phase-in) 
group and 765 for the 1-10 t/yr category.
435
 As a consequence, the great majority of the dossiers were 
submitted by “large industry” (about 87%).
436
 More registrations from SMEs are expected starting from 
the May 2013 registration deadline. 
 
Initially, it was hoped that after the submission of the registration dossiers, the setting up of automated 
IT systems by the ECHA would ensure that the need for ECHA human intervention at this level would 
be kept to a minimum.
437
 Registrations only had to undergo a simple electronic check to verify 
completeness.
438
 But the dynamics of registration soon showed that the process would be much more 
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complex and demanding for the Agency. This is mainly because during registration companies have 
obligations to share data and this often results in disputes between them.
439
 Data sharing is organised 
in the so called “Substance Information Exchange Forums” (SIEF).
440
 For every substance there 
should be one SIEF. Members of the SIEFs include “all relevant actors submitting information to the 
Agency on the same phase-in substance” (i.e. mainly potential registrants but also downstream users 
and third parties).
441
  
 
The idea behind these platforms is that potential registrants can see what studies are available and 
request access to them where needed (for registration).
442
 The owners of the studies have to react to 
requests for data sharing and seek financial compensation in a fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory way.
443
 The organisation of companies in the SIEFs also facilitates the joint submission 
of the registration dossier.
444
 Within each SIEF, a „lead registrant‟ is selected to submit the parts of the 
data that have to be sent jointly, and then each registrant will be responsible for sending the 
remaining information to the ECHA.
445
 By July 2011, there were 3280 SIEFs in operation.
446
 One of 
the difficulties associated with the SIEFs is that leading these platforms has costs for their „leaders‟ 
and can be difficult. ECHA has noted that “[f]eedback from industry associations indicated that some 
registrants were reluctant to take over the lead registrant responsibilities due to the amount of 
resources needed for administering the SIEF and preparing the joint submission as well as the lack of 
understanding of the legal obligations.”
447 
 
Moreover, the occurrence of many data sharing disputes has forced the ECHA to intervene strongly in 
this area. ECHA notes that “severe problems among the registrants” relate to “data-sharing in general 
and cost-sharing in particular”.
448
 In order to avoid the duplication of tests with vertebrate animals, 
ECHA tries to force agreement between those who have already made those tests and others who 
wish to get access to them. But if the concerned parties fail to agree on the terms of the data sharing, 
two things may happen. First, if the owner of a study (with vertebrate animals) “refuses to provide 
either proof of the cost of that study or the study itself” to another SIEF participant, he will not be able 
to register the substance (unless the ECHA allows him to).
449
 In cases where the study that is being 
requested by a potential registrant is included in a dossier that has already been registered (and, 
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again, the parties cannot agree on the sharing of the data or on the level of compensation), the 
Agency has to “perform an assessment” on whether one of the parties has failed “to make every 
effort” to find a solution to the dispute at hand.
450
 ECHA may then decide to grant the potential 
registrant permission to refer to the information that was requested (subject to financial compensation 
to the party that performed the study).
451
 In this context, ECHA is expecting that as we approach the 
subsequent registration deadlines, its decisions on data sharing will often be followed by appeals 
(through the internal Board of Appeal)
452
 and that this will then imply a “substantial amount of work” 
for its legal defence.
453
  
 
As a consequence of these problems, the Agency says that while it still hopes to achieve “fully 
automated registrations and workflows”, the pre-registration experience has shown that “failure or 
insufficient functioning of IT systems can have a dramatic impact on the need for human intervention, 
specifically for support at technical-administrative level.”
454
 It also observes that while “initially it was 
assumed that technical compliance checks and invoicing would be almost entirely automated 
procedures”, in fact “only a partial automation was possible” and “many technical and administrative 
verification steps of dossiers are required, especially for the dossiers submitted by the lead registrants 
of each SIEF.”
455
  
 
3 - The quality of the registrations and the public controls in „evaluation‟ 
 
While the official discourse at the ECHA is that the industry is „living up‟ to its challenges, the fact is 
also that many mistakes and shortcomings have been identified in the registrations. One of the central 
concerns is the quality of the dossiers, which is often poor.
456
 According to an ECHA official, what is 
missing is often the description of “what exactly is being done with the substances.”
457
 While 
compliance checks “confirm whether registrants have fulfilled their obligations with regard to REACH 
information requirements in many aspects of hazard and exposure information”, ECHA notes that until 
this moment “these initial checks have indicated that a significant proportion of dossiers have 
shortcomings and still need to be improved with further information”.
458
 More specifically: while “many 
endpoint records and exposure scenarios are filled with valid information”, the registrants “often did 
not provide dossiers in compliance with all the information requirements.”
459
 According to the ECHA, 
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the industry is generally unable to justify why new studies are not necessary as a way to assess the 
proprieties of the substances and their effects on humans and on the environment.
460
  
 
The ECHA is meant to conduct compliance checks on 5% of the registration dossiers (for each 
tonnage band). The Agency performs random and non-random checks.
461
 While ECHA has defined 
“prioritisation criteria” to select the dossiers subject to compliance checks;
462
 it is also considered 
“highly recommended” that this is complemented by a system where dossiers are selected “mainly at 
random in the first years after entering into force of REACH in order to be able to identify the main 
reasons for non-compliance.”
463
 This (5%) minimum target means that few dossiers are actually 
checked. There is also an issue about the intensity of the ECHA‟s scrutiny of those dossiers targeted 
for compliance review. According to an agency official, while “any registrant who has submitted an 
incompliant dossier is in breach of the law and may face regulatory action, it has to be acknowledged 
that it was and remains challenging for companies to comply with the new requirements, both in terms 
of workload and understanding and complying with the novel regulatory approach imposed by 
REACH.”
464
 The ECHA seems to prefer “active feedback and stressing the fact that industry remains 
responsible for the content of their dossiers, also after the registration deadline” instead of a bolder 
strategy targeted at problematic dossiers.
465
  
 
When ECHA performs dossier compliance checks, it can choose to do three things: 1) no further 
action (when the information is considered sufficient); 2) submission of a „quality observation letter‟ to 
the registrant (in case there are shortcomings “not necessarily related to the lack of information”); or 
3) issue a „draft decision‟ to the registrant if missing data is identified and ordering corrections to be 
made until a certain date.
466
 Data from 2010 shows that only 17 % of the evaluated dossiers were 
concluded with a final decision (the majority are either readily accepted or subject to a quality 
observation letter, which tends to focus on classification and labeling issues).
467
 At least until that 
date, the ECHA did less dossier compliance checks than required by REACH (i.e. the minimum target 
set by the Regulation is 5% compliance reviews for every tonnage band).
468
 While recent data (2011) 
shows that more draft decisions are being sent to the registrants when compared to previous years,
469
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there are indications that the ECHA continues to do perform less compliance checks of high 
production substances (> 1000 tonnes per year) than it does for lower production ones.
470
  
 
The ECHA dossier reviews are also very constrained processes. As the ECHA explains, the “outcome 
of a compliance check is a request for further information.”
471
 The requested information “concerns 
specific studies on properties of the substance, or information on uses and exposure.”
472
 It is noted 
that while “missing information elements that are used for the derivation of the risk characterisation 
and risk management” may to a certain extent be addressed through a draft decision, “the actual risk 
management measures applied or recommended by the registrants cannot be addressed or corrected 
by requesting further information.”
473
 The actual risk management measures will have to be adopted 
„later‟ under the appropriate REACH, CLP (classification, labelling and packaging) or other legislative 
frameworks.
474
 Meanwhile, the ECHA notes that “there remain expectations that the compliance 
check will address such [risk management] issues.”
475
 This rigidity is not helpful and the ECHA now 
considers that the “borderlines of compliance checks versus other risk management mechanisms 
under REACH […] needs further discussion with all stakeholders to be better defined.”
476
 This ECHA 
warning is important and it indicates that while the challenges involved in the assessment and 
management of risks in this area very fluid and dynamic, the current institutional structures are too 
rigid and self-contained. 
 
‘Substance evaluations’ and the limited levels of national outsourcing  
 
The REACH assessment processes comprise not only the review of the quality of the dossiers, but 
also a “substance evaluation” system.
477
 While the dossier evaluations are focused on the quality of 
the dossier, the substance evaluations serve to clarify an “initial concern” with the substances, to 
acquire more information on them and to consider whether and how that data should be used for risk 
management purposes.
478
 Unlike the evaluation of the dossiers (an ECHA responsibility), the 
substance evaluations will be carried out by the Member States‟ competent authorities.
479
 The 
allocation of substances to particular NCAs is carried out via a Community Rolling Action Plan 
(CoRAP).
480
 This plan is currently being prepared and the substance evaluations should take-off in 
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2012.
481
 During the process of drafting the CoRAP, a national authority which is interested in the 
evaluation of a substance has to explain “the grounds for considering that the substance constitutes a 
risk to human health or the environment and argue why […] the substance should be prioritised for 
addition to the draft Community rolling action plan […]”.
482
 While the ECHA “coordinates” the 
preparation of the CoRAP and the allocation of substances for different NCAs, it cannot impose 
particular chemicals on the national authorities.
483
 
 
One of the most interesting aspects about the operation of this EU regulatory system is the link 
between internal capacity constraints and the lack of national outsourcing. During its first years of 
existence, the ECHA secretariat has had to manage a very demanding registration process and 
performed many dossier checks on those registrations. The structure of these processes and the 
commencement of the substance evaluations in 2012, emphasises a preference for having much of 
the technical work being performed „in-house‟. Once the substance evaluations begin, however, it is 
likely that the regulatory burden on the national authorities will increase. The performance of a 
substance evaluation requires the previous assessment of the registration dossier (for quality 
assessment purposes) and where the ECHA secretariat has not yet done this, the national competent 
authority will have to do that work herself.
484
  
 
The substance evaluations should suffer from many of the constraints on the ECHA dossier checks. 
When a substance evaluation is initiated, the amount of information that is available largely depends 
on the quality of the data that the industry has supplied when it submitted the registration dossier.
485
 
Moreover, the substance evaluations are limited from a risk management perspective. While the 
substance evaluations allow national authorities to „prepare‟ subsequent risk management strategies 
if that is considered necessary (see below); the actual evaluation of the substance only allows public 
authorities to ask the industry to provide more data on the substances. The national authorities are 
equally dependent on the industry for the provision of that information. The outcome of a substance 
evaluation consists of a decision on whether sufficient information is available to clarify the existing 
concerns and, where more information is needed, a formal decision shall be sent to the registrant.
486
 
The enforcement of those decisions should remain difficult. We shall see below that these constraints 
are putting more pressure on the ECHA authorisation procedure.  
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4- The expansion of the authorisation procedure and its problems 
 
One of the new and more significant features of REACH is the introduction of an authorisation 
procedure targeting the most dangerous substances on the EU market.
487
 Once chemicals are 
included in the authorisation list they can only continue to be marketed if they benefit from this EU 
authorisation.
488
 But the authorisation procedure is also a complex and staged process. Its importance 
lies not only in the decision to keep or ban a substance on the market, but on a series of 
administrative steps which deal with the “identification” and “prioritisation” of substance for 
authorisation.
489
 The authorisation procedure therefore begins with the preparation of an Annex XV 
dossier for the identification of a substance of “very high concern” (i.e. SVHC).
490
 This is done either 
by the ECHA (on behalf of the Commission) or by an NCA (following a procedure in which other 
national authorities and the ECHA are given a chance to comment on the proposed Annex XV 
dossier).
491
 If no comments are received or agreement is reached on a SVHC dossier, the relevant 
substance is included in the so-called „candidate list‟.
492
 The chemicals on the candidate list are not 
subject to authorisation immediately. Within this list, substances that are considered to require 
„priority‟ have to be assessed first, taking into account the ECHA‟s capacity to handle the 
authorisation applications.
493
 This “prioritisation” is orchestrated by the ECHA secretariat, which 
selects (according to a set of pre-defined criteria) the priority substances for inclusion in Annex XIV - 
the formal EU chemicals authorisation list.
494
 The national authorities are also engaged in the process 
through the Member State Committee.
495
 Based on an ECHA technical recommendation, the 
Commission then decides (via comitology) on the inclusion of these substances in Annex XIV, for 
authorisation.
496
 After a substance has been included in Annex XIV, applications for authorisation may 
be submitted by the manufacturer(s), importer(s), and/or downstream user(s) of the substance.
497
 The 
Commission is responsible for deciding on these applications, while the ECHA provides an expert 
advice on this.
498
 It does so through the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) and the Socio-Economic 
Committee (SEAC), depending on the particular authorisation „route‟ (as we shall see below).
499
 
 
Importantly, this EU authorisation procedure is formally independent from the registration and 
evaluation processes. The subjection of a substance to authorisation does not require that it has 
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previously been registered or evaluated by the ECHA. This introduces a dimension of fluidity in the 
regulatory system. Whereas the ECHA explains that the “normal procedure” for the “identification” of a 
SVHC (i.e. the beginning of the authorisation procedure) is that “readily available sources such as 
registration dossiers and results from previous evaluation(s) are obtained and reviewed”, the 
„identification‟ may still proceed without the registration of the substance if the required information is 
available.
500
 Different scenarios can therefore be envisioned. A substance may „only‟ be registered 
and not yet evaluated and still be identified as a very high concern chemical. It is also possible that a 
substance has not even been registered but a SVHC dossier has already been prepared. What 
matters therefore is the information that is (or not) available and the different functions which these 
particular institutional layers occupy in the regulatory system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Simplified description of authorisation procedure
501
 
 
The importance of the substitution analysis and the socio-economic assessment 
 
Once substances are included in Annex XIV (following the prioritisation process described above) 
they can be authorised either through the „adequate control‟ route or via the „socio-economic‟ route.
502
 
If the risks posed by a chemical are considered to be “adequately controlled”, an authorisation may be 
granted; but even if that is not the case, an authorisation can still be given if the socio-economic 
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benefits outweigh the risks and no safer alternatives are available.
503
 The discovery of alternatives is 
therefore a crucial part of the authorisation procedure, and so is the understanding of the socio-
economic context of the substances. Whereas the preparation of a substitution plan (i.e. the 
commitment to substitute the substance under consideration by another one) is only required if the 
alternative is in fact safer and in case this substitution is technically and economically feasible for the 
applicant,
504
 every application for authorisation has to come with an analysis of alternatives.
505
 Even 
in the socio-economic route (which will only be considered if no substitutes are available) ECHA 
wants companies to invest in the research of potential substitutes and this will be taken into account 
when deciding the precise terms of the authorisation (e.g. length of the review period for the 
authorisation).
506
 On the other hand, while REACH does not require a socio-economic assessment 
(SEA) under the „adequate control‟ authorisation route, the Agency recommends that every 
application includes that evaluation and (again) this can affect the precise terms of the authorisation 
(review periods, for example).
507
 This requires much from the industry, which has to invest significant 
resources in the identification of those socio-economic effects, communicate with the users and 
interested parties, and make its own case on the balancing of the chemicals‟ risks against the wider 
advantages associated with them.
508
 The key in a SEA is to “identify (and where possible quantify) the 
impacts that could occur under a refused authorisation in a proportionate and robust way.”
509
 To that 
end, applicants have to define the so called “non-use” scenario (i.e. what would happen in case the 
authorisation is refused), and what would be the “likely response of relevant actors (manufacturers, 
downstream users, consumers, suppliers of alternatives, etc.)” if the substance becomes unavailable 
for a given use.”
510
 The socio-economic assessment requires applicants to assess sensitive and 
complex issues (e.g. employment concerns, relocations and trade-related matters, regional aspects).     
 
The relevance of the substitution analysis as well as the growing status of the SEA suggests that the 
EU chemicals authorisation procedure represents much more than a „yes or no‟ answer to the 
marketing of particular chemicals. It is better understood as a staged, complex and interactive 
process through which the EU regulatory system seeks to learn about the precise risks involved the 
use of chemicals that cause concern, force the investigation of safer alternatives by the industry and 
understand the socio-economic benefits of the said substances.
511
 Authorisation ensures an extensive 
analysis of risks and socio-economic benefits (from the applicants); but also the obligation of each 
manufacturer, importer and downstream user of the concerned substances to apply for an 
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authorisation for their own uses.
512
 Considering the process of inclusion of a substance (Diarsenic 
Trioxide) in the EU authorisation list, the next section explains that this „learning‟ potential of the EU 
authorisation procedure is being extensively relied on by ECHA to compensate for registration and 
internal capacity problems in the regulatory system.   
 
Diarsenic Trioxide  
 
Based on a dossier prepared by the French Competent Authority, Diarsenic Trioxide (DT) was 
identified as a Substance of Very High Concern (SVHC) as it is classified as a carcinogen (i.e. may 
provoke cancer) and it was then included in the candidate list for authorisation on October 2008.
513
 
DT is mainly used in Europe in the manufacture of glass, zinc by electrolysis and ultra-pure arsenic 
metal.
514
 In the glass sector (where it has raised more concerns, as we shall see below), this 
substance is used (according to the ECHA) in the manufacturing process as a “decolourisation agent, 
enamel or a fining [removal of glass bubbles from the glass melt] agent.”
515
 According to official 
estimates, the manufacturing volumes of diarsenic Trioxide within the EU are around 1,820 t/y.
516
 The 
imported amounts are between 500 – 600 t/y (and those disposed of are about 200 t/y).
517
 This 
means a total volume placed on the global market of 2,200 t/y.
518
 As most of this volume (above 1,200 
t/y) is exported to regions outside the European Union, the volume actually used within the EU is “in 
the range of 690 – 850 t/y […]”
519
 Concerning the glass manufacturing sector (which is the one that 
has raised more concerns, as we shall see below), the level of use of Diarsenic Trioxide in the EU is 
estimated at 150 t/y, and most of this “is used for the production of special glass”.
520
  
 
The concerns of the ECHA with regards to Diarsenic Trioxide are thus essentially focused on the use 
of this substance in the manufacture of glass.
521
 According to the industry, the glass sector “applies in 
general strict exposure restriction conditions as it uses several materials with CMR properties” and 
“due to the high toxicity of [Diarsenic Trioxide], the material is handled in industrial facilities under 
strictly controlled conditions (SCC).”
522
 The ECHA notes, however, that regarding “occupational 
exposure, there seem to be problems with preventing such exposure in the manufacturing of hand-
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made decorative glass for arts and crafts […]”.
523
 According to the Agency: “[…] it is well recognized 
that different from the industrial glass sector, SCC is not guaranteed for the artisan handmade glass 
sector where supply of the material and mixing often occur under suboptimal conditions.”
524
 This 
evidence was obtained from studies conducted in the Murano district of Venice, which showed that 
the risks of lung cancer for those glass workers were higher than normal.
525
 Indeed, biological 
monitoring of those working in these glass manufactories (Murano) showed that “workers employed in 
the mixture preparation and in the furnace work are still significantly exposed to arsenic despite the 
technical preventive measures adopted.”
526
 In this Italian district, there are about 80 production sites 
and each of them employs around 800 – 1000 workers in the manufacturing of arsenic containing art 
glass.
527
 Also, in Murano, the annual consumption of As2O3 [molecular formula of DT] for art glass 
manufacture is about 8.2 t and 12 t/yr in the entire Italian territory.
528
 ECHA observes that whereas the 
industry (As-Consortium) “tried to find confirmation if practices in the artisan handmade glass making 
would lead to As2O3 exposure in other areas”, it still “could not find confirmation of such.”
 529
 Unlike 
the Italian situation, the industry‟s investigations show that in countries such as Austria or Belgium the 
artisan glass productions “seem either to use other substances for the fining and decolourisation in 
these types of crystal or have better controlled exposure management […]”.
530
 Importantly, the 
National Competent Authorities (MSC) concluded that it is “not clear” whether occupational 
exposure to DT “is a problem for the entire glass production industry or only of this specific 
part of it, i.e., artisanal glass production.”
531
 [Emphasis mine] In the light of these concerns, the 
Member State Committee decided (on December of 2010) to propose the prioritization of Diarsenic 
Trioxide for an EU authorisation.
532
 
 
The Member State Committee discussions on Diarsenic Trioxide emphasise the fluidity of the EU 
regulatory system. The MSC had to decide whether or not to wait for the registration of the substance 
(which would have been available after 1 December 2010 at the earliest) before moving forward with 
further risk management measures.
533
 This (registration) information should then have allowed the 
MSC to better understand “the widespread use of the substance” and, hence, the real dimension of its 
risks.
534
 The committee considered, however, that the registration of DT would not generate the 
required information on its uses. The industry intended to register DT as an “„intermediate‟” (i.e. a 
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substance that is used in the manufacturing of another substance where it is itself transformed into 
that other substance); which would mean that only limited data would be submitted.
535
 For the ECHA, 
the use of DT in glass manufacture could not be classified as an intermediate as it is “not used in the 
synthesis of glass itself but as processing agent for modifying the properties of glass […]”.
536
 The 
ECHA cannot, however, impose its views on this or force the future registrant to submit the dossier 
according to a particular understanding of the substance‟s uses or its appropriate legal definition. This 
is a job for the industry. Moreover, this Diarsenic Trioxide episode appears to reflect a wider concern 
in the ECHA about the registrations. The Agency has noted that its “screening of over 400 registration 
dossiers for intermediates has indicated that 86% of them appear not to contain sufficient information 
to demonstrate that these conditions are fulfilled.”
537
 Companies are supplying less information than 
they are supposed to and there is not much that the ECHA is doing to control this.  
 
 
      
 
 
 
Figure 3: The operation of the REACH regulatory model in the case of Diarsenic Trioxide: this may happen in 
many other cases. While it is does not represent an „abuse of power‟ as such, the extensive use of authorisation 
for fact finding purposes forms an institutional anomaly, and it is problematic.  
 
In contexts of uncertainty and internal capacity constraints, the use of the authorisation procedure has 
advantages for the ECHA.
538
 The Member State Committee‟s conclusion that glass production 
problems in the Murano district “may occur in some similar sites throughout the EU” and that “there is 
no exposure data for the industrial glass production with the use of diarsenic trioxide” was therefore 
important.
539
 It was also noted by the Committee that an authorisation would “improve the conditions 
in the whole glass industry […]”.
540
 This reasoning suggests that substances may be included in the 
EU authorisation list primarily as a way to get more information on their uses. The authorisation „path‟ 
offers greater guarantees that the industry will not be able to hide behind incomplete registration 
dossiers.  
 
While the institutional dynamics of Diarsenic Trioxide do not necessarily represent an „abuse of 
power‟ as such, the extensive use of authorisation for fact finding purposes is an institutional anomaly 
(and it is not without problems). Authorisation can represent a significant burden for the industry 
(particularly for small and medium enterprises) and imposes regulatory obligations on third-parties 
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(i.e. downstream users of the substances) which cannot be blamed for registration failures.
541
 
Perhaps more importantly, the reliance on EU authorisation to compensate for internal capacity 
constraints is inevitably limited in terms of its effectiveness and has its own problems. Registration 
involves thousands of companies and of substances. It is simply inconceivable that the EU 
authorisation procedure can grow enough so as to deal with most of the serious data gaps that 
remain in the system.       
 
The limits of judicial controls  
 
The inclusion of substances in the EU candidate list for authorisation has (we shall see below) led to 
litigation in the General Court and it is expected that the judiciary will also have to consider cases of 
Annex XIV inclusions (i.e. imposition of the EU authorisation requirement). However, judicial controls 
not only fail to constrain potential cases of public abuse, they are also incapable of solving any of the 
capacity problems which this EU regulatory system currently faces.  
 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is now established that acts of agencies can be 
reviewed by the EU Courts if they are “intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”
542
 The 
question is therefore what type of acts can be considered to “bring about a change” in the parties‟ 
“legal position”.
543
 This question has emerged in the context of the ECHA candidate list entries. A 
number of chemical producers whose substances have been included in the candidate list are trying 
to challenge these decisions in the General Court.
544
 The EU Courts are adopting, however, a 
restrictive position that leaves these activities out of the control radar. While the General Court has 
not yet decided on the main proceedings of these cases, the President of this Court has already 
rejected a request for the interim suspension of ECHA‟s decision to include a substance (Acrylamide) 
in the candidate list.
545
 In the case of Acrylamide, the applicant (SNF SAS), one of the world‟s leading 
manufacturers of this substance, sought to suspend the ECHA‟s inclusion of this chemical in the 
candidate list with the argument that this decision is causing considerable damage to its business.
546
 
It contends that as a consequence of the identification of acrylamide as „very high concern‟ (and its 
consequent inclusion in the candidate list), its customers are already anticipating a ban on the 
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substance and will start using other alternatives instead.
547
 The Court disagreed with that 
assessment. Accordingly, the identification of acrylamide as a substance of very high concern 
“essentially does no more than confirm that it is potentially „hazardous‟”.
548
 While the Court recognises 
that the aim of “authorisation” is the progressive replacement of very high concern substances for 
suitable substances and technologies, that is “far” from establishing “an absolute and unconditional 
objective of replacement”, and “makes the replacement envisaged dependent upon the economic and 
technical viability of those alternative substances and technologies” and on the evaluation of the 
socio-economic benefits of the substance.
549
  
 
The Court‟s assessment in the Acrylamide case also raises the question of whether it is possible to 
challenge Commission decisions including substances in the EU authorisation list (Annex XIV). 
Arguably, these acts are different from candidate list entries. They do not just confirm the dangerous 
properties of the substances (i.e. their “identification”) but already involve a stronger form of regulatory 
treatment. While the Order of the President of the General Court in „Acrylamide‟ leaves some margin 
for interpretation, his reading suggests that judicial review of these decisions is difficult. The argument 
according to which the ECHA candidate list acts are not reviewable by the Courts because they do 
not force the substitution of the substances but depend on subsequent administrative assessments is 
also valid for the Annex XIV inclusions.
550
 For the Courts to control the (Commission) decisions which 
impose the EU authorisation requirement, the legal status of the ECHA technical opinions would also 
have to be addressed.
551
 The EU Courts currently accept that the “formal legality” of agency opinions 
to the Commission can be controlled; but the fact that (here) the ECHA is only “preparing” the 
authorisations is relevant.
552
 The General Court may still decide to strengthen the duties of 
justification on the Agency by requiring it to provide further reasons in support of its „Annex XIV‟ 
technical proposals.  
 
The public information on the ECHA‟s Annex XIV opinions to the Commission is already extensive, 
however. More duties of justification on ECHA would only be useful if the level of uncertainty 
concerning the risks was not so high. The intervention of the EU Courts in this area would not appear 
to actually constrain possible instances of public abuse and it does not solve the internal capacity 
problems of the EU regulatory system. The „solution‟ might have to be found in a reform of ECHA‟s 
role and powers in the control of the industry registrations.    
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5- The need to reform the ECHA procedures: external capacities and fines 
 
The deficits of the new EU chemicals policy have been a problem for ECHA and have an important 
impact on the dynamics of its internal processes. The current limitations of the registration system and 
the lack of capacity to control this through own resources generate a dysfunction in the way that 
procedures are used. There are also issues about (and limits to) the extent to which the system can 
support „more authorisations‟. This is hardly a standard option to deal with thousands of substances 
and with much uncertainty on their uses and risks. It is not coincidental that, according to the ECHA, 
the “growing workload of the [authorisation] Committees […] is a cause for concern and the support 
for the members should be strengthened.”
553
 It has also been observed that the Risk Assessment 
Committee “will face an unmanageable workload in the coming years” and that the magnitude of this 
work shall “depend especially upon the number of authorisation applications which are foreseen to 
reach a level of 200-400 annually in 2013-2014.”
554
 In other words, there is a limit as to how much 
ECHA can do through „authorisation‟ and those institutional processes should not be relied on too 
much for things that are not directly connected to the approval or rejection of the substances. 
The reform of the ECHA procedures therefore has to take into account the promotion of a more 
effective policy and the maintenance of an internal structure that is predictable and which prevents 
institutional anomalies (such as the ones we currently find). Two dimensions of the regulatory model, 
in particular, should be reconsidered. The first concerns the relationship between internal resource 
constraints and the reliance on external capacities. The second deals with the enforcement of 
regulatory decisions and the controls on the industry. With respect to the first issue, ECHA could rely 
on environmental NGOs to serve as patrols and support the Agency in the review of the industry 
registration dossiers and the missing data. The new environmental patrols would not displace the 
basic authority of the Agency in the performance of those checks, but would inject more energy and 
capabilities in the regulatory system. Such collaboration could be organised by granting access to the 
data to the environmental group (or groups) and allowing them, at the end, to include (attach) an 
opinion on the relevant file and concerning the data that is possibly missing. One way to think about 
this partnership would be through the lens of regulatory “tripartism” (with some adaptations, as 
explained below).
555
 Tripartism is, according to its proponents: “a process in which relevant public 
interest groups (PIGs) become the fully fledged third player in the [regulatory] game.”
556
 This 
approach empowers certain public interest groups (which have to show ability to perform the work 
and commitment to the objectives of the regulatory strategy) by giving them “access to all the 
information that is available to the regulator” and by involving the latter in the “real business of 
regulation”.
557
 Tripartism was originally conceived in a context that is somewhat different to the one 
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considered here. It was promoted as a way to deal with the risk of „capture‟.
558
 The idea, here, is not 
really to transform the environmental groups into a “fully-fledged third player” in the system, but to use 
them as patrols, to benefit from additional (external) capacity as a way to control information better 
and to identify problematic cases of industry non-compliance (with EU registration requirements). The 
selection of the particular environmental groups would also be based on an idea of “contestability”.
559
 
Different environmental groups should compete for this policing role, which (hopefully) would also 
generate more interest in these positions and generate the appropriate capacity to perform the work.   
Still, it is clear that use of external patrols will only be useful if the regulatory system is capable of 
ensuring that companies in fact supply more (quality) data on their substances. Additional resources, 
alone, might not solve the problem. One of the issues with the current model is that companies lack 
incentives to supply a full and complete description of their substances and of hazard profiles. The 
regulatory model needs to recognise this difficulty and tighten up the controls on the industry in what 
the provision of data is concerned. It is therefore suggested that the Commission be given the power 
to fine companies which have consistently and repeatedly failed to provide the data or shown lack of a 
credible effort to acquire that information and supply it to the Agency. The responsibility of the ECHA 
would be to make recommendations on fines, and the opinions of the environmental patrols should be 
attached to the relevant file. That should increase the pressure on the industry to fulfil its legal and 
regulatory obligations. The fines could, in addition, be expected to stabilise the internal processes of 
ECHA. It would become clearer that the authorisation procedure is only to be used if no other 
alternative can be found. Moreover, the Commission fines could be contested, judicially. On the basis 
of Article 263 TFEU, companies would be able to challenge these fines as they clearly interfere with 
their legal position.  
In conclusion, one might borrow the terms of Harlow and Rawlings and say that this is an example of 
an area where we should give “green light” to the (European) public administration.
560
 Instead of 
conceiving the role of Law as that of establishing clear and fixed boundaries for governmental action 
or place all emphasis on the need to control the administrative activity of the state (the “red-light” 
perspective), the „green light‟ view would accept that administrative law can be a “vehicle for political 
progress” and “welcomes the administrative state”.
561
 Accordingly, the role of administrative law is not 
only to “stop bad administrative practice, and there might be better ways to achieve this than 
adjudication”; but to “enhance individual and collective liberty conceived in positive and not just 
negative terms.”
562
 There are strong reasons to allow the ECHA to have the initiative on fines and to 
allow the Commission to impose them (where that is considered to be very much necessary). The 
poor policy of the EU in this area creates not only a problem in terms of its overall effectiveness; it is 
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also problematic from the viewpoint of the institutional dysfunctions it generates (and the negative 
impacts which this implies for „checks and balances‟).   
Conclusion  
 
The introduction of REACH promised big changes to the EU regulation of the sector. It predicted that 
through privatisation and centralisation strategies, more substance data would become available and 
that European public authorities would be better positioned to face the existing risks. But the 
registration of thousands of chemicals in the EU has proven to be very complicated, administratively, 
and has not generated the expected level (and quality of) data on the substances. ECHA also has a 
limited capacity to control these dynamics; it has few internal resources and is dependent on the 
industry for data provision. We have also seen that due to these problems, the regulatory procedures 
have become very unstable and favour the growth of the authorisation procedure as a fact finding 
device. The reform of the ECHA procedures is therefore important. It should recognise that the lack of 
effectiveness of a policy communicates strongly with poor „checks and balances‟ in the system. 
Without a regulatory strategy that is effective (and internal capacity constraints are very challenging in 
this respect), the way in which the new administrative procedures will be used becomes more 
unpredictable and dysfunctional. The case for reform should consequently be supported on these two 
points: use of external capacities and the (Commission) power to fine companies (for serious and 
continuing failures to provide legal mandatory data). The proposed solution makes the best use of 
private interest groups and seeks to benefit from the resources and expertise which they might have 
for the benefit of the EU public interest. Moreover, the authority to fine companies would put pressure 
on the regulatory system to really justify well the use of the EU authorisation procedure. It stresses 
that authorisation is not to be relied on as a standard way of managing problems of access to the 
data, and (in such a way) the reform also contributes to the quality of the ECHA activities and to the 
stability of its internal procedures.          
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Chapter IV 
 
The dualism of the „Lamfalussy‟ model and the new institutional dynamics of EU 
securities regulation 
 
Introduction 
 
The year of 2001 marked an important turning point in the EU regulation of financial services. In July 
of the previous year the Council decided to nominate a “Committee of Wise Men”, headed by 
Alexandre Lamfalussy, to consider the difficulties facing the integration of EU securities markets.
563
 
The final report of this committee argued that the absence of European-wide regulation on a number 
of issues, the inefficiency of the regulatory system and the inconsistent implementation of Community 
rules were standing in the way of the development of the European securities markets. This report 
was emphatic in its statement that the main impediment to progress in this area was related to the 
institutional system. The Wise Men‟s point was that: “Whilst part of the problem concerns the 
incomplete regulatory coverage at European level, the greater part of the responsibility lies in the way 
in which EU legislation has been decided…and „implemented‟…”
564
 After blaming the basic law-
making process of the Union (i.e. Community method) for its slowness, rigidity and ambiguity in 
implementation; the Wise Men proposed that the EU financial regulation be handled through a new 
institutional structure. That model comprised three decision-making levels. Level 1 develops the 
“framework principles” of the legislation and this is agreed in accordance with traditional Community 
legislative procedures. Level 2 was concerned with the definition of “technical implementing 
measures”, adopted by the Commission under comitology (with the European Securities 
Committee).
565
 Importantly, the Lamfalussy model also introduced, at level 3, regulatory committees in 
the areas of securities, banking and insurance to adopt non-mandatory technical guidance 
implementing the level 1 and 2 rules. The three Lamfalussy committees were: the European 
Securities Regulators (CESR)
566
, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
567
 and the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (CEIOPS).
568
 Finally, the 
enforcement of EU financial services law would be ensured by the Commission, at level 4.  
 
This chapter considers the role of the CESR in the Lamfalussy structures. It studies, particular, this 
committee‟s involvement in the development of two legal regimes of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID): the „best execution‟ rules and the suitability and appropriateness.
569
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Whereas in „best execution‟ level 3 (through a CESR „questions and answers‟ document) played a 
central role in the definition of the new regulatory regime, and level 2/comitology was insignificant; the 
development of the suitability norms of MiFID were fully worked out at levels 1 and 2, with no space 
for CESR/level 3 to intervene. While in „suitability‟ the EU political process occupied law-making 
territory in a way that made it more difficult for the regulatory structure to be of any use, in „best 
execution‟ the instruments of CESR were found to be much better suited to engage with these 
dynamic and fluid markets. The „best execution‟ experience suggests that one of the defining features 
of Lamfalussy was the link between the traditional political process of the Union and a new regulatory 
structure that allowed the EU to engage with a novel type of task, to integrate other types of actors 
and to promote particular instruments of public intervention in markets that are very dynamic and fluid. 
The Commission‟s role changes in this context. While regulatory expertise grows into technical rule-
making, the Commission becomes less of a rule-maker itself and more of a check on the new 
regulatory structures (although not necessarily a strong one, as we shall see). CESR was also highly 
constrained in terms of capacity, which created risks of capture by national expertise and emphasised 
its reliance on the sector in the course of its deliberative practices. The best „execution‟ episode 
contrasts the importance of the wholesale interests in the CESR technical discussions with the 
marginalisation of the retail community in those instances. If this institutional imbalance is to be 
corrected, something „better‟ than a one-off consultation with consumers might have to be offered.  
 
After this research had been concluded, and following the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
institutional structures of EU financial regulation have been reformed. Among other things, CESR has 
been “reinforced” through the creation of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
570
 
We shall see below that in terms of rule-making, the new powers of ESMA to an important extent 
formalise the technical and institutional role of CESR in the Lamfalussy structures. While the 
significance of the reform should not be overstated, the „soft‟ powers of CESR have given way to 
„binding technical standards‟, which ESMA initiates, and the Commission has to approve. The growing 
connection between the EU financial regulatory state and the implementation of EU law requires that 
we pay more attention to internal constraints within the deliberative process of the EU regulator and to 
the existing risks.  
 
I - The formal division of political and regulatory roles under the Lamfalussy model  
 
The legislative distinction between „framework principles‟ and „detailed implementing measures‟ was 
one of the most important aspects of the Lamfalussy process. The difference between the two levels, 
however, has since the beginning been a source of ambiguity. According to a European Council 
resolution “the split between framework principles (Level 1) and implementing measures (Level 2) 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis in a clear and transparent way…”
571
 The same 
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resolution also invites the Commission, when submitting its proposals, to indicate the kind of 
implementing measures it foresees.
572
 The distinction between general orientations and detailed 
measures has therefore been a very fluid and uncertain one. For Avgerinos, the difference between 
the two levels “is more a political problem than a point of law.”
573
  
 
The Committee of Wise Men‟s report was not well received in the European Parliament. This 
institution was excluded from the adoption of technical implementation measures (level 2) and was 
only to be informed at that level.
574
 The creation of level 2 was seen as a way to transfer important 
regulatory functions to the Commission and the committee system, thereby compromising the EU 
inter-institutional balance.
575
 This uneasiness culminated when the Parliament massively approved a 
resolution which demanded a „call-back‟ power over level 2 draft measures.
576
 The European 
Commission and the Council rejected this request, which “they perceived as a parliamentary intrusion 
in the broader comitology arrangements.”
577
 The Commission began, however, involving the 
Parliament in the level 2 discussions on an informal basis.
578
 In practice, this meant that the E.P. was 
given a period of one month to react to the proposals for technical implementing measures (level 2). 
The Commission pledged to take into account the opinion of the Parliament and, so as to improve 
transparency and the regular flow of information between the two institutions, Commissioner 
Bolkenstein proposed that “regular meetings” should take place.
579
 
 
The inter-institutional tension was beginning to wound the workings of the Lamfalussy process. The 
EU institutions ended up agreeing on the introduction of a „sunset clause‟ to the level 1 measures.
580
 
A time constraint (four years) was then placed on the Commission to exercise delegated powers 
(level 2). As explained elsewhere: “the sunset clause was intended to provide reassurance that the 
Parliament‟s demands for a change in the text of Article 202 EC would be addressed before the lapse 
of the initial four-year period of delegation.”
581
 The change to the text of Article 202 EC was supposed 
to have taken place with the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty. With its rejection, the 
problem still called for a resolution, which came in 2006, with the introduction of the „regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny‟.
582
 That new comitology procedure gave the Parliament a veto power over 
the exercise of delegated powers by the Commission.  
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CESR and level 3 
 
In accordance with the Lamfalussy proposals, the European Union set up „level 3‟ regulatory 
committees, which integrated the competent authorities of the Member States.
583
 The origins of 
CESR, in particular, could be found in the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO), an 
informally established group which dates back to 1997. The competences of CESR were divided into 
two broad categories. The first consisted on the provision of technical advice to the European 
Commission at level 2. For Ferran, the “potential for CESR to dominate the Commission … in the 
regulatory process is clearly present because CESR can draw upon its superior understanding of 
regulatory issues based on its members‟ day-to-day experience of grappling with the operation of 
financial markets.”
584
 Secondly, CESR developed common standards of implementation and 
promoted regulatory and supervisory convergence (level 3). The CESR recommendations and 
standards did not have legal force. This Committee used peer review instruments to force its 
members to comply with the approved common positions. CESR was also a dynamic body that, over 
time, became more involved in the promotion of regulatory and supervisory convergence.
585
 
According to Moloney, the “mismatch between CESR‟s formal status and the scale of its influence can 
… be characterised in terms of its regulatory capacity or ability, as an expert network with an insecure 
formal foundation and with limited powers, to further regulatory goals or resolve problems.”
586
  
 
II – The reform of the Lamfalussy system and the establishment of ESMA  
 
After the research on CESR that is presented here had been concluded much has happened in the 
global and EU financial world. Following the US subprime crisis (and once the global contagion 
effects of those problems had become apparent) the European Commission charged a High Level 
Group on Financial Supervision chaired by Jacques de Larosière to consider the case for reform of 
European regulation and supervision in the financial sector.
587
 This 2009 report goes beyond the 
organic architecture of EU financial regulation (it also addressed some substantive legal changes that 
were considered necessary); but the institutional dimension of that report‟s analysis and proposals is 
crucial. For the High Level Group, the old EU institutional design in this area failed to promote the 
required levels of legal and institutional cohesiveness and made it too difficult to respond to common 
challenges in a way that was credible, effective and quick.
588
 To be sure the problem was not just the 
level 3 committees. The Report notes that often it was the EU political process which failed to push for 
the desired level of harmonisation by leaving too much space for national options; which made 
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(according to the authors) the EU more vulnerable and less able to respond to the financial crisis.
589
 
Moreover, the level 3 committees were limited in their ability to act in that they had few powers and 
could not manage all the problems at level 3.
590
 With regards to CESR, the High Level Group was 
particularly concerned with the absence of a legal mandate to adopt common decisions, the lack of 
resources of the committee, and an underlying problem of confidence between the national 
supervisors within this structure.
591
  
 
The de Larosière Report proposed instead to introduce a “European System of Financial Supervision” 
(ESFS) with strengthened level 3 committees. The ESFS is a network of EU financial supervisors that 
empowers level 3 while maintaining a decentralised structure in which the NCAs remain primarily 
responsible for the day-to-day supervision of their markets.
592
 Having followed these proposals, the 
Union has equipped itself with three new structures that replace the former Lamfalussy committees: 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which replaces CESR;
593
 the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) (that supersedes CEBS);
594
 and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), taking the place of CEIOPS.
595
 The de Larosière Report also concluded 
that, in order for them to be effective, the new financial services authorities should have more 
resources, “be able to employ more people, with a larger budget.”
596
 While this chapter is focused on 
CESR and on this tripartite decision-making model, the de Larosière Report also proposed changes in 
the EU system of macro-prudential supervision. Most notably, it proposed (and the EU has now 
established) a Systemic Risk Council in order to address systemic risks in the financial sector. The 
ESRC does not interfere with the (new) Lamfalussy “way” of doing things; but it gives Europe new 
instruments to assess and control the overall stability and integrity of the EU financial system as 
such.
597
  
The structures of the reformed institutional system 
  
The new institutional model maintains the four-level structure of the Lamfalussy procedure, but 
somewhat changes the formal role of ESMA at levels 2 and 3. The new level 2 reflects the distinction 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty between delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) and implementing acts 
(Article 291 TFEU). Regarding the delegated acts, the purpose of which is to substantiate the more 
general level 1 rules; the traditional (Lamfalussy) comitology system applies. The Parliament and the 
Council may object to these „regulatory technical standards‟ or revoke the delegation of powers to the 
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Commission.
598
 This parliamentary „equivalence‟ vis-à-vis the Council in the control of the 
Commission at level 2 was an important victory for the EP and it culminated years of inter-institutional 
struggle after the Lamfalussy procedure excluded the Parliament from the adoption of the 
implementing technical rules (see above). In this „first layer‟ of the new level 2, ESMA may submit 
draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission for endorsement.
599
 Whereas the Commission 
may still decide not to follow ESMA‟s recommendation, there is now an obligation of „reinforced 
cooperation‟ between the Commission and the ESMA: the Commission (which has 3 months to 
decide whether to support the draft standards) cannot adopt the standards without justifying changes 
which it intends to make to the ESMA.
600
 If the Commission does not support the draft standards, 
ESMA has 6 weeks to revise them in the light of the Commission‟s concerns and resend a revised 
version to this institution by means of a “formal opinion”.
601
 As long as the ESMA complies with the 
relevant time limits for the amendment of the draft technical standards and has reworked them in a 
way that reflects the worries of the Commission, the latter cannot reject them or change them again 
without “prior coordination” with the ESMA.
602
 When drafting binding technical standards ESMA also 
has to consult the (new) Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group, which means to ensure 
„balanced representation‟ of “financial market participants operating in the Union, their employees‟ 
representatives as well as consumers, users of financial services and representatives of SMEs.”
603
 
 
Moreover, level 2 now includes a new category of acts (the „implementing technical standards‟) which 
are governed by Article 291 TFEU and are adopted by means of implementing acts (Regulations or 
Decisions).
604
 These acts will be issued in areas specifically defined by the relevant legislative 
document and shall be of a „technical‟ nature (they cannot imply “strategic decisions or policy choices” 
and should determine the conditions of application of the legislative acts).
605
 Institutionally, the main 
difference vis-à-vis the regulatory technical standards is that the Parliament and the Council do not 
control the exercise of these EU powers and only have to be kept informed throughout the process.
606
 
The control of the implementing technical standards will be exercised by the Member States (since, 
post-Lisbon, this type of acts are not considered to be “delegated” by the Parliament/Council) via 
“comitology-style oversight procedures through the European Securities Committee.”
607
 In this layer of 
level 2, the task of the ESMA is to develop implementing technical standards and submit them as 
drafts to the Commission for endorsement.
608
 The relationship between the ESMA and the 
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Commission is similar to the one that governs the adoption of regulatory technical standards: the 
ESMA may issue a formal opinion to the Commission in case of an initial disagreement; the 
Commission is not formally tied to that expert advice but before it changes the draft standards it has 
to “coordinate” with ESMA.
609
 The Commission „oversight‟ of the binding technical standards might 
hide the existence of a shadow or covert delegation of powers to ESMA, where the Commission is 
formally in charge of technical rule-making but actually becomes more of an institutional check on the 
EU regulatory system.  
 
At level 3, changes have also been introduced. Just like CESR did, ESMA may prepare guidelines 
and recommendations addressed to the NCAs or financial market participants in order to promote 
consistent supervisory practices in Europe.
610
 Compliance with these documents is not mandatory but 
the peer review system has been reinforced through more formalised and demanding “comply or 
explain” procedures.
611
 The NCAs and market players have to “make every effort” to comply with the 
guidelines and recommendations.
612
 Once a guideline or recommendation has been issued, each 
NCA has 2 months to “confirm whether it complies or intends to comply with that guideline or 
recommendation”, and in case of non-compliance the relevant national authority has to inform the 
Authority and state its reasons.
613
 ESMA then has to publish the fact that there was non-compliance 
by a competent authority, and may also decide (on a case by case basis) whether or not to “publish 
the reasons provided by the competent authority for not complying with that guideline or 
recommendation.”
614
 In case it is required by the guideline or recommendation, financial market 
participants have to report “in a clear and detailed way” if they comply with that ESMA guidance.
615
 
Finally, ESMA is to inform the Commission, Parliament and the Council about the guidelines or 
recommendations which have been issued, state which competent authorities have failed to comply 
with them and how it intends to make sure that those authorities abide by its guidance in the future.
616
 
At level 3 ESMA has also been given further responsibilities in convergence of supervisory practices. 
As a consequence, ESMA may intervene in the mediation between NCAs;
617
 and in the management 
of emergency situations.
618
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Finally, at level 4 (and without prejudice to the general enforcement powers of the Commission under 
Article 258 TFEU) ESMA may investigate breaches of EU securities law and act upon the 
infringement, in cooperation with the Commission.
619
 If a NCA has failed to comply with its EU legal 
obligations, ESMA may send a recommendation to the relevant NCA(s) setting out the measures 
necessary to comply with EU law.
620
 If the NCA has still not complied with the ESMA 
recommendation, the Commission may issue a formal opinion to that authority requiring 
compliance.
621
 If the problem persists, ESMA may adopt an “individual decision” that is addressed to 
a financial market participant, demanding it to comply with EU law.
622
 These individual decisions are 
only possible where the relevant EU legislative act itself (excluding an existing regulatory technical 
standard or an implementing technical standard) is “directly applicable to financial market 
participants”.
623
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conflict (Article 19 (2) and (3)). In what concerns the colleges of supervisors, which ESMA helps to coordinate (Article 21 (1), 
the Authority may (in matters concerning systemic financial risks) or request particular deliberations of a college if a particular 
course of action which had been envisaged would disrespect EU law or harm the convergence of supervisory practices in 
Europe (Article 21 (2) – e) 
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The dynamics of the new institutional system 
 
ESMA was established in January of 2011 and has done very little work so far. But while it is still early 
to make definitive statements on the impacts of the Authority, what we know from CESR may help us 
understand what is (and what is not) about to change. In the formal structures two main things have 
changed when compared to „Lamfalussy‟: the creation of a new category of acts (the „implementing 
technical standards‟), and the reinforcement of level 3 through „comply or explain‟ procedures. The 
new „Lamfalussy‟ therefore creates an additional institutional layer between the former level 2 and 
level 3 where the standards developed by ESMA will be reflected in a Regulation or Decision. The „de 
Larosière‟ reform announces an important formal shift in the system with the „growth‟ of ESMA into 
level 2. It makes „Lamfalussy‟ look more dualistic from an institutional standpoint by emphasising the 
distinction between the general political principles and orientations (which continue to be handled 
through the traditional law-making processes of the Union) and the development of more detailed 
„binding technical standards‟, where ESMA has a prominent role. The Commission „stays‟ at level 2 
but its role also seems to be changing.  
 
In many ways (and taking into account the research that is presented below), „de Larosière‟ can be 
seen as formalising the institutional dynamics of Lamfalussy. Most of the problems which de Larosière 
indentified in the previous structures (e.g. Directives too ambiguous, too detailed and purposely 
preserving national options) were connected to level 1 and nothing changes in the shape of that 
 
The Lamfalussy procedure 
1- The EU legislator defines „essential requirements‟ 
2- Commission to adopt technical implementation measures under comitology (CESR 
advises) 
3- CESR defines common standards of implementation (soft-law) 
4- Commission checks Member State compliance  
The reformed institutional system 
1- The EU legislator defines „essential requirements‟ 
2- ESMA drafts regulatory and implementing standards and Commission adopts 
3- ESMA adopts “comply or explain” guidelines and recommendations 
4- ESMA and Commission enforce EU Law 
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central EU political dialogue. More importantly, the level 1 delegations to „level 2 Lamfalussy‟ were not 
always as important as de Larosière makes them seem. We shall see below (when considering the 
drafting of the MiFID best execution regime) that one of the defining features of Lamfalussy was 
almost a full concentration of law-making at level 1 (with level 2 becoming a copy-out of the level 1 
legislation) and the development of the required technical standards by CESR, at level 3. In this 
context, the formal role of the Commission has also been reassessed. In a 2011 FAQ, the ESMA 
interestingly notes that the role of the Commission (at level 2) is to “check that [the Authority‟s] draft 
laws are in the Union interest and are compatible with EU law and then to adopt these draft technical 
standards with minimal standards, if at all possible.”
624
 This reading emphasises that while 
CESR/ESMA have grown into technical rule-making, the Commission „remains‟ in the „level 2‟ 
institutional system as a sort of Ombudsman, a source of institutional and procedural checks on the 
new EU regulatory expertise. The question as to whether this type of Commission oversight actually 
controls the dynamic institutional risks of ESMA will be answered in the negative.  
 
The formalisation of ESMA‟s rule-making competences, the link between its internal deliberation and 
binding technical standards, is important. The Authority will now be able to use its „implementing 
technical standards‟ to impose certain lines of action on the NCAs and financial market participants 
which otherwise would have to be dealt with at level 3, through soft guidelines. While these 
implementing standards formally co-exist with ESMA‟s level 3 guidelines and recommendations, what 
should matter is how actual problems should be addressed and fears of national non-compliance 
linked to level 3. To be sure, the formalisation of ESMA‟s authority does not imply that it will always be 
effective or successful in its endeavours (compliance problems may remain); but it somewhat 
reshapes „level 3 Lamfalussy‟ and affects the terms of the relationship between the national 
competent authorities and between the latter and the regulated sector. The institutional system 
becomes less „soft‟, less dependent on “peer reviews” to ensure EU compliance and more 
characterised by tighter mutual controls and stronger European commitments (which constrains the 
opportunities for underrepresented interests to go their own way).  
 
Whereas „de Larosière‟ proposed to increase the resources of the level 3 regulatory systems, ESMA 
is set to continue to rely on external expertise to a large extent. It is remarkable that while the budget 
of ESMA is €17 million for 2011 (it is predicted to grow to €24 million within a period of two years), the 
(UK) FSA annual budget for 2010-2011 was £458 million.
625
 The ESMA staff will “rise from 70 in 2011 
to 120 in 2013”, which is considerably more than what CESR had (and reflects the new competences 
of the Authority), but remains clearly insufficient to sustain the operational autonomy of new 
structure.
626
 The implication of these capacity constraints is that the EU regulatory system will remain 
very much dependent on external capacities. The national supervisors who provide the resources and 
engage more significantly with the technical discussions will therefore benefit, and so will the more 
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influential wholesale interests which dominate the regulator‟s technical consultations. The new 
provision, requiring ESMA to consult a „Stakeholders Group‟ (while preparing binding technical 
standards), falls below what could be expected to ensure institutional rebalancing in the context of the 
existing constraints. A bolder and more demanding system could involve ESMA having to explain in 
detail how its rule-making orientations communicate with the concerns expressed by consumers, 
representatives of the financial market participants‟ employees, users of financial services and SMEs 
(during consultation). While these internal controls may constrain the ESMA to a certain extent, they 
also emphasise the important role of this regulatory body in the governance of EU securities markets. 
 
[First Case-Study] 
III - The MiFID „best execution‟ requirements 
 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
627
 was arguably the most important piece of 
legislation of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP).
628
 MiFID has the objective of liberalising and 
integrating the investment service industry in the European Union. The Directive maintains the 
“passport” principle of the Investment Services Directive (ISD)
629
 but provides for a much higher 
degree of harmonisation, in particular with regard to conduct of business rules. The ISD, approved in 
1993, had major limitations from the point of view of the creation of an internal market in financial 
services, which were mainly related to the fact that firms continued to face significant costs when 
operating cross-border services. This happened mainly because the ISD did not prevent the Member 
States from applying their conduct-of-business rules on foreign firms. Although firms based on a 
Member State of the Union could use their operating licence as a “passport” to other jurisdictions, the 
effectiveness of such possibility was highly reduced by divergent legal, regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks. It is this limitation that MiFID fundamentally tries to overcome.  
 
MiFID also aims to foster investor protection and promote competition in the provision of financial 
services. The abolition of the “concentration rules”
630
 should increase competition between 
established stock exchanges, Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and systematic internalisers 
(investment firms which internalise client orders on a systematic basis). Each of these regulated 
markets will now be able to trade shares in every Member State of the Union, putting an end to the 
monopoly that stock exchanges had in many of these countries. Secondly, the MiFID objective of 
enhancing the protection of investors relies mainly on four factors: 1) establishing rules relating to 
conflict of interest of investment firms; 2) the creation of a suitability and appropriateness regime 
which considers the investor‟s experience and knowledge; 3) forcing firms to achieve best execution 
for their clients when carrying out orders; and 4) introducing detailed rules on transparency and 
disclosure for share trading in regulated markets.    
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This chapter focuses on the development of two particular regimes of the MiFID conduct of business 
framework. The first one is the „best execution‟ regime. One of the key components of MiFID is the 
obligation of service providers to give clients the best possible result in their investments. This means 
that financial intermediaries who execute client orders have a clear obligation to act in their best 
interests. They have to execute trades in the regulated market which provides better financial results 
for the client. Best execution requirements are important because they not only set a standard of 
investor protection, but have the potential to determine the way brokers deal with market 
fragmentation and the choice among competing stock exchanges, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) 
and systematic internalisers. After analysing the best execution experience, this chapter moves on to 
examine the development of the suitability and appropriateness rules. Suitability and appropriateness 
are tests which constrain the service that investment firms can provide to clients according to the 
characteristics of the latter. The objective of such regimes is to protect consumers of financial 
services from certain investments, the risks of which they cannot fully understand or be financially 
prepared to support. The rationale of these protections is the assumption that the relationship 
between a client and an investment firm is an unequal and unbalanced one, since the firm will 
normally understand the nature and risks of the services it provides more fully than the client 
(particularly if it is a retail client). In addition, the risks of a bad investment decision may harm the 
retail client considerably, while the investment firm is not faced with a comparable vulnerability.   
 
1- The dual structure of the „best execution‟ regime 
 
The present section examines the development of the best execution rules. It concludes that the 
crucial moments in the definition of this regime were levels 1 and 3. The level 2 directive was little 
more than a „copy-out‟ of MiFID level 1. The relevant matters left unaddressed by the implementing 
directive were relegated to CESR under level 3, where this body issued an important document: the 
„Questions and Answers‟ on best execution.
 631
 Instead of a three-level process of decision-making, 
the Lamfalussy model displayed a dualist institutional dynamic. Levels 1 and 2 could be „brought 
together‟ under the EU law-making umbrella; and that was then followed by the coordination of 
national implementation strategies at level 3.  
 
The MiFID level 1 provision introducing best execution is Article 21. The best execution principle is 
prescribed in Article 21 (1) and provides the following: 
  
Member states shall require that investment firms take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the 
best possible result for their clients taking into account price, costs, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, 
nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order.
632
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Article 21 (2) then states that Member States shall require investment firms to set up an “order 
execution policy” aimed at establishing “effective arrangements to comply with paragraph 1.”
633
 The 
level of detail is considerably enhanced when the Directive considers the content of the order 
execution policy. Article 21 (3) is significant in this regard:  
 
The order execution policy shall include, in respect of each class of instruments, information on the different 
venues where the investment firm executes its client orders and the factors affecting the choice of execution 
venue. It shall at least include those venues that enable the investment firm to obtain on a consistent basis the 
best possible result for the execution of client orders. (…) 
634
 
 
When the best execution regime reached „level two‟ the decision was to have an implementing 
directive
635
 which would not substantially develop the regime of Article 21 MiFID. The most significant 
example of this is the issue of „relative importance‟ of execution factors. Article 21 (6)-(a) of MiFID 
level 1 states that, under level 2, the Commission shall adopt implementing measures concerning “the 
criteria for determining the relative importance of the different factors that, pursuant to paragraph 1, 
may be taken into account for determining the best possible result taking into account the size and 
type of order and the retail or professional nature of the client.”
636
 Article 44 (1) of the implementing 
directive then mentions the best execution criteria that investment firms have to take into account: a) 
characteristics of the client; b) characteristics of the client order; c) characteristics of the financial 
instruments subject of the order; and d) characteristics of the execution venues to which the order can 
be directed. However, when it comes to establishing the criteria for defining the relative importance of 
the execution factors, Article 46 (2)-(a) simply says that investment firms have to provide retail clients 
with the following details on their execution policy: 
 
an account of the relative importance the investment firm assigns, in accordance with the criteria specified in 
Article 44(1), to the factors referred to in Article 21(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC, or the process by which the firm 
determines the relative importance of those factors.
637
 
 
There is an important difference between the mandate provided by Article 21 and the extent to which 
MiFID level 2 defines the relative importance of the best execution factors. The implementing directive 
decides not to substantiate the best execution obligation and leave that task to the investment firm. 
The same regulatory constraint was evident in what concerns the inclusion of a list of the trading 
venues on the execution policy of firms. Article 46 (2)-(b) of the implementing directive basically 
repeats what the level 1 directive had already stated. The only issue where the level 2 directive 
increased the level of regulation of execution policies of firms was connected to client instructions 
[Article 46 (2)-(c)]. This provision prescribes that investment firms, through their execution policies, 
have to provide retail clients with a “clear and prominent warning” that any instructions from them may 
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“prevent the firm from taking the steps that it has designed” in its order execution policy to meet the 
best possible result.
638
   
 
On the other hand, the level 3 story of best execution is radically different from the regulatory 
constraint displayed at level 2. In order to provide guidance on how best execution requirements 
should be implemented by the Member States; CESR chose a „Questions and Answers‟ format.
639
 
Unlike the level 2 directive, the Q&A did not fall short of substantiating the best execution obligation 
for investment firms. Put bluntly, the level 1 directive created the best execution principle and level 3 
explained how to apply it. This is clear on the level 3 guidance on „relative importance‟ of execution 
factors. Execution factors are the criteria which is used to measure how best execution is to be 
obtained and there were important discussions under level 3 to consider whether CESR should 
impose an obligation on firms to explain the relative importance of each of those factors. The Q&A 
document is quite explicit in this regard. It states that the execution policy should include the “key 
steps the firm is taking to comply with the overarching best execution requirement and how those 
steps enable the firm to obtain the best possible result.”
640
 This document also prescribes that the 
execution policy has to address the “… information on how those [execution] factors affect the firm‟s 
choice of execution venues …”
641
 Without developing too rigid a method to measure best execution, 
the Q&A document still has considerable implications in terms of operational adjustments and costs 
for investment firms. Secondly, the Q&A bites on the nature of the relationship between investment 
firms and the stock exchanges in the fragmented and competitive European market that MiFID aimed 
to create. The best execution regime has the potential to determine the level of freedom that 
investment firms have to choose where to conduct share trading (see below). 
 
The expertise and information of CESR in „best execution‟ was therefore important. Defining a best 
execution obligation is an extremely complex process. It requires a good understanding of the 
processes through which firms execute share trading and the precise factors which matter to ensure 
that the investor is given the best financial treatment by the firm. The fact that these reforms are to be 
applied in 27 Member States is also relevant to understand why the regulators had the upper hand. A 
well-grounded knowledge of how firms, in the different European countries, provide investment 
services and products to their clients was important to ensure that the best execution rules to be 
introduced were adjusted to the functioning of markets. Moreover, the role of the national supervisors 
in the implementation of EU securities law emphasises an idea of institutional dependence. Approving 
ambitious directives, such as MiFID, may be seen as a significant step in the reform of financial 
markets in the European Union. The effectiveness of the proposed changes will ultimately depend on 
whether, and how, the Member States implement those changes in their national jurisdictions. The 
threat of sanctions in case of failure to implement by Member States may always be present, but in an 
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European Union of 27 Member States, and in a field as complex as the securities sector, one needs 
to be very optimistic to imagine the Commission going after each Member State that fails to 
implement some part of the 42 legislative measures of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). 
The Commission understood that to ensure smooth and well-functioning processes of implementation 
it was important to embrace the national supervisors and CESR. The CESR‟s Himalaya Report is 
interesting in this regard, emphasising the important role of CESR members in the processes of 
national implementation.
642
  
 
2- The nature of the dialogue within CESR and its risks 
 
The central role of CESR in the definition of the best execution regime emphasises the importance of 
its internal deliberative practices. For the Commission, the main concern was that, within CESR, the 
national supervisors were essentially worried about their domestic firms (reflecting the lack of an EU 
dimension).
643
 In the words of a Commission official that had dealings with CESR, the main concern 
of the national authorities was that they “might get in trouble with their national firms”.
644
 Also, the 
supervisors are accountable to their national governments and/or Parliaments. Their independence 
from national executives has not been uniform.
645
 CESR was also far from an ideal model of 
„deliberative‟ decision-making. A Commission official who has often participated in CESR discussions 
explains that decisions were taken by consensus (no voting was held) and that in the beginning of the 
meetings “red lines” were clearly defined by the national supervisors.
646
 There was no sense of self-
overcoming or common European vision. The same official also noted that the positions of the 
regulators “did not normally change during the negotiations.”
647
  
 
Moreover, the level and quality of national input in CESR was quite asymmetric. According to a former 
senior national official who was involved with CESR, the performance of the actual operational work 
of the Committee essentially rested on four Member States: the U.K, Germany, France and Italy.
648
 
When the heads of all the national competent authorities would convene (in Paris, where CESR was 
based) the significant majority of them would only „sit and watch‟, letting others do the talking.
649
 The 
active Member States, within CESR, did not just dominate the technical discussions; they also 
provided the resources for it to work. The internal resources of CESR were, in fact, quite limited. The 
CESR secretariat included not more than 20 people and only 4 or 5 really contributed to the technical 
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work of the Committee (the other were administrative staff).
650
 Inevitably, that gave an “advantage” to 
those countries which supplied the technical resources.
651
  
 
While the performance of the operational work of CESR rested on (voluntary) contributions from a few 
national competent authorities, the lack of resources of the Committee also emphasised the reliance 
on the particular expertise and dynamics of a sector that is highly complex and fluid. When the best 
execution rules reached level 3 important issues fell on CESR‟s hands. There were significant 
tensions between: 1) Member States which were adapted to “internalisation” (executing the client‟s 
order within the firm, see below) and those which were not; 2) bigger and smaller investment firms; or 
3) investment firms and stock exchanges. In this context, we shall see that CESR tried to find a 
balance between the different interests involved; but that in doing that this conversation became 
essentially about articulating the tensions between the large investment firms and the stock 
exchanges. This is visible, first, in the clash between those interests in the so-called „prior express 
consent‟. The question was whether a firm should obtain the prior express consent of its clients before 
executing orders outside a regulated market or a Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF). There was a 
conflict between the stock exchanges and investment firms because those wishing to internalise 
clients‟ orders will have more or less difficulty in doing so depending on the nature and level of 
consent that has to be obtained from clients. This explains why Euronext, the 'Deutche Boerse‟ and 
the London Stock Exchange were strongly in favour of making sure that firms seek “prior express 
consent” from clients before executing orders outside a regulated market or MTF. The majority of the 
views in the banking community were quite different. The British Banking Association, for example, 
made a strong case for a more flexible approach, arguing that in the case of the United Kingdom “the 
fact that a client has dealt with the firm for a period of time would be regarded as a “course of dealing” 
which could constitute consent.”
652
 In its Q&A, CESR stated that internalisation of orders requires the 
prior consent of the client, but it also accepted that prior consent “may, at least in some jurisdictions, 
be tacit and result from the behaviour of the client such as the sending of an order to the firm after 
having received information on the firm‟s execution policy.”
653
  
 
The CESR Q&A reflected a concern with balance and coordination between the different market 
interests. More than forcing financial market participants to adjust to a particular vision of best 
execution, CESR tried to „build bridges‟, to find solutions which communicated well with the views of 
the actors involved. However, the fact that an equilibria was found between those in the banking 
industry and the stock exchanges still raises the question whether those perspectives were really the 
only ones that mattered. The domination of the consultation process by the „large‟ wholesale interests, 
as well as the importance of their input in the CESR Q&A, emphasises this difficulty. Only four 
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consumer groups participated in the best execution consultation.
654
 Moreover, there was no 
connection between the concerns expressed by the retail community on best execution and the duties 
of justification of the wholesale sector. The inter-institutional reports on the Lamfalussy procedure 
have also drawn attention to the lack of consumer input in these (level 3) dialogues.
655
  
 
3- The role of the Commission and the CESR/ESMA duties of external justification 
 
Under level 3 CESR is subject to few political controls. On the basis CESR‟s foundation decision, 
political control works through the Commission and the European Securities Committee.
656
 CESR is 
under an obligation to present its annual report to the Commission (Article 6) and should maintain 
close operational links with the Commission and the ESC.
657
 The best execution experience suggests 
that it is appropriate to focus on the nature of the relationship between the Commission and CESR at 
level 3. The „questions and answers‟ on best execution are accompanied, in appendix, by a 
Commission working document where this institution submits “answers to CESR” on “scope issues” 
under MiFID and the implementing directive.
658
 It deals with three issues: 1) dealing on quotes; 2) use 
of specific instructions; and 3) obligations on portfolio managers and order receivers and transmitters. 
Without questioning the importance of such matters, the Commission document does not deal with 
some of the most controversial and sensitive topics on the level 3 best execution agenda (CESR did 
not demand answers from the Commission on such topics). These „answers‟ to CESR on best 
execution (and the weaknesses of „level 2 Lamfalussy‟, considered above) suggests that the 
Commission acquired an Ombudsman-type role in the operation of the  system, it worked as a source 
of institutional checks on a regulatory committee that grew strongly into technical law-making territory. 
Meanwhile, those Commission controls (as seen in best execution) do not necessarily go to the „heart‟ 
(or substance) of the relevant technical work, but may reflect particular concerns with process or 
specific matters that were called to the Commission‟s attention. 
 
Following de Larosière, the Commission „oversight‟ of EU regulatory expertise in this area has been 
formalised (see above). Where ESMA initiates binding technical standards, these will have to be 
approved by the Commission and the latter cannot adopt different standards without prior 
coordination with ESMA. Taking the CESR „best execution‟ context as our reference point, we would 
then have the Commission “answers to CESR” (on best execution) possibly being channelled through 
the new level 2 procedures. The limits of the Commission/Ombudsman checks emphasise the 
importance of mechanisms of institutional rebalancing within the regulatory process itself.  
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As explained above, the consultation of consumers in „best execution‟ was poor, did not affect the 
relevant technical discussions and failed to generate any significant duties of justification from the 
large wholesale interests. ESMA now includes (as noted above) a Securities and Markets 
Stakeholder Group and the Regulation imposes mandatory consultation in the course of the 
Authority‟s rule-making processes.
659
 The creation of this structure emphasises the importance of the 
retail community in the reform of EU securities legislation. The stakeholder group seeks to restore 
institutional balance in the context of a sector that is dynamic and where the influence of the large 
wholesale lobby is considerable.
660
 But the ESMA markets and stakeholders group can also be seen 
as formalising the pre-existing CESR consultations, which were themselves part of the problem. 
Consultation does not sufficiently recognise the asymmetries of the market and the capacity 
constraints of the CESR/ESMA system. The important point is to restructure the terms of the internal 
dialogues within ESMA and strengthen the duties of justification of the Authority/sector vis-à-vis the 
underrepresented social and economic interests. Perhaps that objective could be better attained if 
ESMA was (in addition) asked to justify its draft technical standards in the light of the concerns 
expressed by stakeholders in consultation, creating a „notice-and-comment‟ type of deliberative 
interaction. Even if the equal footing of the different interests can still not be ensured, the 
„proceduralization‟ of external justification duties would hopefully strengthen the links between the 
various interests and promote the quality of EU rule-making.              
 
[2
nd
 Case-Study] 
IV- MiFID‟s suitability and appropriateness rules  
 
1- The legal framework of the suitability regime 
 
After considering the CESR institutional experience in „best execution‟, the focus now turns to the 
development of another important part of MiFID‟s conduct of business regime: the suitability and 
appropriateness rules. Suitability and appropriateness are tests which limit the access of the 
consumer to investment services according to the nature of the risk involved. The products or 
financial services the investment firms provide have to be “suitable” or “appropriate” to the client, 
having in regard her specific characteristics. The objective of such regimes is to protect the investors 
from investments risks which they cannot fully understand or be financially prepared to support. The 
suitability rules recognise that the relationship between a client and an investment firm is an 
unbalanced one. The firm will normally understand the nature and risks of the services it provides 
more fully than the client (particularly if it is a retail client). The firm is also not subject to a financial 
risk comparable to the one which is faced by a “normal” consumer of financial services. Beginning 
with an analysis of the relevant legal framework, this chapter shows that the detailed nature of MiFID 
level 1 and 2 pre-empted the development of guidance by CESR, at level 3.  
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The suitability requirement is expressed in Article 19(4) MiFID.
661
 This provision states that:  
 
When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall obtain the necessary 
information regarding the client‟s or potential client‟s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to 
the specific type of product or service, his financial situation and his investment objectives so as to enable the 
firm to recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and financial instruments which are 
suitable for him.
662
   
 
Article 19(5) then creates a less demanding appropriateness test. This applies to investment services 
not covered by paragraph 4 (suitability). The appropriateness regime will normally apply to more 
general recommendations on a specific product. The nature of this test is different from the suitability 
requirement in three aspects: first, it merely places an obligation on the investment firm to “ask the 
client” to provide information, while the suitability test forces the firm to “obtain the necessary 
information”.
663
 Secondly, paragraph 5 (appropriateness) is concerned with the client‟s “knowledge 
and experience” in the relevant investment field, while the suitability requirements are also focused on 
the client‟s financial situation and investment objectives. Thirdly, Article 19(5), unlike paragraph 4, 
explains the consequences of finding that the product or service is “not appropriate” to the client. In 
such cases the investment firm “shall warn the client or potential client”, which can be done in a 
standardised format. Finally, Article 19(6), providing an exception, prescribes that under certain 
circumstances a firm may escape the obligation to obtain information from clients or meet the 
appropriateness tests when providing execution-only services and/or reception or transmission of 
client orders.  
    
On the basis of MiFID level 1, the implementing directive develops a quite detailed 
suitability/appropriateness regime. It deals with suitability and appropriateness in three articles: Article 
35 (assessment of suitability), Article 36 (assessment of appropriateness), and Article 37 (provisions 
common to the assessment of suitability or appropriateness).
664
 In what suitability is concerned, 
Article 35 imposes an obligation on Member States to ensure that investment firms obtain from clients 
(or potential clients) the necessary information to “have a reasonable basis for believing, giving due 
consideration to the nature and extent of the service provided, that the specific transaction to be 
recommended …” is suitable for the client. The level 2 directive then reiterates the three conditions 
that MiFID level 1 had defined to measure this suitability requirement. The financial product or service 
should therefore: 1) meet the investment objectives of the client; 2) avoid financial risks which the 
client cannot bear, and 3) be such that the client has the necessary experience and knowledge in 
order to understand the risks involved.
665
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The second paragraph of Article 35 is of considerable importance, providing that professional clients 
can be assumed to have “the necessary level of experience and knowledge” in their relationship with 
the investment firm. The firm will only have to assess whether the product meets the investment 
objectives of the client and if the service it intends to provide does not create financial risks which are 
not consistent with the client‟s investment objectives. In addition, for clients who are considered to be 
professionals (covered by Annex II to MiFID level 1 directive) the investment firm may assume that 
“the client is able financially to bear any related investment risks consistent with the investment 
objectives of that client.”
666
  
 
The implementing directive goes on to substantiate, again with a considerable degree of detail, the 
information which firms need to obtain to assess the financial situation of the client (paragraph 3) as 
well as her investment objectives (paragraph 4). In specifying the information required to consider the 
financial situation of the client, Article 35 (3) prescribes that this shall include: 
 
information on the source and extent of his regular income, his assets, including liquid assets, investments and 
real property, and his regular financial commitments.
667
 
 
Another important issue that the directive deals with relates to the consequences of failure to obtain 
the necessary information from the client to assess the suitability of the product or service to be 
provided. The Commission directive is drastic in this respect, prescribing that: “Where, when providing 
the investment service of investment advice or portfolio management, an investment firm does not 
obtain the information required (…), the firm shall not recommend investment services or financial 
instruments to the client or potential client.”
668
 Article 36, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
assessment of appropriateness. Apart from repeating the content of Article 19(5) MiFID, it also 
creates an exception for professional clients, which may be assumed to have the “necessary 
experience and knowledge in order to understand the risks” involved in the investment services or 
products for which the client is classified as being professional.
669
 Article 37 then incorporates 
provisions common to the assessment of suitability and appropriateness. This provision explains 
which information is required to consider the knowledge and experience of retail clients. This 
information can be divided in three categories. The first one is the “types of service, transaction and 
financial instrument with which the client is familiar.”
670
 Secondly, the firm needs to consider the 
“nature, volume, and frequency of the client‟s transactions in financial instruments and the period over 
which they have been carried out.”
671
 Finally, the profession, relevant former profession and level of 
education of the client shall be taken into account.  
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In conclusion, MiFID provided for a high level of harmonisation in this area and the level 2 directive 
was not just a copy-out of „level 1‟. The creation of a lighter regulatory regime for professional clients 
by the implementing directive clearly shows this. Having in mind the extensive nature of the suitability 
legislative framework it is unsurprising that CESR did not consider it necessary to define common 
standards of implementation for these rules. 
 
2- The limits of level 3 and the nature of the „suitability‟ risks 
 
Having explained that EU law-making reduced the space for level 3 guidance, it is worth considering 
why this happened and what kind of challenges are associated with this. For the Commission (in what 
the suitability test is concerned) firms “need to know precisely what test they have to apply.”
672
 The 
idea seems to be that leaving things to level 3 would have resulted in regulatory confusion and lack of 
effectiveness. Moreover, level 3 was seen as „weak‟ due to problems with the CESR “peer reviews” 
(which were considered not to put enough pressure on the national authorities to abide by the level 3 
guidance). In the words of a national representative (CESR), the Committee‟s peer reviews “simply 
did not work”.
673
 The Commission (and the Parliament) learned to somewhat distrust CESR due to 
these institutional failures.
674
   
 
Secondly, the nature of the risk involved in the suitability tests helps to explain the heavy reliance on 
legal instruments in the development of that regime. Suitability and appropriateness requirements are 
designed to manage the access of investors to the market. They are associated with a more 
paternalistic and proactive conception of consumer protection.
675
 These tests were created to address 
a risk which is deemed to be serious enough to (possibly) justify a denial of the freedom to buy a 
financial product or service. This dimension of risk policy is important to understand why levels 1 and 
2 were so detailed when defining the suitability regime. Unlike the suitability requirements, best 
execution rules were not established to address a great risk to investors. Best execution is essentially 
about making the consumer „better off‟, forcing the investment firms to give clients the best possible 
result. A more flexible and loose regime in that context did not carry the same type of „suitability‟ risks.  
 
Thirdly, the nature of political conflict can prevent matters from being pushed „downwards‟, towards 
CESR and level 3. The political tensions were visible at level 1: the European Parliament, in its first 
reading of MiFID, excluded suitability checks on execution-only services (services where the 
investment firm merely executes a client order, instead of providing investment advice or portfolio 
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management).
676
 The view of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the Parliament 
reflected a concern with “light touch” regulation.
677
 The idea was that it was important to give meaning 
to investor choice, and avoid the introduction of an aggressive regulatory regime which unduly 
restricts the freedom of the consumer to evaluate what is appropriate for him. The Commission, on 
the other hand, seemed more concerned with making sure that the risks to consumer protection were 
effectively managed. Moreover, the different conceptions of consumer protection did not go away at 
level 2. A member of the European Parliament who was involved in the MiFID negotiations noted that 
issues where an institution „lost‟ at level 1 could be re-opened at level 2.
678
 The suitability and 
appropriateness regime was no exception. When addressing the suitability issues, therefore, the level 
2 process became politicised and prolonged the type of political interactions which had taken place at 
level 1.  
  
3- Comparing „best execution‟ and „suitability‟: implications for CESR/ESMA 
 
The analysis of these two MiFID regimes showed clear differences in the dynamics of the Lamfalussy 
procedure. In the best execution requirements, level 3 essentially „swallowed‟ level 2. The EU political 
institutions defined the best execution principle and then CESR „explained‟ – through its Q&A 
document – how that principle should be defined. On the other hand, the development of the 
suitability rules has been completely concentrated at levels 1 and 2. The nature of the risk involved in 
„suitability‟ made it harder for these issues to be passed over to level 3. The existence of political 
differences between the Commission and the Parliament in the suitability agenda also worked as an 
„upwards‟ institutional pressure and led to a more aggressive type of legal intervention.  
 
The institutional contrast between the two MiFID regimes outlined above emphasises that 
„Lamfalussy‟ generated a strong distinction between formal EU law-making and the emergence of a 
new regulatory system that was addressing novel challenges, engaging a wider range of actors and 
connecting with dynamic and transnational markets. This dualism had an important impact on the 
institutional role of the Commission. While the EU regulatory structures were growing into technical 
rule-making in some areas, the Commission started to check the operation of CESR. The notion that 
the Commission began to act a bit like an Ombudsman in this model underlines the significance of the 
institutional shift that was taking place here.  
 
The de Larosière reforms have formalised these dynamics, as explained above. It has therefore 
become more important to see how the internal deliberative practices of ESMA work and what the 
risks are. The chapter also noted that the type of „politics‟ which CESR advanced had some good 
things: the best execution experience suggested that CESR tried to secure mediation between 
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conflicting interests once issues got to level 3 and the committed way in which it connected with the 
sector allowed that to happen. Meanwhile, the conversations with the sector essentially involved the 
dominant wholesale interests: the global banks and the stock exchanges. Consumers, for example, 
were severely underrepresented during the technical discussions and the CESR Q&A was only 
concerned with how the best execution system was going to be organised between those wholesale 
actors. The absence of duties of external justification within the system vis-à-vis the retail community 
(wider interests) was problematic. Moreover, the way in which EU law has addressed this concern 
through de Larosière is unsatisfactory. The ESMA Regulation formalises the CESR consultations 
(through the creation of the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group) without doing anything to 
rebalance the relevant institutional dialogues. Instead, ESMA could be asked to justify its rule-making 
initiatives in the light of the concerns expressed by stakeholders in consultation. A „notice-and-
comment‟ type of interaction would represent a bolder solution in an area where the internal capacity 
constraints of the EU regulatory system expose it to particular risks of institutional bias and capture.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Lamfalussy process changed the EU financial services rule-making and regulatory dynamics in 
important ways. Lamfalussy maintained a three-level decision making structure, distinguishing 
between EU law-making, comitology and (what might be called) new EU regulatory forms of 
intervention. Its more interesting (and perhaps also salient) feature was, however, the emergence of a 
particular link between formal law-making (level 1 and level 2) and a regulatory system offering new 
capabilities and instruments in the management of complex, dynamic and fluid transnational markets. 
The role of the Commission changes, in that context. The Commission saw CESR grow significantly 
into technical rule-making, and that evolution has now been confirmed and formalised by „de 
Larosière‟. Whereas CESR‟s level 3 guidance was subject to few (formal) political constraints, the 
Commission is now more involved with the work of ESMA and has to approve the binding technical 
standards prepared by the latter. The Commission is not formally bound by the ESMA advice but has 
to justify changes to the draft standards. Moreover, the momentum of the system and the complexity 
of many of the technical issues which will have to be dealt with suggest the institutional role of the 
Commission at level 2 has been somewhat clarified; its potential as a „check‟ on ESMA, a sort of 
Ombudsman in the new (level 2) institutional system, is being recognised.  
 
CESR was (and ESMA is and will be) highly constrained in terms of regulatory capacity. The limited 
resources of the Authority create a risk of „capture‟ by national expertise and emphasise its reliance 
on the dominant forces of a sector that is very dynamic and fluid. The prevalence of the large 
wholesale lobby in CESR‟s technical consultations (and the marginalisation of the retail interests) was 
problematic. By requiring ESMA to consult the (new) Securities and Markets Stakeholders Group in 
the course of technical rule-making initiatives, EU law runs the risk of formalising the institutional 
imbalances instead of counteracting them. A braver solution would involve stronger duties of external 
justification on the ESMA/sector collaboration and demand that the draft technical standards be 
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explained (internally) in the light of the concerns expressed by stakeholders during consultation. A 
commitment to pluralism in this area would also recognise the important and growing role of the 
„regulatory state‟ in EU financial services.  
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Chapter V 
 
External capacities and lenient regulatory checks: the European Aviation Safety 
Agency and its challenges 
 
Introduction 
 
The establishment of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), in 2003, has been an important 
moment in the EU regulation of the sector.
679
 Most notably, the EASA is responsible for airworthiness 
type-certification of aircraft and parts in the EU. What the EASA does, in this context, is consider the 
airworthiness of the particular „type‟ projects (e.g. Airbus A380 or Boeing 787) and it will issue a type-
certificate where the relevant project meets the required safety and environmental standards. The 
granting of individual certificates to the aircraft, on the other hand, falls on the national aviation 
authorities (NAA). The EASA is also responsible for the continuing safety (airworthiness) of the 
approved aircraft and product types. In more recent years, the mandate of the EASA has been 
extended to cover the certification of flight crew licensing and the safety related aspects of air traffic 
management and air navigation systems. This type of work can broadly be understood as „product-
type‟ evaluation and licensing. We shall see, in this respect, that airworthiness type-certification (i.e. 
making sure that the aircraft types are safe) is what the EASA spends most of its time with, and the 
chapter is also focused on this. In addition, the EASA has also been given „rule-making‟ 
responsibilities (i.e. provision of technical legislative advice to the EU institutions and issuing of 
„certification specifications‟),
680
 and it has moreover been handed the task of scrutinising the NAAs‟ 
compliance with EU legal requirements (this is called „standardisation‟).  
 
The creation of the EASA has therefore promoted the executive centralisation of type-certification 
tasks, something that is important in particular for the large EU manufacturing industry. European 
cooperation in the development of common certification codes for large aeroplanes and engines had 
previously been organised via the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), as we shall see below. But the 
EASA also takes on new responsibilities and has been given direct decision-making powers, namely 
to approve new aircraft models (types). The first years of the EASA were difficult. The Agency was 
forced to outsource all the type-certification work to the national authorities. Since then, EASA has 
progressively attempted (and to a certain extent also succeeded) to promote the internalisation of 
these tasks. Outsourcing to the NAAs continues to be important in this regulatory system, but now 
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most or all of the (type-certification) work involving the large and more complex projects is performed 
in-house. A closer investigation into the type-certification procedures also shows, however, that in 
airworthiness type-certification the applicant company has crucial role in making the case for the 
safety of its „product‟. The reliance of the EASA on the external capacities of the industry is significant, 
and not without risks. There is a danger that the Agency ends up softening its controls on the 
industrial processes and that the required levels of safety of the products may be put at risk as a 
consequence. The chapter finds that the nature of this (EASA/applicant company) relationship has 
had a detrimental effect on „checks and balances‟ in the institutional system. Whereas the EASA type-
certification procedures provide for some internal controls via consultation with interested parties and 
through the intervention of the Panel of Experts (an internal structure created to review EASA 
deliberations) in matters which are considered to be „important‟; in practice those procedures are 
hardly used. The type-certification of the Airbus A380 will be used to show this dynamic in more 
detail. It is also found that the relevant decisions are taken between lower-level EASA experts (the 
product certification managers) and the applicant company, and that the checks on this work (through 
these EASA officials‟ hierarchical superiors) are quite rare. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: first, the role of the Joint Aviation Authorities is explored and the 
emergence of the EASA considered. Secondly, the chapter looks at the organisation of the EASA and 
investigates its regulatory mission. In the third section, the type-certification competences of the 
Agency are developed and the nature of EASA‟s regulatory capacity is assessed. Subsequently, the 
chapter explains the (nature of the) „narrow‟ expertise of the EASA, its focus on a particular type of 
regulatory work. In the fifth section, the formal EASA procedures for airworthiness type-certification 
shall be examined. Finally, the chapter assesses the dynamics of deliberation within EASA and 
reflects on the challenges which this involves.  
 
1- The Joint Aviation Authorities and the emergence of the EASA  
 
In order to understand the motivations behind the establishment of the EASA, the nature and purpose 
of previous regulatory arrangements in Europe deserve to be considered. International cooperation in 
this sector has been important and it led to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 
Convention), signed by 52 states on December 1944 (which defined minimum safety standards for 
civil aviation).
681
 It was not until a few decades later that European countries agreed to build on these 
(international) minimum standards and work on further harmonisation of their aviation safety rules. 
This happened in 1970, when a number of European states created the Joint Aviation Authorities 
(JAA) in order to produce common certification codes for large aeroplanes and for engines.
682
  
Although these were soft rules, they set market expectations and were heavily relied on by the 
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industry. In addition, the Joint Aviation Requirements (the airworthiness codes prepared by the JAA) 
became compulsory in the European Union with the approval of Council Regulation 3922/91.
683
 
Member States were consequently under an obligation to accept products certified in accordance with 
these requirements, unless urgent “safety problems” required unilateral action, which would have to 
be duly justified.
684
 The restriction of the JAA to large aeroplane certification was considered to be 
important “to meet the needs of the European Industry and particularly for products manufactured by 
international consortia (e.g. Airbus).”
685
 Although the JAA‟s mission was extended, in 1987, to all 
classes of aircraft, there is a very tight connection between the purpose and mission of the Joint 
Aviation Authorities and the perceived need to sort out the large aviation industry‟s complications 
when it came to the certification of aircraft and parts on a EU-wide scale.   
 
Despite a number of relevant achievements (outlined below), the JAA faced several institutional 
difficulties which sentenced it future. Schout explains that there had been “many delays in agreeing 
on rules implementing the JAA objectives, a lack of commitment from member countries towards the 
JAA‟s non-binding legislation, industry being faced with many different national requirements, and 
unanimity voting preventing clear legislation and resulting in protracted decision-making.”
686
 The same 
author goes on to explain that, in the wake of the EU enlargement, the costs which the industry had to 
face to comply with nearly thirty different procedures were “enormous”, particularly for big aviation 
projects.
687
 The nature of the JAA‟s decision-making process was therefore disappointing for the 
Commission, which wanted a “[…] strong and efficient agency able inter alia to carry out certification 
functions and to be a valid partner for foreign aeronautical authorities.”
688
 In conclusion, while the 
work of the JAA in the development of common aviation safety codes has been significant and the 
nature of its task central to the definition of the future EASA tasks in EU air transport safety, its 
incapacity to generate consensuses in difficult issues and the absence of swifter standardisation 
processes opened the way for the creation of the European Aviation Safety Agency.    
 
EASA 
 
It was in the context of these institutional failures that the EASA‟s focus on „type-certification‟ began to 
be delineated. The solution would not be found in a reform of the JAA procedures, but instead 
involved the centralisation of certain executive functions. According to the system defined by 
Regulation (EC) 1592/2002, the granting of airworthiness and environmental type-certificates to 
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aircraft and parts should be issued by the new European agency (EASA) directly and not by the 
national authorities, as before.
689
 Prior to an examination of the operation of these powers, the wider 
regulatory strategy of the EU and the significance of the new agency deserve to be considered. The 
notion that the first priority of the EASA should be centred on the certification of aircraft was clear in 
an important report on the future of EU aviation policy. This High-Level Group Report (2000), which 
formalised and represented the main political expression of the „Single European Sky‟ (SES) program, 
launched in 1999 by former Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio, considered the main 
challenges faced by the EU in the field of air transport and opened the door to the establishment this 
agency.
690
 The assessment of the High-Level Group was that European competiveness in the aviation 
sector was threatened by disparate and fragmented air traffic management (ATM) rules and by the 
absence of a coherent safety strategy.  
 
Similar concerns were expressed by the Commission, in 2000, when this institution noted that the 
existing institutional system was “criticised for not being able to ensure aviation safety oversight 
efficiently and in a cost-effective manner”.
691
 It was therefore hoped that the definition of common 
rules and the establishment of an “independent authority for the certification of aeronautical products 
would overcome those deficiencies.”
692 
The Commission added that “thanks to a common system, 
applicants for certification of aeronautical products will have only one set of procedures to follow to 
get an approval, which would then be valid throughout the whole Community without restrictions or 
additional bureaucratic requirements.”
693
 This was considered “particularly important in view of the 
fact that Europe‟s main competitors‟ certification mechanisms, eg in the USA, are provided free of 
charge to the aircraft manufacturing industry.”
694
 The High Level Group supported the Commission‟s 
views and argued that the “first priority” of this agency should be centred on aircraft certification.
695
 
Moreover, the „Single European Sky‟ (SES) underlined the importance of additional harmonisation 
efforts in the areas of air traffic management and air navigation systems (ATM/ANS). The fragmented 
nature of ATM/ANS systems in the EU was criticised by the Commission and by the High Level 
Group, which considered that these disparities caused increasing flight delays and significant 
economic inefficiencies. The SES approach therefore distinguished between “safety regulation” 
(where the EASA would become a central actor), and matters dealing with economic efficiency and air 
traffic management, which would not concern the new European agency.
696
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2- The role of the European Aviation Safety Agency 
 
EASA was established in 2003 and is based in Cologne.
697
 It is headed by an Executive Director 
(which is namely responsible for issuing the Agency‟s safety-related decisions) and is governed by a 
Management Board (which brings together representatives of every EU Member State and the 
Commission).
698
 The main tasks of the management board are in the definition of EASA‟s priorities, 
and it also monitors the performance of the Agency and establishes its budget.
699
 Moreover, as the 
EASA decisions have binding effects on third-parties (in type-certification matters, as we shall see 
below), the Agency also includes a Board of Appeal, the role of which is to check whether the 
decisions of the Executive Director correctly apply EU legislation in this area.
700
 Actions for the 
annulment of EASA acts, such as the ones covering type-certification, can only be brought before the 
European Courts after the appeals procedure has been exhausted.
701
  
 
In terms of its internal organisation of tasks, the EASA is divided into three main departments: the 
Certification Directorate, the Rulemaking Directorate and the Approvals and Standardisation 
Directorate. Indeed, the core of this agency‟s mandate covers these three areas (see below).  
 
Type-Certification 
 
As explained above, the „first priority‟ of EASA has been airworthiness and environmental type-
certification of aeronautical products, parts, and appliances (designed, manufactured or used in the 
EU). For the purpose of clarification, a type-certificate (e.g. the Airbus A380 or the Boeing 747 
models) should be distinguished from the individual airworthiness certificates, which continues to be 
granted by the national authorities.
702
 What the EASA approves is the general design model, the 
compatibility of those (design) characteristics with existing safety standards. The EASA also holds 
responsibility for „continuing airworthiness‟, the ongoing scrutiny of the safety of the aircraft in order to 
assess whether or not the conditions upon which a type-certificate was issued are maintained. A 
certificate of airworthiness issued by the EASA remains valid as long as it is not suspended, revoked 
or terminated. Outside these exceptional circumstances, post-certification tasks include the approval 
of changes and repairs to the aircraft and components. An important regulatory instrument in this 
regard is the „Airworthiness Directive‟: a document mandating certain actions to be performed on the 
aircraft so as to restore an acceptable level of safety, when evidence indicates that the safety of the 
aircraft can otherwise be compromised.
703
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The „essential airworthiness requirements‟ have been defined by the Council and by the Parliament 
through the (EASA) Basic Regulation.
704 
These general requirements are then developed in the 
Commission implementing rules.
705
 The applicable airworthiness conditions for the issuing of type-
certificates are defined in the Commission Regulation „Part-21‟ (certification of aircraft and related 
products and parts).
706
 The implementing Commission norms leave the EASA, as the chapter 
explains further below, with a wide margin of technical discretion in the performance of its type-
certification assessments.  
1- The EU legislator defines the „essential requirements‟ 
2- Commission empowered to adopt implementing rules, via comitology (EASA advises) 
3- EASA to issue type-certificates of aircraft and components 
4- The Member States issue individual certificates to the aircraft 
Figure 1: the institutional structure of EU regulation of aviation safety   
 
Rulemaking 
 
Under „rulemaking‟, the Agency carries out two types of tasks. First, it advises the EU institutions in 
the context of any law-making activity which the latter may wish to pursue concerning safety 
regulation in the field of air transport. Secondly, the EASA issues certification specifications 
(airworthiness codes) and guidance material (acceptable means of compliance) for the application of 
EC law. These are not mandatory requirements, but represent the Agency's technical interpretation of 
EU legislation in this area. The influence of the Joint Aviation Authorities‟ work is visible in the 
airworthiness codes adopted by the EASA. The CS-25 (certification specifications for large 
aeroplanes), for example, essentially imported the JAR-25 (Joint Aviation Requirements for large 
aeroplanes) into the Agency system.
707
 
 
The relationship between the Rulemaking and the Certification Directorates is a complex one. In fact, 
when the airworthiness codes have to be adapted or updated for particular projects because the 
relevant aircraft or parts involve novel design features, it is the Certification Directorate that develops 
and issues these „special conditions‟. That is an important part of the EASA‟s work (as we shall see 
below). On the other hand, if the airworthiness codes require general changes, and not simply special 
conditions for specific aviation projects, this task falls on the Rulemaking Directorate. 
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The rulemaking process of this agency recognises the importance of consultation opportunities. When 
a rulemaking initiative is started, be it for the provision of legal advice or for the purposes of 
developing certification specifications or acceptable means of compliance, the EASA publishes a 
„Notice of Proposed Amendment‟ to inform stakeholders of its intentions and to give them a chance to 
submit their views.
708
 Following this discussion, the EASA prepares a „Comment Response 
Document‟ which explains the official position of the Agency and how it communicates with the views 
expressed during consultation.
709
 Two consultative bodies support the EASA in the performance of its 
rulemaking tasks: the Safety Standards Consultative Committee (SSCC), where interested parties are 
represented, and the Advisory Group of National Authorities (AGNA). This chapter shall explain that, 
differently, the type-certification procedures allow for less consultation, foster more closed forms of 
deliberation, and place more emphasis on the authority of specific EASA experts in the management 
of the relevant “dossiers”.  According to an EASA official, this difference is inevitable because the 
“constraints” of both activities also differ; “certification operates on given projects with timelines”; and 
“design includes intellectual property rights so the level of openness is less than for rulemaking where 
discussions are more on general issues”.
710
   
 
‘Standardisation’ (verifying national compliance) 
 
The EASA is also concerned with the uniform implementation of EU aviation safety law in the Member 
States. This agency therefore assists the Commission in overseeing the effective application and 
correct interpretation of the legal requirements. Standardisation essentially involves the process of 
scrutinising the national authorities‟ compliance with the relevant rules. In order to do that, the Agency 
carries out inspections in the headquarters or regional offices of the national aviation authorities. The 
standardisation teams include at least one EASA member, who acts as team leader, and officials 
seconded from the national authorities. While EASA has to „qualify‟ the NCA experts doing this 
standardisation work, reliance on national expertise in this exercise suggests that there is an element 
of „peer review‟ in this. Moreover, the responsibility between the EASA and the national competent 
authorities in the aviation safety oversight is important. According to an EASA official, “99% of EASA 
inspections include a sampling of several approved undertakings, in order to monitor whether the 
NAA has properly discharged its certification and oversight duties.”
711
 On the other hand, the more 
direct and local safety oversight responsibilities fall on the NAAs. With regards to this, an EASA 
official explains that it is “almost impractical for the Agency to perform ramp inspections on aircraft 
and aerodromes located in the territory” of a Member State; and that the NAAs “as competent 
authorities for certification and oversight of undertakings are responsible for oversight of those 
organisations that are on their territory except for Design Organisation Approvals” [DOAs are entities 
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considered to have the know-how required to design aviation products in accordance with the legal 
and technical rules and that are consequently granted certain privileges in the performance of such 
tasks].
712
 In conclusion: “EASA cannot perform „on-site‟ safety oversight – but it can perform sample 
compliance checks at the undertakings‟ level in the course of our [EASA] inspections, and that the 
EASA always does.”
713
   
 
The first extension of the EASA competences   
 
When proposing the establishment of the EASA, the Commission explained that the Agency‟s 
competences should, at a later stage, be extended to air operations and flight crew licensing, as well 
as to the regulation of the safety related aspects of airports, air navigation services and traffic 
management systems.
714
 This view has been supported by Patrick Goudou, the EASA‟s Executive 
Director, who has argued that the extension of the EASA system “to all aspects of aviation safety 
under a total system approach is technically consistent and logical.”
715
 The reason for a gradual 
transfer of powers from the national authorities, under the JAA regime, to the EASA, can be explained 
by the significant regulatory challenges involved.  
 
The first extension of the EASA competences has covered air operations, flight crew licensing and 
third-country authorisation. The European Union realised that the aviation community needed a 
uniform set of rules and a more efficient decision-making process not just for product certification, but 
also in what concerns air operations and flight crew licensing. Indeed, for a new aircraft type model to 
become operational, the competent authorities have to validate the airworthiness and environmental 
compatibility of that type design as well as the aircraft “operational qualification”, which includes the 
training and qualifications of crew members (cockpit and cabin), and operational suitability elements 
(e.g. procedures in cases of emergency).
716
 And, therefore, through Regulation (EC) 216/2008, the 
remit of the Agency was finally extended to these areas.
717
 The Commission implementing rules are 
expected by 2012 (meaning that this transfer of powers is not yet complete).   
 
The 2008 Regulation also extended the mandate of the EASA to the authorisation of third-country 
operators. According to the Regulation, the EASA shall, in relation to third-country operators involved 
in commercial operations: a) conduct itself or through the NAAs (or qualified entities), investigations 
and audits; b) issue authorisations unless a Member State exercises the functions of the state of 
operator in relation to the relevant operators; and c) amend, limit, suspend or revoke these 
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authorisations if the conditions under which they were granted are no longer fulfilled.
718
 These new 
tasks will impact on the updating procedures of the “Community List” of air carriers subject to an 
operating ban within the EU.
719
 That list is defined by the Commission, assisted by a Committee of 
Member States. And while Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 limited the role of the EASA to information 
reporting in what the Community list is concerned, its future competences in this field mean that if the 
Agency refuses third-country air carriers the relevant authorizations, it shall pass on to the 
Commission the information on which it based its actions. The EU should then consider whether the 
name of the air carrier should be included on that list.
720
  
 
The second extension of EASA competences  
 
Moreover, the competences of the EASA have been extended to cover aerodromes, air traffic 
management and air navigation systems. The “total safety approach system” outlined above, 
supported by the EASA and by the Commission, requires the Agency to grow into areas of airport and 
ATM/ANS safety. The „Single European Sky‟ Group highlighted that the European aviation community 
would greatly benefit from increased coordination between the national ATM/ANC systems, the 
disparities among which cause increasing flight delays, harming economic efficiency and the 
environment.
721
 While the new EASA tasks shall not become effective before 2012, according to 
Regulation (EC) No 1108/2009 (extending the mandate of the EASA to aerodromes, air traffic 
management and air navigation services) EU regulatory involvement in these fields is much weaker 
than in airworthiness type-certification.
722
 National authorities shall (continue to) certify their own 
ATM/ANC systems.
723
 The EASA will benefit from certain certification tasks but in “clearly defined 
cases”, notably in external relations matters.
724
 Finally, one of the most significant aspects of this 
extension is the exclusion of airports (aerodromes, on the contrary, are covered) from this legislative 
package, the regulation of which is addressed separately in an “action plan” for airport capacity, 
efficiency and safety.
725
 In the opinion of an EASA official, this is an understandable solution and 
“there is merit in decentralisation in particular in the field of general aviation”; “proximity is 
important”.
726
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3- EASA and airworthiness type-certification 
 
The first years of the EASA were difficult. In 2003 and 2004 the Agency delegated all the work it was 
assigned to perform, through outsourcing contracts, to the National Aviation Authorities (acting under 
the responsibility and supervision of the European agency).
727
 As it became increasingly clear that the 
EASA was facing serious operational difficulties, the U.K. Commons Transport Committee, in 2006, 
considered this European agency to be “an accident waiting to happen” and it manifested concerns 
that the transfer of powers to this agency “could lead to a shift towards lowest common denominator 
and therefore the dilution of the CAA‟s high standards of aviation safety.”
728
 The British Members of 
Parliament argued, in particular, that these operational shortcomings were creating a “knowledge gap” 
in the EASA and that this undermined safety innovation in this field.
729
 According to an EASA official, 
“we [EASA] don‟t think this concern has materialised.”
730
 EASA began to progressively internalise the 
airworthiness type-certification tasks (see below). But some worrying figures remain, particularly 
concerning the continuing airworthiness (on-going safety oversight) targets. In 2007 the Agency was 
only able to perform 55% of the planned continuing airworthiness work.
731
 Some progress was 
achieved in 2008, but still only 72% of the planned activities could be performed then.
732
 An EASA 
senior official explains that this is a “critical issue” for this organisation and that the Agency continues 
to lack some resources in order to properly fulfil its mission.
733
   
 
Partial internalisation 
 
Faced with this troubled start, the EASA initiated an internalisation strategy which would require a 
significant increase of its staff numbers. In 2005, a total of 45 new Project Certification Managers 
joined the EASA.
734
 The Agency claims that by that year: “(…) all major transport aircraft and engine 
programmes, including related continuing airworthiness tasks, were already managed centrally from 
Cologne.”
735
 It has been reported that in many cases the Agency was “forced to internalise 
certification tasks at short notice” as the NAAs were losing their own staff.
736
 Despite these efforts, 
until 2006 this internalisation tendency only touched on 30% of the certification projects, affecting in 
priority the large projects.
737
 On the other hand, the EASA continued to rely, through outsourcing 
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contracts, on the national authorities for smaller and less complex certification programmes.
738
 In the 
following years the centralising push of the EASA had a more significant impact. In 2007 the 
certification project work performed internally exceeded 50%, including all major projects and in 2008, 
after 145 additional temporary agent posts were occupied in the Certification Directorate, the Agency 
achieved a target of 63% in the level of internalisation for certification activities.
739
 This dynamic 
suggests that the national authorities remain a central part of the type-certification processes in the 
EU and that it is important to clarify the dividing lines between the „EASA product‟ and the NAAs‟ one, 
as well as the administrative impacts of this on the operation of the European agency. An example of 
the EASA‟s retreating intentions, for less complex certification programmes, is the contract which it 
concluded with national regulatory authorities entrusting the latter with all activities related to 
gliders.
740
 According to the EASA this solution is justified by the fact that proximity is “important” in 
general aviation and “outsourcing does not mean transfer of responsibilities.”
741
 
 
The salience of new type-design activities in EASA 
 
Despite the EASA‟s type-certification limitations and transitional problems, the fact is that the 
Certification Directorate is the largest department of this organisation. According to 2008 figures, the 
Certification Directorate includes 34% of the EASA staff, followed by the Approvals and 
Standardisation Directorate (19%) and, finally, by the Rulemaking Directorate (14%).
742
 These 
numbers would be more unbalanced (in favour of the Certification Directorate), had the Agency not 
decided to transfer to the standardisation department (inspections to the NAAs) a task which clearly 
concerns „certification‟: the approval and oversight of design organisations (entities which are 
considered to design aircraft and parts in accordance with the applicable legal requirements).
743
 This 
internal rearrangement therefore hides that more than 50% of the EASA staff deal with certification 
tasks, whether it is product certification or design organisation approvals (considered below).  
  
It is also significant that despite the EASA extensions, the prominence of new type-design 
(airworthiness) activities remains unaffected in the European regulatory framework. Based on recent 
indications, it appears that the level of resources directed towards the second extension areas 
(aerodromes and ATM/ANS systems) is quite limited. It is expected that these new activities will only 
require the EASA to hire, in 2011, one expert for the relevant certification activities. That is because 
“EASA has no certification responsibilities for aerodrome and only responsibilities for pan-European 
systems in ATM/ANS.”
744
 Until 2013, this number may rise to a total of 10 experts.
745
 This contrasts 
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with the 79 posts in the product certification department (2008), or with the allocation of 20 officials, 
during that same year, to the „large aircraft section‟ (also product certification).
746
 Differently, the first 
extension areas (flight crew licensing and air operations) put more pressure on the EASA. This is 
particularly so in what concerns flight standards certification (operational suitability of the aircraft). 
Interestingly, even before the formal extension of the EASA competences had been accomplished, 
this organisation began providing, on a voluntary basis, certain services to the industry in this area of 
flight standards certification (maintenance review board activities).
747
 This highlights the importance of 
the EASA‟s role in the promotion of uniform and consistent safety standards for the introduction of 
new aircraft „types‟. Until 2013, the EASA estimates that 49 new recruits for flight standards 
certification will be in place.  
 
While the level of regulatory work involved here is important, the figures show that, if one divides the 
product type-certification activities, distinguishing the design related activities from the approval of 
flight standards (operational suitability of the aircraft): the „new type design‟ related tasks currently 
require more resources than what any new EASA powers will call for in the predictable future. The 
Agency estimates that until 2013, and for that year only, the number of hours performed in the area of 
flight standards certification does not exceed a total of 110.000.
748
 By contrast, in 2008 the EASA 
invested 122.681 hours in airworthiness and environmental certification and it estimates that this shall 
increase to a total of 152.986 hours in 2013.
749
 Finally, it is noteworthy that whereas in type-design 
certification the EASA has achieved a level of internalisation which exceeds the 60% mark, the 
Agency explains that in what concerns the first extension fields (FCL and air operations), its aim is to 
perform only 50% of the required work in-house, which means that outsourcing to the national 
authorities will have a deeper impact in these fields.
750
              
 
4- The „narrow‟ expertise of the EASA 
  
The previous section highlighted that while the EASA has progressively developed a set of regulatory 
capacities to fulfil its mission; in reality the expertise on which it relies serves a quite specific type of 
task. This restriction has implications in terms of the nature (and origins of) the expert capabilities 
assembled in Cologne.  
 
Looking at the distribution of nationalities in the EASA staff, it is striking that the number of French 
and German experts nearly equals the sum of all the other EU nationalities represented in this 
agency. In 2008, out of a total of 439 EASA agents, there were 111 Germans and 97 French.
751
 For 
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an EASA member, “a predominance of nationals of the State where an agency is located is a 
commonly seen consequence of its business operation.”
752
 Even if this was so (this level disproportion 
in the national origin of the experts is not common) one would still have to question why France is 
„represented‟ in almost 1 out of 4 (EASA) officials. Another EASA official notes that “among all 
Member States Germany and France belong to the main aviation industry states which impacts on the 
quantity and quality of personnel trained in aviation.”
753
 Behind comes the United Kingdom with 43 
officials and Italy with 34.
754
 Moreover, it is interesting, for example, that the two Product Certification 
Managers assigned to the Airbus A380 programme (Rachel Daeschler and Alexandre Peytouraux) 
are both French.
755
 An EASA member says that there is “no hidden intention here; we simply have 
used the people that had the knowledge because they were doing the same job in their country before 
the responsibility was transferred to EASA.”
756
 
 
The EASA, as mentioned before, forms a system and not simply an agency with its own staff. The 
previous sections mentioned that the EASA has succeeded in internalising an increasing share of 
aircraft projects, but still today, in the field of airworthiness certification, more than 30% of all 
applications received by the Agency are contracted out to the national authorities. In what the 
outsourcing procedures are concerned, an accreditation procedure has been established by the 
EASA Standardisation Directorate to ensure that the national authorities have the required 
organisation and expertise to perform the relevant certification tasks.
757
 The initial accreditation 
requires on-site investigation and, in certain cases, may involve witnessing from EASA staff of a 
particular product certification project executed by the investigated entity („shadow certification‟).
758
 
Ongoing validity of the accreditation is subject to period assessments through surveillance 
programmes and there is a duty on the accredited entity to report any significant changes to the 
scope of accreditation.
759
 A total of 16 Member States (in addition to Switzerland and Norway) have 
been accredited by the EASA.
760
 More than 75% of the certification work performed by the NAAs on 
behalf of the EASA is carried out by five Member States: France, United Kingdom, Germany, The 
Netherlands and Italy.
761
 These are, according to EASA, “also the countries where the vast majority of 
the design activities are located”, which means that they have “developed an expertise to discharge 
their responsibilities.”
762
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Equally significant is the possibility of NAAs being accredited to perform certification tasks in Member 
States other than their own. When the EASA came into operation the NAAs could only provide 
services to the EASA in relation to aviation products or parts if they were the “state of design”. 
Currently, however, a Management Board Decision allows national authorities to provide certification 
services in relation to products which were designed in other Member States if the state of design 
authority is not accredited or not able or willing to execute the task in accordance with the EASA 
procedures and within the required timeframe.
763
 An EASA official explains that the Agency has often 
made use of this possibility and that, for example, in the field of rotorcraft, a significant part of the 
relevant certification tasks are contracted out to Italy, which, according to the EASA, has acquired 
relevant expertise in this area.
764
  
 
5- The formal EASA procedures for airworthiness type-certification 
 
Having examined the wider impact of the EASA‟s shrinking administration on the internal and external 
allocation of regulatory resources and on the type of „Europeanization‟ involved here, it is important to 
consider the operation of the Agency‟s type-certification procedures in order to consider the 
challenges associated with this specialised expertise.  
 
The formal procedures shall be explained first. In the field of airworthiness certification, once an 
application is accepted, the EASA nominates a team of specialists to conduct the investigation of the 
relevant aviation product so as to assess whether it deserves to be granted an airworthiness type-
certificate.
765
 These specialists are led by a Product Certification Manager (PCM) which is, along with 
his/her team, accountable to the responsible EASA Certification Manager.
766
 With the aim of 
establishing a „good‟ certification team, the EASA Certification Manager may ask the applicant to 
provide an initial briefing for general familiarisation with the project.
767
 Following these exchanges, this 
official appoints a certification team and a Product Certification Manager to deal with the certification 
project. The EASA certification processes also include a Panel of Experts, formed by specialists with 
extensive technical knowledge in this field, which may be called on to provide advice on technical 
certification principles and on the interpretation of the implementing rules of the Basic Regulation.
768
 
 
Once the team is finally established, the EASA type-certification procedures can be broadly divided in 
four stages: 1) technical familiarisation and establishment of the type-certification basis; 2) agreement 
of the certification programme; 3) compliance demonstrations; and 4) final report and granting of a 
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type certificate.
769
 It will be explained that most of the EASA‟s time, efforts and resources are directed 
towards the early certification stages (i.e. technical familiarisation and type-certification basis 
definition).  
 
Technical familiarisation and type certification basis 
 
During „technical familiarisation‟ the EASA receives from the applicants “thorough technical briefings” 
about the product.
770
 This is important for the Agency to be in a position to “fully understand the 
design, including new used technologies and any unconventional features or unconventional usage of 
the product.”
771
 Normally, the applicable type-certification basis is defined at the end of the technical 
familiarisation stage, but in some cases this has been settled later on in the certification process.
772
 
The type-certification basis is formed by the applicable airworthiness code and the „special 
conditions‟.
773
 The airworthiness codes are more general standards and are “only amended when 
EASA gained sufficient experience with such technologies so that its contents are generic enough 
and not drafted around a technology (which would be the case of a special condition).”
774
 If, on the 
other hand, the particular design features of a product cannot be addressed by the applicable 
certification specifications (airworthiness codes) the EASA type-certification basis shall include these 
special conditions (and elect to comply).
775
 An aircraft which incorporates, for example, an innovative 
braking system, is likely to include special conditions addressing the relevant safety issues through 
specific engineering standards, adapted to that type of product and its specific characteristics. The 
special conditions therefore represent the more dynamic element of the type-certification exercise. 
The airworthiness provide for more general and stable standards on how the design of the products 
should be made, but this may need to be adapted if: 1) a programme includes novel or unusual 
features; 2) it involves unusual operations; or 3) service experience shows that unsafe conditions may 
be present.
776
 The initial type-certification basis is approved by the responsible EASA Certification 
Manager, and any changes made to this should be based on a draft prepared by the Product 
Certification Manager.
777
  
 
Importantly, the decision-making process is different (and more open) when the special conditions are 
qualified as “important”:  
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Deviations from the applicable airworthiness codes, environmental protection certification specifications and/or 
acceptable means of compliance with Part 21, as well as important special conditions and equivalent safety 
findings, shall be submitted to the panel of experts and be subject to a public consultation of at least 3 weeks, 
except if they have been previously agreed and published in the Official Publication of the Agency.
778
 
[Emphasis mine] 
 
The fact the when the special conditions are “important” they have to be subject to consultation and 
examined by the EASA Panel of Experts shows that there is a dual decision-making structure here 
(this is developed below when considering the type-certification of the Airbus A380).  
 
The authority of the Product Certification Manager in the operation of the type-certification procedures 
is important. These procedures underline that: “[...] every effort should be made to resolve all kinds of 
disagreements concerning certification issues between EASA and the Certificate Holder/Applicant at 
the lowest possible level.”
779
 Therefore, the certification team forms the “primary decision-maker” in 
the process, acting under the supervision of the PCM.
780
 The certification team is given “the power to 
take the first decisions to the largest possible extent.”
781
 
 
Certification Programme 
 
The agreement of the certification programme forms the second phase of the type-certification 
procedures. Emerging from a discussion between the EASA team and the applicant, the certification 
programme defines: a) the proposed means of compliance with the type-certification basis, and b) the 
activities and involvement of the EASA team in compliance demonstrations, test witnessing, 
compliance tracking and recording, conformity statements, and schedules for compliance to be 
achieved.
782
 It is the applicant‟s responsibility to produce this certification programme. This process is 
not a very transparent one. As these documents are owned by the companies and because the EASA 
does not publish information on the allocation of regulatory resources in particular projects, there is a 
lack of data on the Agency‟s activities dealing, for example, with test witnessing.
783
 For an EASA 
member, this has to do with the fact that “certification deals with projects; projects include intellectual 
property rights.”
784
 Moreover, the same official says that EASA “consults on certain special conditions 
and this was not done in the past.”
785
 It is also noted that the US Federal Aviation Administration 
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“does consult on all special conditions but sometimes it becomes really repetitive.”
786
 Be it as it may, 
we shall see below (based on Airbus 380 type-certification process) that most of the EASA does not 
consult on most special conditions; which then means that the dialogue between EASA and the 
applicant company during the assessment of a type-certification project cannot be accessed or 
controlled through more open procedures.  
 
Compliance demonstrations 
 
Showing compliance with the certification basis is the applicant‟s responsibility.
787
 The applicant 
should equally: a) define the EASA type design, b) produce a statement of conformity for certification 
tests, c) provide the required certification documents (compliance reports, manuals, etc.), and d) 
conclude the compliance reports with a Declaration of Compliance with the relevant requirements.
788
 
These compliance demonstrations might then have to be accepted by the EASA certification team 
(depending on the design organisation approval privileges). The existence of DOAs (design 
organisation approvals) means that EASA will automatically accept some compliance documents 
submitted by the applicants. An EASA official notes that the DOA concept is “concept of the future” 
and that the Agency “is not is a position to verify all and everything done by the manufacturers on a 
given project.”
789
 Moreover, DOAs “are a way to ensure a demonstration of capability for design and 
logically some privileges should be given.”
790
 While the number of approved DOAs continues to grow, 
the Agency is progressively transferring the ones which still are managed by the national authorities 
to the European system. By the end of 2008, a total of 170 DOA were governed by the EASA and 74 
remained with under national authorities‟ supervision.
791
 It is estimated that, in 2010, a total of 255 
design organisation approvals had been issued by the EASA. This limits the EASA‟s role to the early 
type-certification stages, concerned with the definition of the type-certification basis (airworthiness 
codes and „special conditions‟). Moreover, while the EASA has the responsibility of scrutinising the 
DOA‟s compliance with their legal requirements (by reviewing reports, inspections, flight test 
witnessing, etc.) the Agency appears to have some difficulties meeting these oversight duties (in 
2008, for example, only 54% of the planned audits to DOAs were performed).
792
  
 
Final Report and Type-Certificate 
 
The fourth and final stage of the type-certification process consists of a Final Report and the granting 
of a type-certificate. Once the relevant milestones of the certification programme have been achieved, 
the applicant offers a declaration of compliance stating that the type design of the aircraft complies 
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with the applicable EASA type certification basis.
793
 This should be followed by a statement of 
satisfaction of the team members to the PCM. The latter shall then issue a compliance statement to 
the responsible EASA Certification Manager, confirming that the type design of the product respects 
the type certification basis.
794
 The type-certificate is granted by the Executive Director of the Agency.  
 
6- The dynamics of deliberation: the challenges and the controls 
 
Having examined the formal EASA procedures for airworthiness type-certification, the chapter seeks 
to better understand how these work and what kind of issues emerge from those dynamics. As some 
of the previous paragraphs already noted, the transparency of these processes is a challenge. While 
(here) we are dealing with industrial projects with intellectual property rights, it can also be important 
(as we shall see) for the sector and stakeholders to check how the technologies of a given project are 
being handled and how the EASA is developing its mission, more generally. We will see below that 
the problem of transparency is mainly linked to the number of special conditions which are classified 
as „important‟ (as that generates a more open decision-making system) and that, in practice, most of 
the decisions escape those procedures.  
 
Secondly, the formal steps outlined above also suggest that the applicant company has a crucial role 
and is mainly responsible for the type-certification process. The certification programme, in particular, 
is prepared and owned by the applicant company. One of the effects of this is that it is virtually 
impossible to check what the exact role of the EASA in the certification processes really is (as the 
companies will not supply this information to the general public).
795
 As a consequence, with the 
exception of a few facts which are sometimes made public (which is usually the case in very large and 
symbolic type-certification projects where the public will be informed that, for example, EASA pilots 
were involved in the test flights of a particular new aircraft model that is undergoing type-certification 
analysis);
796
 „nobody‟ knows what the EASA is (or not) doing in the course of particular type-
certification programmes.  
 
While it is not ignored that the EASA has to operate in the context of certain institutional constraints 
connected to the nature of these industrial projects, it is nevertheless questionable that everything (or 
almost everything) should be secret or decided without prior consultation. In this regard, the type-
certification „special conditions‟ are important. When a given type-certification project incorporates 
new technologies the safety of which cannot be addressed through the existing airworthiness codes, 
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the EASA has to draft special conditions, representing new safety standards that manage the novel 
design features. These „special conditions‟ consequently form a new and very specific form of EU 
industrial checks. They are relevant also in that they stabilise market expectations (through the 
creation of new standards), which may guide the concerned industry and serve as the basis for future 
regulatory updates (through the amendment of the airworthiness codes).
797
 We shall see below that 
while the drafting of these special conditions is meant to integrate a wider range of actors in the 
decision-making process and generate certain „checks and balances‟ in the process; that rarely 
happens in reality.  
 
The reduction of consultation opportunities: looking at the A380 project  
 
The type-certification of the Airbus A380 is the „flagship‟ of the EASA. The A380 is the largest 
commercial airliner in the world, with capacity for 555 passengers.
798
 This aircraft has been presented 
as one of the most significant technological breakthroughs in the global aviation industry (not only for 
its significant capacity but also for the efficiency and environmental standards which it has set).
799
 
After decades of planning and several years of tests (accumulating more than 2,600 flight test hours), 
the Airbus A380 received its EASA type-certification on December of 2006.
800
  
  
The dynamics of EASA deliberation in the case of the A380 type-certification suggest that the 
operation of these procedures is challenging in terms of who is involved and how the regulatory 
expertise may be checked. To begin with, EASA appears to manage airworthiness type-certification 
through a heavy reliance on lower-level officials (the product certification manager) and his/her 
decisions are rarely reviewed by the hierarchical superiors (certification manager and director). In the 
Airbus A380 certification programme, there was (only) one issue where the product certification 
manager and the Airbus experts failed to agree on, motivating the intervention of the Certification 
Director.
801
 The fact that most decisions are often kept at a „low‟ technical level appears to indicate 
that the expertise of some of these officials is not matched by others in the EASA; and without expert 
substitutes „peer reviews‟ cannot really take place.  
 
It was explained above that in the context of EASA airworthiness type-certification the only issues 
which may be accessed by the public are the „important‟ special conditions. Everything else is settled 
between the EASA experts and the applicant company „behind closed doors‟. Moreover, the case of 
the Airbus A380 shows that in practice most special conditions are classified as „normal‟ (i.e. not 
important) and as a consequence they are not subject to consultation nor have to be examined by the 
Panel of Experts. In the A380 type-certification process, only three special conditions were considered 
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to be “important” and consequently subject to consultation and to the Panel of Experts‟ review; the 
remaining 39 special conditions fell under the “normal” category, meaning that, here, the Product 
Certification Manager only needed to coordinate with the company.
802
 Taking into account the many 
and significant product design innovations introduced by this new aircraft „type‟, the limited number of 
special conditions classified as “important” in the A380 type-certification process suggests that most 
of the relevant matters were “previously agreed” (as the type-certification procedures call it) between 
the PCM and the Airbus experts, therefore escaping the more open and inclusive processes which 
the „important special conditions‟ call for. As mentioned above, in the US the FAA consults on all 
special conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: the dynamics of deliberation in the Airbus „A380‟ type-certification process. The important decisions 
were taken between the EASA product certification manager and the applicant company, with very few 
(hierarchical) institutional checks and almost no stakeholder consultations (or intervention of the Panel of 
Experts) 
 
The consultation on the three A380 „important‟ special conditions also stresses that these dialogues 
are confined to a very limited number of actors. Only Boeing and the UK regulator (the latter only on 
one occasion) were interested in commenting on the A380 “important” special conditions. Boeing‟s 
concerns dealt essentially with the US manufacturer‟s worries that harmonisation in these specific 
fields might not be achieved through these special conditions, calling for technical refinements to the 
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standards so that harmonisation with the existing (US) Federal Aviation Administration rules may be 
better achieved.
803
 Considering the very complex and technical matters that are being addressed here 
it is hardly surprising the process does not invite many comments. Perhaps this may also suggest that 
other safety issues in the A380 were perhaps more important or interesting for the industry or 
stakeholders but these did not undergo the more open process of the important special conditions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The operation of the European Aviation Safety Agency highlights that this body relies to an important 
extent on the capacities of the regulated industry, and the nature of this interaction raises questions 
about how checks and balances within the system can be maintained and promoted. We have seen 
that the first years of the EASA were very challenging, operationally (the Agency essentially had to 
outsource all the type-certification work to the national authorities). EASA then began a progressive 
move in the direction of „internalisation‟ of these tasks and it appears to have been modestly 
successful in doing so. When one digs deeper into the type-certification procedures and into the 
Agency‟s more precise responsibilities, however, it also becomes clearer that most of the work in this 
area is performed by the applicant company (with the Agency serving as a sort of check on industrial 
self-regulation). There is a risk, here, of having the EASA becoming too uncritical of the industry‟ 
assessments, too close to its processes or lacking the ability to understand where the problems are.  
 
One of the concerns which these institutional dynamics raise is that „checks and balances‟ may be 
difficult to ensure under the particular constraints of the industrial activity considered here. While the 
EASA type-certification procedures „recognise‟ that the important relationship in this system is really 
between the Agency‟s experts (product certification managers) and the applicant‟s „people‟, those 
procedures also allow for some consultation and internal reviews via hierarchical superiors of the 
product managers (as well as through the Panel of Experts). In practice, however, the decision-
making space is much more reduced, consultation rarely occurs and the Panel of Experts has 
become marginalised. To be sure, the relationship between consultation and the nature of the type-
certification processes is, in fact, challenging. But it is also reasonable to conclude that the EASA may 
be able to „do better‟ than this. EASA could, in particular, follow the example of the Federal Aviation 
Administration and consult on all special conditions. That would prevent the current situation where 
the more open and contestable procedures are often escaped. Provision could also be made for the 
Panel of Experts‟ intervention to be sought in contexts where consulted parties have particularly 
serious concerns about how a certain dossier is being handled by the Agency. 
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Chapter VI 
 
Conclusion  
 
1- The new „Euro-markets‟ and the institutional politics of distrust  
 
The focus and the structure of the administrative state of the EU have evolved considerably during the 
last two decades. The Union has become much more closely connected with the regulation of highly 
specialised products and dynamic markets. That has implied both substantive and institutional shifts. 
Europe is doing new types of things, and is doing them through different bodies, actors and tools. 
From the late 1990s, that transformation was particularly visible in the scientific assessment of „risks‟ 
and to a large extent reflected the wider impacts of the BSE crisis. There were fears about the Union‟s 
independence, credibility and capacity as a regulator and manager of complex risks. It was hence felt 
necessary to „update‟ the institutional settings and ensure that the decisions that were being taken on 
the products benefited from the best possible technical advice. More recently, the concerns of the 
new administrative state seem to have turned towards a new type of market. Here, the lessons of the 
subprime crisis of 2008 are perhaps more important to understand the reasons for having more 
agencies and their interest in sectors which are highly networked. The issues with these markets is 
not just that products have to be “safe” and therefore considered by experts; it is also that the level of 
economic and financial interdependency has become so strong that more intense links between the 
Member States and their administrations have to be organised. Be it the third, fourth or fifth 
generation of (EU) agencies, the relevant point is that the markets which concern these bodies are of 
a much more dynamic and fluid nature. In such a context, it is hardly surprising that the EU has now 
created over thirty regulatory agencies, that their number keeps growing, and that the powers of these 
bodies are also becoming more significant.  
 
The new administrative state has also grown alongside European comitology, not replaced it. The EU 
not only has more agencies than it had twenty years ago, it also has many more committees. The 
notion that the agencies supplement the „old‟ administrative state might suggest two things. The first 
is that the agencies in fact do something that is substantially different from the EU committees‟ work; 
they engage with new problems and organise particular forms of social and technocratic interaction. 
The new administrative state (one might say) has consequently become important in its own right. On 
the other hand, it is also tempting to see the EU agencies as a further layer of a supranational 
bureaucracy on the rise. Agencies imply more, not less, EU government. While the first (internal) 
perspective suggests that the agencies are unique and that the controls on them might have to be 
different, the second point stresses that the more general challenge is to understand how 
administrative law should approach underworld technical structures which are bound to have their 
own dynamics and generate new problems.  
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The emergence of the new administrative state is also linked to problems of institutional trust, both 
within the Union‟s institutional framework and between the Member States‟ administrations. This 
politics of distrust (we shall say) increases the appetite for EU regulatory agencies. With respect to 
the Union‟s own issues of inter-institutional trust, at least since the Santer scandals and the food 
scares of the 1990s (mentioned above) there has been a clear discomfort in the European Parliament 
and the Council with respect to extending the regulatory competences of the Commission. Whereas 
the Commission had once been seen as an essentially capable, impartial and technically competent 
administrator, the perception today is different and it stresses a view of this institution as a self-
interested bureaucracy which has become more politicized and prone to capture.
804
 The lack of 
confidence in the Commission, which is critical to understanding the role of modern EU agencies, is 
contemporary to problems of trust between national administrations. Mutual recognition between 
national regulatory processes has not worked, and that also explains why EU regulatory agencies 
have become necessary.
805
 One of the flaws in current reflections on EU agencies is the underplaying 
of these national conflicts. We are told that the supranational technocratic structures allow Europe to 
lay aside social and institutional tensions which had previously blocked the political integration 
process.
806
 The EU regulatory expert is portrayed, here, as committed solely to his own technical 
know-how and ethics. This position (which protects the Commission and exacerbates the differences 
between the EU political and technocratic worlds) overlooks that the „former‟ conflicts might not go 
away by engaging in institutional engineering. It has also deviated attention from the pluralism of the 
institutional concerns within the EU agencies.  
 
2- Problems for European regulatory capacity 
 
The complex nature of the (new) euro-markets has placed strong demands on the capacity of the EU 
regulatory agencies to address the new challenges. We have seen that there are two inter-related 
types of issues with regard to this theme of European regulatory capacity: the resources (human, 
financial and institutional) which are needed to perform the technical work, and the nature of the 
relationship with more dynamic and fluid areas. Whereas „resources‟ essentially refers to the 
manpower and to the physical means which are necessary to carry out the regulatory activities, 
„dynamic markets‟ emphasise that the problems here are more unpredictable, vary from one sector to 
the next and that the public administration will then reflect this „liquidity‟. European regulatory 
agencies have limited internal resources. Their secretariats are small and the agencies structure more 
or less decentralised forms of interaction between the national competent authorities. This makes the 
agencies more dependent on the Member States for resources and makes them more vulnerable to 
external „capture‟ by third parties.  
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The internal capacity constraints of EU regulatory agencies implies that much of the work has to be 
outsourced (through contracts) to the national authorities. It is interesting that this is so, for the 
general perception is that the agencies were created precisely to allow the Commission to outsource 
technical tasks which could be better organised by specialised bodies. These „power cascades‟ would 
suggest that it is becoming ever more difficult to control the exercise of this power. One of the 
paradoxes about the EU regulatory systems is that they may increase national regulatory 
responsibilities. Whereas one would expect that national regulatory capacities would be put under 
less pressure after an EU structure had been created, often the opposite happens and problems of 
national regulatory capacity can emerge. The power seems to be being „pushed away‟ from the EU 
regulatory agencies (by the agencies themselves), in many different directions and with varying levels 
of intensity and that then creates a challenge in terms of how we can get hold of it. 
 
If the EU agencies lack resources, the issue is not only whether and how institutionalised national 
interests can benefit; it is also that internal capacity constraints increase the reliance on the dynamics 
of the sector. There is an issue there about the possibly excessive level of proximity with the dominant 
forces of the market and how that can negatively affect „smaller‟, underrepresented interests. The 
nature and intensity of such problems may vary (to be sure) depending on the type of task which is 
being pursued, the structure of the industry or the particular market context. At the same time, the 
fluidity of the new euro-markets would stress that the quality of the internal deliberation can be 
problematic, that it may be difficult to ensure „checks and balances‟ within the process and that 
balanced communication between the experts (and the experts and the markets) can be complicated. 
Last but not least, there is a danger that the capacity constraints of EU agencies can put the 
effectiveness of the regulatory policies at risk. Those (institutional) limitations beg questions about the 
current powers and tools of EU regulatory agencies and whether they allow them to properly fulfil their 
technical mission and „to deliver‟.  
 
3- Principles of fluid administrative law 
 
In view of the dynamic, capacity-related dysfunctions, additional external and static formal constraints 
on the new administrative state will hardly help to improve things. Such proposals do not connect to 
the fluidity of the new administrative power and the problems it creates. Alternatively, having a set of 
constant administrative law principles to coordinate the operation of the agencies could be 
envisioned. These principles would seek to ensure that the dynamism and unpredictability of the new 
administrative state still holds a place for law in subjecting that fluidity to certain norms and values.  
 
Fluid administrative law can hence be better understood as a set of values and an institutional 
framework that gives „life‟ to those values. It stands in opposition to a static vision of administrative 
law. „Static administrative law‟ may therefore be read as a conception of the organisation and control 
of the public administration which articulates three basic points: the direct association between formal 
administrative procedures and the dynamics emerging from the latter; the assumption that 
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administrative law problems can be understood a priori and that we have the instruments necessary 
to anticipate the type of risks which will be involved in particular institutional arrangements; and the 
underplaying of the process of European (administrative) integration as a phenomenon generating 
new institutional concerns related to the workings of the public administration. It is the resonance of 
static administrative law which, to an important extent, helps explain the current insistence on more 
judicial, political or parliamentary controls on EU agencies.  
 
Principles of fluid administrative law therefore seek to identify and inject dynamic controls in the new 
administrative state. In EU comitology such controls exist. Fears about institutional drift and 
democratic accountability in those settings have also been followed by a better understanding of the 
new forms of „checks and balances‟ emerging from the operation of those systems.
807
 With respect to 
the agencies, however, the dynamic checks on them are more undeveloped. Agencies require a 
greater emphasis on regulatory capacity, which also creates new problems. They are less based on 
open political argument, more reliant on expertise and technical resources, and organise links with the 
sector which have acquired significantly higher levels of intensity. The subsequent paragraphs 
therefore distinguish between (and develop) four fluid principles: internal process, external 
justification, commitment to pluralism and policy effectiveness. These principles will put pressure on 
the dynamics of the new administrative state and contain the existing institutional risks. The important 
point about the fluid law principles (whether we are talking about these particular four principles, or 
envisioning new ones) is that they have to go beyond the static imposition of certain administrative 
law „goods‟ (e.g. transparency or participation). That, in itself, does not recognise the fluid nature of 
the new administrative state nor does it say why that dynamism should be regulated.  
 
(i) Internal process 
 
The internal process principle reflects a concern that institutions follow their own rules of procedure. 
Regulatory agencies, like other EU bodies, have to abide by certain internal procedures when they act 
and decide things. Those rules are either defined by the Regulation establishing the agency or 
through the latter‟s processes (via its management structures, for example). Internal procedures 
include norms on how decisions are adopted and the requirements of the agencies in that context. 
There are a number of reasons why we would want agencies to stick to their internal procedures. 
First, these ensure that a number of „checks and balances‟ within the decision-making process are 
maintained. They also provide safeguards for third parties as to how institutional decisions are 
taken.
808
 Internal process provides, in addition, more material for external controls on the public 
administration. It seeks to ensure that the commitment to a particular institutional order may illuminate 
external actors about what the concerns and the alternatives are. Finally, the internal process 
principle stabilises expectations; it creates a belief outside the institution that matters will be handled 
in a certain way.    
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The fluid administrative state raises a question about how, and whether, internal rules of procedure 
effectively constrain the operation of the agencies. There is a risk that the dynamics of the agencies 
might escape some of these restrictions and create new problems. According to the case-law of the 
Courts, internal rules of procedure set out a particular way in which the relevant institution is to 
behave and respect for those procedures is important.
809
 Meanwhile, it is accepted that rules of 
internal process are not sacrosanct. The General Court has noted that wider concerns, namely of 
capacity, might have to be taken into account when considering whether an institution has 
disrespected own rules of procedure.
810
 Even if, for example, the internal rules of an agency state that 
an external expert has to be consulted when certain “important” decisions are taken, that agency 
might not be able to ensure that it will always find someone who will be willing or able to comment on 
the matter. However, the principle also produces a set of duties of justification on the institution.
811
 
Accordingly, (in a similar case) the same agency could still be asked to show that it has made a 
serious effort to find an external expert which might be interested in, and capable of, commenting on 
the issue under consideration. In this way (we shall see) the principle of internal process connects to 
the „next‟ one (i.e. external justification). Fluid administrative law therefore suggests that non-
compliance with internal procedures may be particularly problematic if it collides with any of the other 
three fluid principles (considered below): external justification, commitment to pluralism and policy 
effectiveness. That is not to say, however, that the internal process principle can be subsumed in 
those other values. The advantage of this principle is precisely that it emphasises the importance of 
the internal process and (as such) it generates its own duties for the concerned institution.  
 
(ii) External justification 
 
The principle of external justification places a duty on the new administrative state to give reasons for 
its decisions. The duty to give reasons for EU “legal acts” is regulated by Article 296(2) TFEU,
812
 and 
is also mentioned in Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (in more general 
and open terms, under the „right to good administration‟).
813
 External justification imposes 
requirements on the new administrative state to explain why it has done things in a certain way, to be 
questioned by those affected by its power and to be responsible for the reasons which it offers. This 
allows external actors or patrols to understand the institution and its motives in a given case and it 
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enables litigation.
814
 But external justification also establishes a dynamic relationship between the new 
administrative state and those to whom reasons have been given. As such, the duty to give reasons is 
an important part of Bovens‟ understanding of accountability, which he sees as “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his or her 
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement and the actor may face 
consequences.”
815
 External justification will therefore be important if it becomes an instrument of 
dialogue between the new administrative state and those affected by its power, “a commitment to do 
more than merely talk”.
816
  
 
The EU legal system, however, does very little to require such an effort from the authorities. The 
case-law of the Courts holds a very narrow understanding of the duty to give reasons under EU 
law.
817
 Reasons are only seen as a way to understand the administrative decision, which is a way to 
play down the importance of an exchange of views and responsiveness between the new 
administrative state and those with which it interacts.
818
 There is also an issue about the link between 
the nature of external justification and the effects that public measures have on third parties. It is 
unclear, for example, whether the duty to give reasons (currently) provides a third party with the right 
to be heard in a given case before a decision on the matter which concerns him or her is adopted.
819
 
This is only required, it appears, where “restrictive measures are taken against the actors in 
question.”
820
 The new administrative state will therefore be let off in a vast range of cases where its 
measures have a significant and negative impact on third parties without necessarily referring to that 
particular actor. Fluid administrative law proposes a more dynamic way of ascertaining where (and 
how) the duty to give reasons should be protected, and to what extent it should be so. Attention 
should be given to external justification not merely as a communication or dialogue-enhancing device, 
but equally as a principle which requires the administrative authorities to make a strong case in favour 
of whatever solution they consider appropriate. While it is clear that expecting the Courts to adjudicate 
on all sorts of conflicts between new administrative state and the concerned actors would carry the 
danger of shifting power to the judiciary without solving the important problem,
821
 external justification 
(fluid) might also offer new institutional opportunities to structure and promote more responsive forms 
of EU public administration (see below). It is very important that the duty to give reasons may find a 
solid place in the context of a complex administrative state which is also concerned with other fluid 
principles and values.     
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(iii) Commitment to pluralism 
 
The principle of „commitment to pluralism‟ (or duty to take on board diffuse interests) considers who 
the new administrative state interacts with, whose views are being considered by its structures and to 
what extent so. It comes with the idea that it is not good if only certain groups or interests are included 
in the process while the concerns of others, neglected. An effort to accommodate diffuse interests 
also makes institutions (more) internally reflexive. They have to reconsider entrenched ideas and 
assumptions; think about new ways of addressing the relevant issues. Commitment to pluralism 
underlines a risk that well-organised interests might end up exerting undue influence over the new 
administrative state, that the latter‟s policies might become confused with those of particular 
constituencies, losing sight of the general public interest. The new administrative state also creates 
new problems of institutional pluralism. EU agencies include twenty-seven different national 
competent authorities (each of which represents certain groups or has own views about the 
problems). There is a concern about the pluralism of those interactions as well.  
 
EU law has not always had an easy relationship with this principle. In European standardisation 
processes, for example, there have been significant concerns about the “domination [of those] 
procedures by industry and the lack of constitutional guarantees”.
822
 Here, consumer interests are 
represented before CEN (the largest European standardisation body) through ANEC (European 
Association for the Coordination of Consumer Representation), which sits (but does not vote) on the 
Technical Board of CEN.
823
 While ANEC tends to take advantage of these opportunities and submit 
opinions;
824
 it is unclear that this is enough to ensure a strong commitment to pluralism.
825
 Similar 
issues might confront stakeholder groups within EU agencies. Those fora will normally be sensitive to 
the interests of consumers, small and medium enterprises, users of the products, etc. The existence 
of those structures, the increasing provision for consultation with them and even their growing 
activism (see below) might not be sufficient, however, to ensure that the institutional systems in fact 
take on board a wider range of interests. If that is so, a „better‟ effort towards pluralism may have to 
be required from the authorities. The important challenge may lie in the institutional capacity to 
ascertain where, how and to what extent pluralistic values ought to be promoted in the operation of 
particular systems and how the mechanics of that relationship might have to work in order to be 
productive.
826
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(iv) Securing policy effectiveness  
 
EU regulatory agencies are created to pursue certain policy goals (the EU medicines agency seeks to 
protect the health of patients and contribute to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry; the 
chemicals regulator should be able to evaluate and act upon the risks of chemical substances; the 
European aviation agency has to make sure that the new plane models meet safety requirements, 
etc). „Securing policy effectiveness‟ emphasises that it is important that the agencies have the 
institutional ability to carry out the mission which they were created to perform and notes that internal 
capacity constraints can be an obstacle in that context. This fluid principle further suggests that the 
challenge here is not simply to constrain the power of EU regulatory agencies; it is also to enable 
them to (if required) acquire the powers or be granted the tools which are necessary to fulfil EU 
regulatory programmes and initiatives.
827
 „Policy effectiveness‟ can be called into question (with 
particular intensity at least) if the existing problem of capacity is not confined to the agency itself but 
also extends to the EU regulatory system, which surrounds it. In cases where it is not possible (or 
desirable) to outsource tasks to the national authorities and an EU regulatory agency lacks resources, 
there is a danger that these bodies might underperform. In cases where one may observe serious 
obstacles to the accomplishment of the central regulatory objectives of the agency, „securing policy 
effectiveness‟ would then stress that the structure, powers and modus operandi of that body should 
be reassessed. Moreover, „securing policy effectiveness‟ can equally be put at risk if the policy itself is 
wrong (regardless of existing capacity constraints). This fluid principle therefore raises issues about 
reform of the agencies‟ regulatory procedures. With regard to capacity constraints, it suggests that 
there may be room for institutional creativity and it can be possible to do more with a similar level of 
internal resources. Moreover, „securing policy effectiveness‟ is equally concerned with the institutional 
effects of the regulatory underperformance. It draws attention to the fact that in situations where the 
internal capacity constraints are very strong (and the work cannot be „shipped out‟), new dynamic 
dysfunctions may emerge if the agencies then start to engage in some kind of legal or policy 
entrepreneurship to get around the existing problems. Consequently, while „policy effectiveness‟ 
accepts that feeble regulatory systems should not remain stuck in their own weaknesses, there are 
still questions about the way in which this is done. 
 
4- Case-studies: dynamic institutional problems and controls 
 
Having examined the four principles of fluid administrative law, the next step is to consider how these 
should be applied in each of the case-studies (agencies) and what kind of institutional „solutions‟ 
could then be supported if we follow this approach. The thing about EU regulatory agencies, we have 
seen, is that they generate different types of problems. There is not a single set of institutional 
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dysfunctions to be „attacked‟, but rather a plurality of dynamics and of institutional risks. Some of 
these issues may be particularly pressing from the viewpoint of policy effectiveness. Others raise 
questions about the integrity of the internal process. Another possibility is that the difficulty lies 
essentially with external justification or with the level of commitment to pluralism. As such, the 
„solution‟ to each agency‟s problem should have to be designed in accordance with its particular 
features and challenges. The link between the different proposals is provided by the existence of 
constant administrative law principles, as considered above. The fluid principles ensure that the 
different directions in which the dynamic controls may have to go are nevertheless united by a 
common set of ideas and values.  
 
Moreover, the problems which the agencies create are unpredictable. They are only revealed through 
experience. That raises two sets of problems. First, it is doubtful that administrative law will be able to 
predict the risks that each agency will create (or at least there is a high degree of speculation in that 
exercise). Secondly, the fluid administrative state raises questions about the most appropriate way of 
structuring the fluid controls, institutionally. Fluid administrative law can be highly advantageous in this 
context since it has the openness to different sets of institutional concerns while it is sensitive to the 
mechanics of dynamic controls‟ design. It provides both a core set of administrative law values that 
have to be protected in the new administrative state and the institutional instruments to regulate their 
implementation (see below). Finally, fluid law is not only about imposing certain principles, in isolation, 
on the workings of the new administrative state. It also requires a dynamic relationship between these 
principles and communication between the aims which they mean to advance. It provides a 
framework that can be used to understand the existing institutional risks, organise controls and reflect 
on the benefits and limits of different solutions.   
 
(i) EMA: the lack of an internal process 
 
The European Medicines Agency (EMA) faces an internal process problem. The power of the 
Rapporteur is too difficult to control and the checks and balances within the process become diluted. 
There is a lack of internal pluralism in this system and the procedures lack vitality. Ultimately, this 
dynamic raises the danger that the quality of expertise produced by the Agency becomes lower due to 
internal dysfunctions. A fluid law proposal has to take these risks into account and consider how (and 
to what extent) the internal process may be reinvigorated. It is suggested that, with regard to this 
agency, dynamic controls be performed via the European Ombudsman. The intervention of the 
Ombudsman is (under these institutional conditions) arguably the most appropriate way of 
recalibrating the deliberative process and strengthening the procedures. This would work in two ways. 
First, the own investigation of the Ombudsman puts more pressure on the Rapporteur. Where this 
happens, internal controls are not reinvented but the responsibility of the more influential player 
increases. In this way, internal process becomes connected with the principle external justification 
(duty to give reasons). Secondly, the Ombudsman acts as an outside pressure that gives new energy 
to the internal procedures (and particularly to the aims which they seek to protect). The Ombudsman 
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inquiry will ask the EMA to rethink its handling of the dossier and that allows the scientific committee 
to get a stronger hold of the process. It is therefore not about having new procedures with more 
controls which will not work, but instead providing the opportunity to restate the importance of 
institutional pluralism in this decision-making. As such, the role of the Ombudsman brings the fluid 
principle of internal process and of commitment to pluralism closer. Pluralism, here, reflects the 
concern that weaker institutional interests and actors may become active players and have a say in 
these decisions. The link between pluralism and internal process also puts pressure on the notion that 
the problems of the new administrative state will not be solved by creating ever more controls within 
the process. With respect to the EMA, we saw that the real control (in the centralised procedure) has 
been the Member State Co-Rapporteur (which also evaluates the product, independently from the 
Rapporteur). There is, therefore, a certain degree of „internal process‟ in this deliberative model (when 
the two Rapporteurs talk to each other), but we should try to make sure that other actors are also 
invited to participate. Also, there is an issue about the negative impacts on policy that other types of 
proposals could involve. Increasing the time that the scientific committee has to review the 
assessment of the Rapporteur, for example, might allow for rebalancing within the process, for 
example, but that would also raise questions about the wider impacts of a slower decision-making 
system. The important point, to conclude, is that the fluid law recommends a „solution‟ which not only 
seeks to reinforce the internal procedures which have lost vitality (that narrow focus is a recipe for a 
failed new control) but that also looks to the principles of external justification, commitment to 
pluralism and securing policy effectiveness for inspiration.   
 
(ii) ECHA: insufficient resources 
 
The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) confronts a challenge of policy effectiveness which has 
important impacts on its internal process. The failures of the registration system and the incapacity to 
control this through own resources have generated a dysfunction in the way that procedures are 
used. In particular, the authorisation process, which was meant to assess whether particularly 
dangerous substances should remain on the market, has acquired a more expansive role and is 
strongly relied on for fact-finding purposes. There are also problems (and limits) as to the extent to 
which the system can support „more authorisations‟; and this is hardly a viable option to normally deal 
with uncertainty about the existing chemicals, their uses and risks. A solution to these difficulties 
therefore has to give priority to „securing policy effectiveness‟ and to the protection of the internal 
process as a form of stabilising expectations and preventing institutional malfunctions.  
 
The first important thing would be to integrate other external capacities in the system. The ECHA 
could, in particular, rely on environmental NGOs to serve as patrols and support the Agency in the 
review of the industry registration dossiers and the missing data. The environmental patrols do not 
displace the basic authority of the Agency in the performance of this work, but inject new capabilities 
and energy in the system. One way to organise this collaboration would be to grant access to the data 
to the environmental group (or groups) and allow them, at the end, to attach an opinion on the 
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relevant file and concerning the data that is possibly missing. This would involve a change to the 
internal process as it currently stands but seeks to protect the stability of the objectives which the 
procedures are meant to ensure (namely that industry provides the data and that the EU regulatory 
process checks this and acts upon the risks). Still, it is clear that policy effectiveness can only be 
promoted (and the internal process „restored‟) if companies in fact supply more data on their 
substances. More internal resources, alone, might not solve the problem. It can consequently be 
proposed that the Commission be given the power to fine companies which have consistently and 
repeatedly failed to provide the data or shown lack of a credible effort to acquire that information and 
supply it to the Agency. The Commission would have to receive the files from the Agency (with the 
opinions of the NGOs attached) and take a decision on whether a particular company should be fined 
for failure to provide mandatory data. This model conforms well to „policy effectiveness‟ by increasing 
the pressure on the industry to fulfil its obligations. If that happens, the internal process would also 
have been restored. Finally, this solution also connects to „commitment to pluralism‟ and „external 
justification‟. With regard to the former, the reformed model would be better at taking on board the 
interests of actors which are concerned by this regulatory process but nevertheless have little 
institutional expression in its operation. The commitment to pluralism does not appear here through 
the perspective of a deliberative process that needs fixing. Instead, what is at stake is the openness 
of the new administrative state vis-à-vis practical contributions of diffuse interests that can benefit the 
public interest. Secondly, the reformed structures would equally be beneficial from the angle of 
external justification. The use of the authorisation procedure, it would be made clear, would only be 
used if (really) no other alternative could be found. That increases the bond of responsibility between 
the new administrative state and those affected by its power.   
 
(iii) CESR/ESMA and EASA: use of external capacities  
 
The financial services and aviation case-studies emphasise problems related to external justification 
and commitment to pluralism in the new administrative state. Both of these agencies rely, to an 
important extent, on external capacities (sector/industry), which raises issues about „capture‟ and 
undue influences in the operation of these regulatory systems. It also questions their promise of a 
politics of inclusiveness. Certainly, the nature of the challenges in these two sectors is not exactly the 
same. Whereas in the aviation type-certification procedures the agency deals with a specific industrial 
programme (external checks on this are inevitably limited to a few market or institutional actors), in 
financial services the range of interests concerned by ESMA‟s technical standards will understandably 
be higher. The important point, however, is that in both cases there are questions about how the 
relationship with the market works, what the level of public justification is and how the diffuse interests 
are (and should be) integrated in the decision-making.   
 
The issue with European Aviation Safety Agency is that it has to work in the context of the constraints 
of particular industrial programmes, which are extremely complex and mostly concern the applicant. 
There is a strong case, still, for having more extensive consultations within the EASA type-certification 
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procedures (i.e. obligatory consultation of all „special conditions‟). It is about opening up the process 
where possible and forcing the regulator to provide reasons for its decisions. To be fair, more 
consultation does not necessarily imply better external justification. The duty to give reasons would 
also call for a true dialogue whereby the EASA has to respond to the comments it receives (which the 
Agency already does when consultation takes place). This proposal is also meant to ensure that an 
idea of internal process is protected. The current process of the EASA allows for some consultation 
and requires that the Panel of Experts comment on the important type-certification decisions. In 
practice, however, the system tends to ignore these procedures and this „solution‟ addresses that 
challenge by asking the EASA to consult always. The promotion of pluralism under these conditions is 
particularly challenging. Fluid administrative law suggests that the commitment to take on board 
diffuse interests ought to be read in the context of other fluid principles (e.g. securing policy 
effectiveness) without forgetting about its fundamental dynamic demands. Policy effectiveness would 
indicate, in particular, that there are issues about (the possible level of) inclusiveness in the context of 
highly complex industrial programmes which have to address very serious safety concerns. In 
conclusion, fluid administrative law finds space for the requirement of more extensive consultation 
and could demand, in addition, that (during consultation) parties may call on the Panel of Experts to 
review the EASA team‟s performance where it is considered that there has been a clear failure to 
address an important issue of safety in the context of a type-certification programme. That would also 
give „policy effectiveness‟ a more positive (and not only restrictive) role in the definition of the dynamic 
administrative controls.       
 
With respect to ESMA, there are signs that following the introduction of the Securities and Markets 
Stakeholder Group, consultation is becoming more important and consumer interests (i.e. FIN-USE)  
are now more active in that process.
828
 It is very doubtful, however, that by simply having more 
consultation, the process will become more responsive or inclusive. It is therefore proposed that the 
ESMA Stakeholder Group be „given‟ a limited number of yellow and red „cards‟ to use in the course of 
the consultations. A „yellow card‟ would imply that ESMA takes „the utmost account‟ of the opinion of 
the stakeholder group. A „red card‟, on the other hand, means that ESMA cannot propose the 
technical standards and has to present a revised version to the Stakeholder Group which takes into 
account the concerns expressed during consultation. The ESMA can then propose the measures 
provided that the Stakeholder Group gives green light to them and withdraws the „red card‟. The new 
powers of the stakeholder group are hence about having a stronger policeman in the deliberative 
process. This proposal is highly advantageous with respect to external justification. It fosters an 
effective communication and dialogue between the new administrative state and those affected by its 
power. It also suggests that the duty to give reasons may (at least under particular circumstances and 
where the risks of capture are very high) have to imply that the agencies make a very strong case in 
favour of their positions. This model would also be more pluralistic and have to show more 
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commitment towards the integration of diffuse interests. With respect to the policy effectiveness 
principle, there appears to be a paradox in the proposed solution. While it arguably favours the 
objective of a higher level of consumer protection, there is also a risk that these „red cards‟ may 
threaten other policy objectives which are also important. To escape this risk, the system could allow 
the ESMA to go ahead with the envisioned draft measures if it can show that these are of 
fundamental importance and urgent.  
 
5- Structuring dynamic controls over time: the benefits of a new agency to apply the fluid law 
principles   
 
The fact that we need all these different solutions in each regulatory agency (as considered above) 
shows how fluid administrative law has to be in order to deal with the problems of the new 
administrative state. This heterogeneity of solutions then raises issues with respect to the design and 
application of the latter. Importantly, in accordance with their founding Regulations, EU agencies have 
to be reviewed after a certain period (usually three years but it may be more).
829
 The institutional 
shape of the review model also varies. Concerning the agencies examined in this thesis: the 
European Medicines Agency and the European Markets and Securities Authority are reviewed by the 
Commission, the review of the operation of the European Aviation Safety is carried out by consultancy 
groups, and the European Chemicals Agency performs its own review.
830
 In addition, regardless of 
the institution responsible for the review, the system is very open and unclear about what this 
evaluation is about and in accordance with which criteria are the agencies being assessed. Usually, 
the review of the agencies is used to consider the experience with the application of the relevant 
regulatory regime (e.g. REACH, in the chemicals sector), while in other sectors (e.g. aviation), the 
review procedure also looks at the internal practices of the agencies and their working procedures. 
The assessment of the internal practices of agencies is seen, here, from the perspective of efficiency 
and taking into account the overall objectives of the EU regulatory programmes. It holds a narrow 
minded focus on policy effectiveness and disregards other types of institutional concerns.  
 
If we look back at the four principles of fluid administrative law considered above, this is an 
unsatisfactory situation. As the problems which EU agencies create are highly dynamic in nature, that 
is, only after there has been some degree of experience with their operation it is possible to 
understand the existing challenges and capacity constraints; the review process of the agencies 
would be a very good opportunity to address those (four) issues. It offers unique conditions to both 
understand the nature of the new administrative power and structure dynamic controls. In order to 
pursue that objective effectively, the institutional capacity of the EU review system is important. It is 
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therefore proposed that a new EU agency be created to fill that gap. This agency with be responsible 
for the review of EU regulatory agencies and would be asked to (in the context of those reviews) 
submit proposals for each agency in accordance with the (four) fluid administrative law principles. The 
new agency could integrate highly qualified public servants with expertise in administrative law, 
regulatory policy, economics as well as sector-specific experts for each EU agency. It should be able 
to take hearings, pursue own research and carry out reviews on its own initiative. The new „super-
agency‟ proposed here should not have to be a very expensive and big structure. It would be possible 
to generate the capacity to perform this type of mission without spending too much EU money and by 
also relying on contributions from national officials.  
 
The new agency would ensure dedication to the study of fluid institutional risks. We have seen that 
there are, in fact, some dynamic controls in the new administrative state but this is undeveloped and 
the structure of these checks lacks overall vision and coherence from an administrative law 
perspective. There is currently a lack of legal instruments to assess and organise fluid controls in the 
new administrative state, and the result of that has also been the insistence on external and static 
checks on the EU agencies. In their analysis of „real‟ EU accountability, Curtin, Bovens and Hart note 
that counterterrorism experts and crime fighters “are fond of saying that it takes a network to catch a 
network” only to then come to terms with the idea that “from an accountability perspective the 
simultaneous dispersal of both actors and forums into networks creates a whole new set of 
challenges.”
831
 Instead of a „network to catch a network‟, fluid law stresses that we need a new 
institutional system to get hold of the dynamic administrative state.     
 
The creation of a new agency to police the EU regulatory agencies raises a guardianship-type 
question: who will be guarding the new guardian?
832
 It has been noted elsewhere that one of the 
problems about guardianship “is that we tend to deal with failures of trust by accumulating more and 
more layers of guardianship”, and the creation of a new agency may be seen as reflecting a similar 
tension.
833
 However, having a „new guardian‟ has clear advantages in this context. The control of the 
new agency could be addressed much more easily; it would hardly raise the plural and unpredictable 
type of problems that we see in the new administrative state. Still, the new agency should also have 
to comply with the fluid principles (considered above) and could perhaps report to the Commission on 
this, namely in the context of its own review process.  
 
Finally, the proposal to create a new EU agency to police the regulatory agencies begs questions with 
regard to its institutional content and how it relates to European integration more generally. This 
thesis began by underlining an important difference between the nature, structure and purpose of 
                                                          
831
 M. Bovens, D. Curtin, P. Hart (eds.), The Real world of EU Accountability: What Deficit?, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 
192  
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 Supra 821, [Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians, 1988]   
833
 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford University Press, 1992, 
p. 57. See also: S. Shapiro, The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 93, No. 3, 1987, pp. 
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national regulatory agencies and the „EU version‟ of these bodies. In this way, it was attempted to 
underline a fundamental distinction between the dynamics of national regulatory or administrative 
processes and the particular rhythm, characteristics and problems which the new administrative state 
of the EU faces (and how that affects the problem of „control‟). There is still an issue, however, about 
whether (and why) the EU should be worried about this. Part of the answer may be in the notion that 
there is a strong link between the nature of the EU and the importance of institutional challenge and 
experimentation. One of the defining characteristics of the EU is that because its existence is 
„questioned every day‟ there is a pressure to engage with new experiments and ideas which (it is 
thought) will secure higher levels of public acceptability and recognition. There is a sense of ongoing 
self-doubt in the Union which, while carrying its own problems, makes us always look for better 
institutional alternatives and reforms. Fluid administrative law is an example of this. It is not just that in 
national contexts the new administrative state is less fluid. It is also that because we have novel 
European institutional structures, there is an attempt to conceive new ways of dealing with problems 
that, in some way or another, are also not completely foreign to national democratic processes. 
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